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vForeword
In February 2007, the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) 
held a meeting of local government and social service experts to brainstorm on possible 
areas of support for education, healthcare, and social welfare. The purpose was to better 
focus LGI’s actions on the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of decentralized service provision 
while, at the same time, keeping the programs within the goals and values of the Open 
Society Institute. Some of the possible areas of concern were: education provision in rural 
areas, rural municipalities and their ﬁscal and management capacities, intergovernmental 
transfers and taxation as sources of municipal revenues (in weaker municipalities), and 
the provision of capacity-building programs in Budapest in cooperation with the Central 
European University.
One of the areas that LGI chose to focus on after the meeting was rural municipalities 
and submunicipal governments (or neighborhood governments). The current publica-
tion is the result of research on neighborhood government structures in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Poland. The studies in this volume present common 
topics like the forms and functions of neighborhood governments;  critical assessments 
of in-country models, focusing on accountability and public service eﬃciency; and 
proposals on future policy advice and capacity development. 
The overall goal of the project was to strengthen local governments and national 
decentralization programs by sharing information and speciﬁc details on the func-
tioning of community-based governments. The project commenced with the studies 
commissioned in South Eastern Europe. LGI also selected the case of Poland, a highly 
decentralized country with relatively large local governments that traditionally have 
had strong submunicipalities. The case was relevant to the argument since the Polish 
solectwo (submunicipal level) enjoys a stable status and is an example of how citizens 
can actively participate in the decision-making process of their communities as well as 
in the monitoring and transparency actions of larger municipalities.
LGI’s aim was to critically assess the ﬁndings of the available reports by focusing on 
two basic issues: accountability and service eﬃciency. Each case study was presented at a 
regional workshop in Budapest and two follow-up projects were discussed—one on the 
kmetstva in Bulgaria as well as one on the mesna zajednica in Macedonia—that would 
focus on clarifying the legal and ﬁscal status of these neighborhood governments and 
on citizen’s participation and accountability.
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Readers might ﬁnd the studies useful for understanding the problems of fragmented 
municipalities and planning amalgamation reforms (e.g., Hungary), or countries where 
similar-size local governments exist and traditions of community governance prevail, but 
decentralization reforms still have not been launched (e.g., in Central Asia). This volume 
is part of an ongoing program of activities by LGI and other donors that intends to equip 
the actors of central and local public service management with the necessary knowledge 
and skills that enable them to address the problems of rural municipalities.
LGI hopes that Mind Your Own Business! will be a guide for researchers and 
academics working on public administration reform, governance, and public services, 
while practitioners and policymakers also may beneﬁt from the lessons in this volume 
that may serve as a good basis for deciding what types of interventions and policies at 
the rural level in the respective countries.
LGI also would like to acknowledge the hard work of all the contributors, reviewers, 
and colleagues who helped with this volume. 
Irina Faion
Senior Project Manager
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative
October 2008
vii
List of Contributors
Reuf Bajrovic received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from University of Louisville 
in the United States. In 2001, he completed his M.A. in Human Rights and Democracy 
from the University of Sarajevo and the University of Bologna. In 2002, he completed 
another M.A. in Governance and Policy of European Integration at the Univeristy of 
Bologna. Since, he has worked on human rights-based assessment and development at 
the municipal level. He also was a member of the Executive Board of ACIPS. At present 
he runs Method, a Sarajevo-based consulting company that provides advice on public 
relations, media monitoring, policy, and marketing for clients.
Marta Derek, Ph.D. in Economic Geography. Since 2008 she has been assistant 
professor at the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw. She 
is interested in local development and local government as well as in the geography of 
tourism. She is akso the author of many articles in books and journals concerning tourism 
as a factor of local development and the ﬁnancial health of tourist municipalities.
Tatjana Pavlovic Krizanic is a deputy team leader with the Policy Reform Team of the 
USAID’s Municipal Economic Growth Activity in Belgrade. She graduated with a 
Bachelor of Law (LL.B.) in 1988 from Belgrade University Faculty of Law. She holds an 
LL.M. from the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest. She is the author of 
several books, commentaries to Serbian laws, regulations, and numerous publications 
in the ﬁelds of public administration, local self-governance, and human rights law.
Adam Mielczarek is a sociologist unaﬃliated with any academic institution. His areas 
of interest are the current practice of Polish local government and the impact of the 
“Solidarity” tradition in contemporary Poland. He is the author of, among others, 
Ministers of European Gifts, Scholar 2008 (co-author); Sleeping Knights. Rank-and-ﬁle 
Activists of the Warsaw Underground Publishing Movement. Stowarzyszenie Wolnego 
Słowa, 2006; Unequal Coalitions–Urban Leaders in Search of a New Model of Development 
Management, Scholar 2004 (co-author).
viii
M I N D  Y O U R  O W N  B U S I N E S S !
Gábor Péteri has a Ph.D. in Economics. He started his career at the City of Budapest, 
Planning and Economic Department. After working a decade for the Hungarian Institute 
of Public Administration, later he was a freelance consultant on several projects with 
the British Know How Fund, USAID, and the World Bank in Hungary. Since 1999 
he was the research director position of the Local Government and Public Service 
Reform Initiative (LGI) of the Open Society Institute-Budapest. Presently he works as 
a consultant, and he is the executive director of LGI Development Ltd., a nonproﬁt 
consulting company, aﬃliated with the Open Society Network. He has published exten-
sively on local government ﬁnances, ﬁnancial management, and policy formulation on 
local government reforms.
Emil Savov has an M.A. in Accounting and Audit and more than 15 years professional 
experience in local governance, both as a municipal oﬃcial and a technical adviser. He 
worked for the USAID Local Governance Initiative in Bulgaria for over ten years before 
taking on his current position as manager and partner of Eﬀective Solutions Consulting 
Group. He is also a member of the board of the Fund for Local Governments and 
Authorities, a newly established state-owned joint stock company aimed at helping 
local governments access EU structural funds.
Igor Stojanovic has ten years of experience working in the nongovernmental sector 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans. He is a co-founder of one of the most 
inﬂuential nongovernmental organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Centre for 
Civic Initiatives, in which he has been working as a Director for Development and 
Fundraising since 1999. He has participated in a series of national and international 
projects by working in the ﬁelds of research, advocacy, and/or independent evaluation 
of activities. In addition, he has been a consultant and trainer in the ﬁelds of nonproﬁt 
boards of directors, analysis, and policy development. He is a volunteer member of 
the executive governing body and one of the co-founders of the Central and Southeast 
Europe Citizens Network. He has a degree in management and pursued additional 
education in America and Western Europe countries.
ix
List of Boxes, Figures, and Tables
Introduction: Mind Your Own Business!
Gábor Péteri
 Figure 1. Average Size of Local Governments ..............................................  8
 Table 1. Number of Neighborhood Governments .....................................  10
Submunicipal Govenment and Decentralization in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Igor Stojanovic and Reuf Bajrovic
 Box 1. Cooperation between Municipality and LC—The Case of Doboj ...  37
 Table 1. Number of Local Communities in Two Entities (2007) ...............  33
Submunicipal Governments and Decentralization in Bulgaria:
Governance Practices in Rural Municipalities
Emil Savov
 Box 1. Razgrad Municipality ..................................................................  66
 Box 2. Troyan Municipality ....................................................................  69
 Figure 1. Own Revenues Per Capita for 2004 by Groups of Municipalities ...  51
 Table 1. Grouping Municipalities by Population Size ................................  54
 Table 2. Cash Balance ...............................................................................  55
 Table 3. Expenditures Per Student in Comprehensive Schools 
by Groups of Municipalities ........................................................  56
 Table 4. Data on the Mayoralties ..............................................................  59
 Table 5. Groups of Mayoralties by Number of Residents (2006) ...............  60
 Table 6. Mandatory Activities Performed by the Mayorality ......................  65
 Table 7. Services Delegated to the Mayoralty ............................................  65
 Table 8. Types of Local Services Assigned by Mayors .................................  66
 Table 9. Current Status Versus Proposed Model ........................................  72
 Table A1. Number and Size of Local Governments and Subnational 
Governments by Districts (2006) .................................................  76
xM I N D  Y O U R  O W N  B U S I N E S S !
Polish Solectwo–A Latent Field for Rural Governance
Marta Derek and Adam Mielczarek
 Box 1. An Overambitious Mayor in Niepołomice ...................................  91
 Box 2. High Funds for Submunicipal Government .................................  101
 Box 3. Determining Village Funds ..........................................................  101
 Box 4. Arbitrary Distribution of Funds to Villages ..................................  102
 Box 5. Village Own Revenues from Property Sales ..................................  103
 Box 6. The Car Fair ................................................................................  103
 Box 7. Remunerating Village Heads .......................................................  106
 Box 8. Road Repair and Village Heads ....................................................  108
 Box 9. Active Submunicipal Governments ..............................................  110
 Box 10. The Most Beautiful Village Competition .....................................  111
 Figure 1. Average Number of Submunicipal Local Governments in Rural 
and Mixed Rural-Urban Local Governments in Poland (2006) ....  87
 Figure 2. Average Number of Citizens in One Submunicipal 
Local Government in Rural Local Governments in 2005 .............  89
 Figure 3. Average Number of Submunicipal Local Governments in Rural 
Local Governments in Polish Regions in 2005 .............................  89
 Table 1. Average Number of Submunicipal Local Governments (Solectwo)
in Diﬀerent Types of Local Governments in Poland (2006) .........  88
 Table 2. Types of Undertakings Managed the Village Councils
in 1992, 1994, and 1996 .............................................................  116
 Table 3. Activities of the Village Head According to the Inhabitants of 
the Municipality of Komorniki ....................................................  118
 Table A1. Statistical Data Used for Figure 1 .................................................  125
 Table A2. Statistical Data Used for Figures 2 and 3 ......................................  126
 
Rural Governance in Serbia: Charting a Sustainable Future
Tatijana Pavlovic Krizanic
 Box 1. The Case of Smederevska Palanka ................................................  142
 Box 2. The Case of Krusevac and Zrenjanin ............................................  142
 Box 3. Meetings of MZs .........................................................................  143
 Box 4. The Case of a Multiethnic Presovo ...............................................  146
 Box 5. Proactive MZs .............................................................................  155
 Box 6. Intergovernmental Transfers to MZs ............................................  158
 Box 7. Distributing Funds in Subotica ....................................................  159
xi
L i s t  o f  B o x e s ,  F i g u r e s ,  a n d  Ta b l e s
 Figure 1. Citizen Participation in MZ Activities .........................................  144
 Figure 2. Mesna Zajednica Structure in the Municipality of Boljevac .........  151
 Figure 3. The Self-contribution Fee and the Types of Fees 
  That Are Imposed ........................................................................  161
 Table 1. Basic Information on Communal Self-government in Serbia .......  136
 Table 2. Cities in Serbia as of January 2008 ..................................................  163

C H A P T E R  1
Introduction: 
Mind Your Own Business!
Gábor Péteri

3Table of Contents
1. Community Based Governance: Why Is It Important? ...............................  5
 1.1 FDI Project Scope and Objectives ......................................................  7
2. Forms and History .....................................................................................  8
 2.1 Finding the Right Balance: Type and Size of Mayoralties ...................  8
 2.2 From Self-governance to Local Administration: Historical Origins ....  10
3. Roles and Functions ...................................................................................  12
 3.1 Legitimacy and Accountability ...........................................................  13
  3.1.1 Counterpoints to Proportional Electoral Systems .....................  14
  3.1.2 Advocate and Messenger: Involvement in Municipal 
   Decision-making .....................................................................  15
 3.2 Promoting Development: Service Provision and Economic Growth ...  16
4. Financing ...................................................................................................  17
5. The Future of Submunicipal Governments: Constrained Autonomy .........  18
 5.1 Ideas for the Future ............................................................................  19
Sources Cited .....................................................................................................  21
Notes .................................................................................................................  22

5I n t r o d u c t i o n :  M i n d  Yo u r  O w n  B u s i n e s s !
1. COMMUNITY-BASED GOVERNANCE: WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?
Institutions of submunicipal governance have two basic functions. Being part of the 
political system, they guarantee better representation through direct citizen participation. 
This territorial, residence-based representation creates new mechanisms for improved 
accountability in the public sector. Supplementing other local political institutions, 
submunicipal governments also contribute to demand-driven community development, 
as well as they provid eﬀective and targeted local public services. Depending on the scale and 
form of decentralization, they share service management responsibilities with national 
and local governments and bring public administration closer to citizens. 
The critical question is how these two positive main features of local communi-
ties can be utilized in public sector reforms. Modernization of public services usually 
depends on the forms and methods of decentralization. The most important element 
of decentralization is deciding on the allocation of public functions. This is driven by 
several competing factors (Hermann et al. 1999; Swianiewicz 2002). Some of them 
require sizable local governments, while others have a favorable impact in smaller units. 
Submunicipal governments can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence these factors, so the assign-
ment of competencies and public services will be more eﬀective and eﬃcient through 
community governance.1 
One of the primary goals of decentralization, is greater political accountability. This is 
achieved through public control and citizen participation. Public decisions are inﬂuenced 
through various political mechanisms: the party system, civic advocacy, interest groups, 
referenda, etc. Territorial decentralization also guarantees better access to information, 
and consequently provides a greater chance for public control. At the lower levels of 
government, leadership seems to be more responsive. So this is a strong argument for 
empowering submunicipal governments.
Minority interests, however, might be better served in larger local governments. 
Traditional village communities in closed rural societies could be captured by local 
elites. Or they might be misused by strong national governments for centralization 
purposes by establishing hierarchical linkages to this very low level of government. 
To avoid such a scenario, citizen participation should be encouraged. Though this is a 
critical condition of eﬀective local governance, the forms of public participation should 
be adjusted to diﬀerent-size municipalities. Professional organizations and issue-oriented 
interest groups could be as eﬀective as institutions in large cities as the neighborhood-
based representation in smaller local governments. Economic eﬃciency is the second 
important factor in assigning public functions. Larger-sized local governments are 
usually justiﬁed by the economies of scale argument. It means that unit costs of public 
services are supposed to be lower in proportion with the increasing size of the service 
entities. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that in the capital-intensive utility services, 
the marginal costs are lower with increasing facility size. This might be an argument 
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against creating strong submunicipal governments. However, in the case of human 
service organizations—schools, hospitals, and public administration—the unit costs are 
decreasing to the optimal size local governments, though beyond this point they start 
to increase, due to more complicated management structures, higher communication 
costs, etc. The unit cost curve is “U” shaped.
Another sub-component of economic eﬃciency is based on public-choice theory: 
consumers in smaller units are able to express their preferences more clearly. Community-
level governments are the best forms to identify competing objectives, and to confront 
demand in various units of local government. This also helps to identify the costs of 
public functions, especially when services are ﬁnanced through pricing mechanisms. 
In smaller public entities user charges, contributions, and matching grants reﬂect the 
diﬀerences in costs, revenue-raising capacity, and ability to pay.
This is related to the third factor for the assignment of functions: equity and fairness. 
Local governments have to internalize all the costs and beneﬁts of services provided by 
them. In small local governments this spill-over could lead to losses and the ineﬃcient 
allocation of public funds. Free-rider municipalities transfer the burden of ﬁnancing 
services to the neighboring local government. This raises the claim for larger-sized 
local governments. But expanding market-based service delivery mechanisms are able 
to manage this problem. Large communal and utility companies can introduce reﬁned 
pricing mechanisms, when speciﬁc costs at each and every local government are reﬂected 
by the user charges. Thus, in this respect, municipality size does not really matter.
Diﬀerence in revenue-raising capacity is another sub-component of this factor, 
inducing larger-sized local governments. The objectively-measured diﬀerences will be 
greater between smaller local governments. But a lack of own resources can be compen-
sated for by intergovernmental transfers, so, in a fragmented system, there will be a 
higher need for equalization grants. The “adequate” ﬁscal capacity could be achieved 
through the reﬁned system of intergovernmental ﬁscal relations (own sources, revenue 
sharing, and transfers). Submunicipal governments might also be the subjects of these 
revenue equalization schemes.
The fourth set of factors is the administrative capacity of local governments. In larger, 
urban local governments, staﬀ are expected to be more professional, thus the quality of 
management in municipal administration and services provision will be higher. This 
also raises the question of geographic adequacy, and whether local government bound-
aries follow the area of service provision. As services have diﬀerent catchment areas, the 
forms of government and practices of intermunicipal cooperation are also important 
components of this factor. Through various institutional forms of municipal coopera-
tion, the administrative capacity might be improved. 
Summarizing the overall signiﬁcance of these factors, submunicipal governments 
are important institutions of political accountability and for the expression of local 
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preferences. These advantages of strong community governance can only be realized 
if intergovernmental ﬁscal relations support decentralization, where funding schemes 
and methods are able to manage the problems of excessive fragmentation. Improved 
administrative capacity is also a condition of successful submunicipal governance.
1.1 FDI Project Scope and Objectives 
Our analysis of the issues of neighborhood-level governments was implemented under 
the Fiscal Decentralization Initiative of the Local Government and Public Service 
Reform Initiative at OSI–Budapest. The overall goal of the project was to strengthen 
local governments and national decentralization programs through the sharing of infor-
mation and lessons on the use of community-based governments. This policy develop-
ment and capacity enhancement focused on three countries in South Eastern Europe: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Serbia. We also examined Poland, which is a 
highly-decentralized country with relatively large local governments, having tradition-
ally strong submunicipalities. 
The long-term aim of the FDI project is to compare the main ﬁndings and to share 
the lessons with other transition countries. The potential users of this information might 
be either the countries facing the problems of fragmented municipalities and planning 
amalgamation reforms (for example, Hungary), or where like-sized local government 
exist and traditions of community governance prevail, but decentralization reforms still 
have yet to be launched (for example, in Central Asia). 
Beyond its contribution to policy design, the project also aims at laying down the 
foundations of future capacity-development programs. Forthcoming FDI program 
activities intend on equipping the actors of central and local public service management 
with the necessary knowledge and skills to enable them to address rural problems. 
Several comparative, regional reports and country studies analyze the role of local 
communities in the selected areas.2 We focused on the two basic issues highlighted 
above: accountability and service eﬃciency. The country reports targeted three broad 
issues by following similar structures: 
 a) forms and functions of neighborhood governments; 
 b) critical assessment of in-country models, focusing on accountability, and public 
service eﬃciency; and 
 c) proposals on future policy advice and capacity development. 
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2. FORMS AND HISTORY
2.1 Finding the Right Balance: Type and Size of Mayoralties 
The European decentralization models in transition countries present two extreme 
solutions: the creation of either large local governments or much smaller, fragmented 
systems. (Figure 1). Submunicipal governments primarily are established in countries 
with larger-sized local governments. They provide institutionalized forms of internal 
power sharing within these local governments. In a fragmented system, service eﬃciency 
and revenue raising capacity requires cooperation between the smaller local governments. 
The same issue is reﬂected in both models: how to balance between the competing 
factors of decentralization. 
Figure 1. 
Average Size of Local Governments
Source: Dexia 2004; Marcou 2004.
A particularity of the local government system in South Eastern Europe is that 
the larger municipalities exist parallel to mixed forms of meso-level governments 
(Marcou 2004). With the exception of the unique governance structures in Bosnia and 
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
0
1,600 1,900
3,200 4,300
4,600 5,200 5,500
7,600
8,800
10,300
15,500 15,500
29,120 30,400
50,800
52,000
Cz
ec
h 
Re
p.
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Hu
ng
ar
y
La
tv
ia
EU
10
EU
15
Es
to
ni
a
Ro
m
an
ia
Cr
oa
tia
Sl
ov
en
ia
M
ac
ed
on
ia
Po
la
nd SE
E
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Al
ba
ni
a
Se
rb
ia
9I n t r o d u c t i o n :  M i n d  Yo u r  O w n  B u s i n e s s !
Herzegovina, these intermediate tiers are not elected, they are merely regional units of 
the central government. These deconcentrated units of central government agencies inﬁl-
trate to the municipal administration and local decision-making. The okrug in Serbia, 
oblast in Bulgaria, and other units or service entities of the various ministries have a 
tight control over municipal service management and local spending. 
Regions, as planning and statistical units, have been established in several coun-
tries that became new or potential members of the EU. They usually comprise several 
local (or county) governments. Their political power and legitimacy is limited, as the 
regions have no elected bodies or other forms of political representation (with some 
exceptions, like the Polish voivodship). They mostly serve regional development and 
planning purposes. 
In the Balkan countries, there is a strong tradition of separating central and 
local functions. Thus, the responsibility for providing speciﬁc services lies, in reality, 
either with the national government or with the municipalities. If a service is formally 
regarded as a local one (for example, primary education or social welfare services), 
the municipal competencies are limited: a local government controls only the main-
tenance of a school’s basic infrastructure or merely provides the physical space for 
a social-work center. All the critical decisions on service performance, methods of 
delivery, human resources, etc., are made primarily through the deconcentrated units 
of the ministries. 
The allocation of revenues follows a similar principle: local taxes are supposed to 
ﬁnance municipal functions and national budget grants are aimed at deconcentrated 
and delegated services. This has been partially modiﬁed by the new regulations on local 
government ﬁnances, for instance, in Serbia and Macedonia. Here, general purpose or 
block grants, and revenue-equalization grants connect the two levels of government. 
Otherwise, there is still a sharp division between the two tiers. 
Two reasons explain this separation. First, the scope of devolved services is rather 
limited. In SEE countries, local governments are responsible for few functions, typically 
for basic administrative and communal services. In ﬁnancial terms, the local expendi-
tures are only three to six percent of GDP. The other factor is a general mistrust of local 
governments. Thus beyond political decentralization, the real transfer of assets, powers, 
and human resources is limited. 
As a counterpoint, countries with large-sized local governments have developed 
submunicipal forms of governance. In some European transition countries, these neighbor-
hood-based community governments have signiﬁcant historical traditions and operate 
in various forms. They were established as mayoralties, typically in large cities and in 
municipalities that cover several geographical units (villages). In metropolitan local 
governments, they bring administrative and social services closer to citizens. 
In rural areas they have the mixed functions of community development and of 
provision for administrative and public services. In Bulgaria these are the kmetsvo; in 
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Poland solectwo; in the former Yugoslavia mesna zajednica; in Kosovo bashkësia lokale. 
Table 1 shows the average number of submunicipal units in the studied countries.
Table 1.
Number of Neighborhood Governments
Countries Number of Average number 
of submunicipal 
governments 
local governments submunicipal 
governments
BiH, Federation of BiH 80 8,143 16.0
BiH, Republika Srpska 62 9,724 18.0
Bulgaria 264 2,560 9.7
Kosovo 29 453 15.6
Poland 2,478 40,348 16.3
Serbia5 145 4,132 28.5
Source: Country reports in this volume.
There are no comprehensive statistics on community-level governments, because 
the establishment of these neighborhood governments usually depend on the decision 
of the municipalities. Thus, the reports in this volume had to rely on sample-based 
surveys or incomplete statistical data. The information available from these sources 
shows, however, that typically 16–18 community-level governments are organized in 
one municipality. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only half of the local governments in Republika Srpska 
have established mesna zajednica, while it is more common in the Federation (65 percent 
of local governments). In Serbia, the community-level governments are more widespread; 
there is one in almost every village (1.3 settlements/submunicipal government).
Due to the lack of proper statistics, there is no information on the average population 
size of a submunicipal government. According to the available data, these community-
level governments are usually between populations of 300 and 1,000. In Bulgaria, the 
average kmetstvo has a population of 821, and the majority of them (67 percent) are 
between populations of 250 and 1,000. In Poland, with some exceptions, in most of 
the regions the average size of solectwa is between 300 and 500. In Serbia, the mesna 
zajednica are larger; the average population size outside Belgrade is 1,622. 
2.2 From Self-governance to Local Administration: Historical Origins
Village self-government existed for many centuries in all of the four countries presented 
here. Various forms of rural communities were created for managing the common issues 
11
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of production, solving disputes, and ﬁnancing joint activities. The zhupa in Bulgaria, 
mahala in the Muslim-dominated Bosnia and Herzegovina, selo in Serbia, and solectwo 
in Poland all served the interest of the local community. 
They were all partially rooted in the methods and forms of agricultural production 
of the medieval period. In the southern Slavic states, the zadruga (a large, extended 
family) was the unit of common agriculture production. Ten to 20 families, usually with 
a maximum population of 100, lived and worked together. The families were connected 
by relatives who owned the common assets, as no personal property was allowed. Women 
could leave or join a zadruga through marriage only.
The zadruga leader, the oldest and most respected family head, organized the farming, 
and managed community life by solving disputes and making decisions on property 
sales. The wife of this alderman had similar authority over traditional women’s activi-
ties (holiday rituals, sewing, etc.). The zadruga community was highly hierarchical, and 
strictly controlled by the “old man” heading the community. It started to break up only 
in the 19th and 20th century when new inheritance laws were introduced, and agricultural 
production was modernized, while the younger generations left the zadruga (Library of 
Congress, http://countrystudies.us/). 
The community-level self-governance was further developed in two directions. 
First, various state structures were created, and second, the municipal self-governments 
evolved. As southern Europe was under diverse political inﬂuences, the models of public 
administration also followed diﬀerent patterns. The Ottoman Empire controlled the 
local communities and municipalities through the vilayet-based, hierarchical admin-
istrative system. The village-level government kept its relative autonomy in managing 
local matters, such as agricultural production, trade, taxation, public hygiene, care for 
orphans, schools (for example, in Bulgaria), and settling disputes (together with Turkish 
judges in Serbia).
The inﬂuence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and creation of independent 
states throughout the 19th century, led to the establishment of deconcentrated state 
structures. Beyond the lowest level self-government, districts and provinces of various 
types were formed (okoli, okrag, okrug, oblast, etc.). 
During this period, rural municipalities had varying levels of autonomy. In the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Act of Village Municipalities in the late 19th century, 
deﬁned the status of these rural local governments. In Serbia, after a period of uprising, 
and with weaker Ottoman control, the newly-created central state supervised local 
governments through the police, and held strong powers over elected local bodies. Modern 
local governments with greater autonomy over property and taxes were established later, 
by the end of the 19th century.
This parallel development of community-based, very local forms of self-governance, 
and the state-controlled, top-down administrative structures partially explains the 
present attitudes toward decentralization in the Balkan countries. In South Eastern 
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Europe, elected local governments usually have limited functions with a well-deﬁned 
local revenue base. While the central units at lower levels of government do not 
intervene in these municipal issues, they do organize hierarchical, fully controlled 
and ﬁnanced state administrative structures. There is limited cooperation between 
the two forms of government. Local governments rarely manage general public-
administration issues and public services provided by the state are slowly transferred 
to elected municipalities.
These basic parallel structures of public administration and local self-government 
have not changed signiﬁcantly over time. The Yugoslav model of local self-management 
has created special decision-making and self-ﬁnancing rules. Thus, the present larger-
sized local governments in countries of the former Yugoslavia can be partially explained 
by the economic rationale of decentralized self-ﬁnancing. The community-level govern-
ments were part of this system with relatively strong autonomy, until the 1990s, when 
centralization tendencies reached this lowest level of government, and all the assets had 
to be transferred to the national state.
In Poland, where preceding the Second World War the gromada, as a submunicipal 
unit, combined the community and the state functions, the Soviet-type, local govern-
ment system then destroyed these institutions. The “national councils” were controlled 
by the highly-centralized political machinery and, consequently, the submunicipal, 
village-level entities lost their inﬂuence. 
Neighborhood-level governments in the Balkan region also could have supported 
cultural diversity, and might have helped in the eﬀective management of ethnic or 
religious disputes. For example, in highly-divided Kosovo, the conﬂicts can be partially 
explained by the fact that rural communities were destroyed (I. Blumi 2005). Forcing 
control of the more orthodox Islamic community over the less fundamental mosques 
created greater hostility between neighboring villages. Centralized structures in place 
in Serbia since the Yugoslav period, continuing throughout the rule of Milosevic, and 
even under the guise of various international organizations, strengthened divisions, not 
reconciliation, at a very local level. 
3. ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
Decentralization reforms in the studied countries were implemented in several waves and 
at diﬀerent speeds. Poland was one of the forerunners in establishing politically-autono-
mous local governments at the municipal (gmina) level. In South Eastern Europe, the 
establishment of local self-government units were created with some delay, and the real 
devolution of functions is still rather slow. In Bulgaria, the economic crisis of transition 
perpetuated centralization until the late 1990s. In countries of the former Yugoslavia, 
the war and the proceeding political turmoil in Serbia hindered decentralization.
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Most of these reforms focused on establishing political structures at the lower level 
of government. Decentralization of public services was limited, and local governments 
are mostly responsible for some administrative and communal services. As the reforms 
primarily concentrated on the hierarchical linkages between diﬀerent tiers of govern-
ments, the issues of subnational governments were usually not addressed in the past 
reforms. 
The establishment of submunicipal governments depends on the elected local 
governments’ will, except in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Serbia, 
where it is mandatory to organize mesna zajednica in rural municipalities.6 In Bulgaria, 
conditions for establishing submunicipal local governments is regulated by law. The 
creation of a kmetsvo depends on a referendum with 25 percent of supporting votes in 
the village, and also needs to be endorsed by municipal council decision.
3.1 Legitimacy and Accountability
Submunicipal governments, as traditional social institutions, ensure the legitimacy of 
governments through representation and accountability. They are either community-
based organizations or legal entities, established according to the laws regarding local 
governments. The political weight of these community governments very much depends 
on the municipal election rules. The balance of individual ward- and political party-
based election of councilors or mayors determine the signiﬁcance of the neighborhoods 
in local political power and development.
Despite the fact that neighborhood governments in rural communities are often 
built around familial ties or religious lines, their leadership is controlled by the local 
community. Neighborhood governments are political entities connecting individual 
citizens and the elected governments. As such, they also provide mechanisms of social 
and political accountability. In local governments with populations of many thousands, 
these community-based self-governments could also guarantee the inclusion of minori-
ties. In extreme cases, they can even replace formal institutions (as parallel structures). 
As the lowest level of formal government, they guarantee inclusion in public deci-
sion-making, and ensure the transparency of formal public institutions and procedures. 
They might also encourage public participation in local government decisions in various 
areas: urban planning, budgeting, housing, or allocation of social welfare services. In 
terms of community development, neighborhood organizations are critical partners of 
elected local governments. Urban renewal projects, rehabilitation and housing programs, 
rural development, and local economic development activities are often based on the 
cooperation of these community-based organizations with other formal structures of 
government. This is one reason why community empowerment is often the focus of 
poverty-reduction projects.
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3.1.1 Counterpoints to Proportional Electoral Systems
In countries with larger-sized local governments, the councilors are elected by lists and 
not in individual wards. The proportional system of local government elections is usually 
inﬂuenced by political parties and other organized groups. The election rules often 
lead to a situation where villages in the territory of a local government are left without 
any representation in the municipal council, and the nomination of local candidates is 
controlled by political organizations. 
Submunicipal governments are supposed to balance the inﬂuence of political parties 
and other institutions. Usually, community leaders and the neighborhood-level repre-
sentative bodies or councils are directly elected. The election rules are set by the local 
government, and there is no speciﬁc legislation on community-level voting procedures. 
The most typical form is a “village meeting,” though in Serbia, for example, community 
leaders also could be elected at the general municipal elections. 
Community-level leaders and councilors can be elected by public or secret voting, 
too. There are no minimum requirements, either on citizens’ participation in these 
public meetings or on the number of votes needed for getting elected.7 According to 
surveys in Poland, 10–30 percent of the population is typically present at these village 
meetings; in Serbia it is more like a quarter. None of the election thresholds are regu-
lated, except in Republika Srpska, where councilors can be elected by a 50 percent vote 
of those present.
These practices of community-level representation raise doubts about the legitimacy 
of submunicipal governments. As national regulations tend to give high automy to local 
governments in forming and empowering neighborhood-level governments, the inﬂu-
ence of the community leadership very much depends on the elected local governments. 
So when the local council is ready to share its competencies with the submunicipal 
governments, then participation methods are more eﬀective and functions within the 
municipality are further devolved. 
In this case, submunicipal government elections and accountability mechanisms 
are better regulated. Consequently, community leaders have greater legitimacy (as in 
Bulgaria and Poland). If the neighborhood government’s role is merely formal, then it 
is less accepted by villagers (as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia).
The level of trust in submunicipal governments is measured in the individual 
country studies by some indirect indicators. In Poland, survey results show that not 
the village council, but more likely the village head is known by citizens, though only 
one-ﬁfth of the respondents were aware of his activities beyond that of tax collection. 
Participation in public activities varies between 15 percent (one or more activities in a 
year in Serbia) and 25 percent (in Bosnia and Herzegovina). This can be explained by 
the general mistrust towards local governments, which are controlled by the political 
parties down to the very community level. 
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3.1.2 Advocate and Messenger: Involvement in Municipal Decision-making 
Regardless of the forms of submunicipal representation, the community leader is usually 
visible to both the elected local government and ordinary citizens. The village head has 
the right to take part in the municipal council meetings, and is involved the prepara-
tion of capital investment, and small-scale infrastructure improvement projects. As a 
lobbyist, he represents the village at the elected local government. These contacts are 
made only through the mayor (as in Bulgaria, where this is the only way to put proposals 
to the council) or a special advisory council, dealing with local community matters (in 
the case of Serbia). 
The more structured forms of mesna zajednica in Serbia—with a citizens’ assembly, 
council, and a secretary—also allow the strengthening of the representation of ethnic 
minorities at the local government level. As the villages are ethnically more concentrated, 
in the larger-sized municipalities community leaders can raise local issues to the level 
of the elected municipal government. Obviously, it depends on how the recipient local 
councils are organized, because the committees, as ﬁrst entry points, are often controlled 
by political parties. There are, however, opportunities to overcome this problem. In 
Serbia, for example, special committees for small-scale, capital-investment projects were 
created, which even have transferred municipal powers for contracting and spending. 
The neighborhood governments’ other role is to establish direct contacts between the 
elected local government and the citizens. This “messenger” role is executed through 
village meetings, budget hearings, and other opportunities for discussion. These forums 
are regulated by the rules and procedures of the municipality, or by the statutes of the 
community government. They usually support the top-down information ﬂow, and 
provide additional communication channels for the local government. 
Involvement in the municipal decisions very much depends on the community-
level government’s administrative capacities. The community leader has a key role, as 
all the individual country reports point to a lack of human resources and management 
capabilities in the villages. Having a limited number of educated people in the villages, 
or no information on administrative matters, the village head is an important point 
of contact. Recognizing this role of submunicipal government leaders, local govern-
ments often provide ﬁnancial and administrative support. The municipality usually 
pays allowances for the soltys (Poland), the community governments’ members and 
leaders (Federation of BiH), or employs kmetstvo administration, as in Bulgaria. Any 
transfer of funds and greater autonomy at the community level would require further 
monitoring and control mechanisms. They are implemented by the mayor (Bulgaria) 
or by the advisory council (Serbia). 
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3.2 Promoting Development: Service Provision and Economic Growth
Community-based organizations provide public services of various types. These are 
municipal services, further devolved to the village level; implementation of decon-
centrated, primarily administrative functions, as well as services that are delegated to 
submunicipal governments. However, the sharing of public functions at the local level 
very much depends on the scope and form of decentralization in the country. The formal 
transfer of public services to the community level might be easier if the decision on 
funding, personnel, and service performance is kept at the central level. 
Neighborhood governments could guarantee access to basic public services on behalf 
of the municipality. Bulgaria is a well-researched country in this respect, and as the 
survey results show, approximately seven percent of functions assigned to local level are 
further devolved to kmetstva. Public services are taken over by the kmetstva on a diﬀerent 
scale. The kmetstva share is 26 percent of the management of kindergartens, 69 percent 
of basic social day-care service units, 20 percent of street cleaning, 69 percent of public 
lighting, and 15 percent of road maintenance. Similarly, in Serbia, the public utilities 
in those villages that are not connected to the regional networks are also managed by 
the mesna zajednica. 
In Poland, the solectwa might initiate the transfer of municipal services, though the 
general legislation speciﬁes only public administration services that can be relocated 
to the village level. Further devolution of functions has to be regulated by municipal 
statutes. The model statutes that were proposed to local governments name only three 
ways of solectwo involvement: (i) the right to make proposals on capital improvements 
of roads, utilities, kindergartens, primary schools, and tourism; (ii) cooperation for ﬁre 
protection, local order, environmental protection, and social services; (iii) management 
of municipal property and funds. The transfer of all these proposed functions depends 
on each local government’s decision. 
Community governments, in closer proximity to citizens, also provide administrative 
services, deconcentrated to this lowest level. Being close to citizens is the focal point of 
basic administrative services, and provides the connection to the local administration 
in the case of more complex issues. Locally-provided administrative services include the 
issuing of certiﬁcates, permits, and licenses needed for citizen registration, construction, 
public order, environmental protection, etc. Some tasks in municipal tax collection are 
also devolved to mayoralties (as in Bulgaria and Poland).
In Serbia, deconcentrated units of municipal administration provide access to these 
services (mesna kancelarija). They follow the dual character of local government admin-
istration, so they also operate as the lowest units of state administration. In villages they 
also serve the submunicipal governments by providing basic oﬃce services to them. 
Finally, there are services delegated to the community level, when the transfer of 
functions is combined with the full funding of these services. Here, the submunicipal 
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governments might have some limited competencies. For example, in Bulgaria they 
appoint the managers of part-time kindergartens, social centers, and cultural organiza-
tions. They could also inﬂuence the location and usage of these institutions. 
Perhaps the most important function of submunicipal governments is community 
development. They can inﬂuence the local economic development and urban develop-
ment throughout the planning and grant allocation process. Obviously, all these initia-
tives have to be implemented through the elected local governments, but community 
leaders are important actors in the physical planning, local strategy design, and sectoral 
planning. Their powers and authority very much depend on the overall decentralization 
framework, policymaking practices, and political mechanisms.
This brief overview of decentralized service functions clearly shows that submu-
nicipal governments have rather limited functions. Assignment of these services very 
much depends on local political preferences. Thus, eﬃcient service provision, as the 
main reason for creating larger-sized local governments, clearly dominates these four 
individual country models. Depending on the scope of decentralization, communities 
might take over some limited competencies, but local governments keep the ultimate 
decision-making power. Within the overall national legislative framework, the transfer 
of functions depends on diﬀerences in local culture. 
4. FINANCING
Because submunicipal local governments manage a limited number of functions, their 
share in local budgets is also minimal. Most of the countries reporting on community 
governments do not even have aggregate ﬁscal information on spending at the submu-
nicipal level. The only exception is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where 
mesna zajednicas’ ﬁnancial share is 0.7 percent. In this entity, services managed at the 
community level are rather limited, and thus in the other countries the share might 
be higher. 
All the countries we studied keep the unity of the local government budgets, so 
submunicipal spending and revenues remain part of the municipal budget. Transfers 
to mayoralty staﬀ and other community-level spending are accounted as part of the 
municipal budget. They are also incorporated into the consolidated, municipal treasury 
system; however, they have separate bank accounts in some countries. 
Submunicipal governments have the authority to levy and collect own source 
revenues. In Poland, agricultural tax might be shared with the solectwo budget, though 
this rarely happens in practice. They can also raise funds through the utilization of 
local public property. In Bulgaria, kmetstvo levy environmental ﬁnes, while in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, donor funding is a signiﬁcant community revenue. Communities 
usually have no access to own property. In Bulgaria and Poland, the revenues 
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generated by the use of communal property might be kept by the submunicipal govern-
ments.
In Serbia, mesna zajednica collect a self-contribution fee. Fourteen percent of local 
governments levy this fee on their entire territory, while two-thirds of municipalities have 
self-contribution at least in one rural community. The mesna zajednica are not public 
entities. Thus, according to current ﬁscal regulations, they cannot be subject to revenue 
sharing, and the national tax oﬃce does not collect these self-contributions. The latest 
amendment of the ﬁnancial rules, in 2002, left the submunicipal governments without 
the former shared utility fees and local taxes.
Submunicipal governments are not subject to any direct, national-budget grants. As 
all the community-level spending is part of the municipal budget, only local government 
transfers are received. These funds are usually negotiated with the municipal council, 
though in some instances allocation criteria are built into the budgeting procedures, 
like when submunicipal funds are allocated in the form of matching grants (as in 
Serbia), or the basis of the allocation formula are the population number, tax levies, or 
community area. 
Financial management autonomy is also rather limited at the submunicipal level. 
Lacking separate bank accounts, and not being a legal entity, communities enjoy no 
autonomy over spending. In Bulgaria, where the kmetstva have diverse forms of operation, 
they can reallocate budget appropriations within the same function, with the exception 
of salaries. Any potential unused funds are centralized to the municipal budget at the 
end of the year. 
5. THE FUTURE OF SUBMUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS: 
 CONSTRAINED AUTONOMY 
The most important conclusion from this overview of the submunicipal governments in 
the four countries studied, is that they operate as counterpoints to elected local govern-
ment, and additionally, are important institutions of direct democracy. Within these 
studied local government systems—which are all based on proportional elections—the 
community councils and village heads are directly elected, thus are better known, and 
subsequently more accepted by the citizens. 
This, however, does not necessarily mean that they have a greater legitimacy. The rules 
of elections at the submunicipal level are not standardized in all these countries.8 Practices 
for the nomination and election of local leaders are very diﬀerent across communities, 
and are fully controlled by the municipal governments. This is an area where changes in 
legislation and local government operation could signiﬁcantly contribute to the weight 
and importance of submunicipal governments.
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The other main lesson is that new forms of community empowerment might improve 
the status of submunicipal governments. This means enhancing their capacity to make 
choices and transform those into actions and results (see CESI/WBI). The ability to 
make meaningful choices is to envisage future options, and to make community deci-
sions. This depends on the opportunity structure within which they operate, and their 
ability to transform choices into actions. 
Within this framework, there are diﬀerent degrees of empowerment. The studied 
countries have relatively broad opportunities to make decisions at the community level, 
so the choice—as the ﬁrst stage of empowerment—exists. Local traditions support 
the community governments, thus they remain accepted institutions with their own 
informational and internal management structures. The size and eﬃciency of the social 
capital accumulated by local society, however, should not be overestimated. Within these 
villages there is an increasing disparity in attitudes by income, age, and education level. 
Modernization initiates the transformation of local values, and consequently individual 
objectives and strategies also alter.
Empowerment also depends on the actual use of the available opportunities. Diverse 
in the four countries, it depends on the scope and form of decentralization. The ﬁnal 
degree of empowerment can be measured by the achieved results, though we simply 
could not collect information on this stage of empowerment. 
Perhaps the strongest function of community-level governments is to be a messenger 
and advocate. According to the individual country studies, this is their true role. The 
overall institutional framework is mostly guaranteed, though lobbying and represen-
tation of village interests could be further strengthened. The actual inﬂuence of the 
submunicipal governments depends on the quality of their leadership. 
In municipal service provision, community governments have a very limited role. 
The overall trend is that elected local governments have the ultimate responsibility for 
managing public services, as well as the funds available at the local level. Thus, sub-
municipal governments are able to participate in ﬁnancial planning and service manage-
ment decisions only according to the overall rules of ﬁscal decentralization. The unity 
of service organizations and municipal budgets is the main argument for preserving 
large-size local governments.
5.1 Ideas for the Future
The future of rural submunicipal governments has to be developed within the overall 
decentralization framework of the countries with sizable local governments. In South 
Eastern Europe, structural changes might be initiated only if the entire administrative 
system is reformed. This would primarily mean the redesign of the regional planning 
units, and government organizations operating at the intermediary or middle level. 
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The feasibility of these structural reforms is low, so, accepting the given legal and 
institutional framework, several steps still can be initiated. The report on Poland deﬁnes 
the character of submunicipal governments as the “auxiliary units” of local governments. 
Keeping this status, the standard criteria for establishing community-based governments 
have to be legislated and put into practice. Depending on each country’s legal struc-
ture, the minimum conditions for initiating the creation of village governments, the 
framework rules and procedures of nominating and electing leadership has to be set. 
These legal regulations should also formulate the control mechanisms over these elected 
bodies and village heads.
An eﬃcient use of submunicipal governments will increase the openness of all local 
governments. This would require an increase in public awareness on the beneﬁts of 
communal governments. Information should be shared with the general public about 
how these territory-based forms of representation ﬁt into the existing network of advo-
cacy organizations. The submunicipal local governments themselves have to learn the 
everyday practices of campaigning, marketing, and promotion of their ideas. For the 
local government’s part, the minimum conditions of transparency towards submunicipal 
governments have to be deﬁned. 
Public participation and inclusion in local government decisions is primarily impor-
tant in budgeting and citizen control over service organizations. Submunicipal govern-
ments are mostly involved in planning capital-investment projects, especially if they are 
ﬁnanced through matching grant schemes, when the service users also have to provide 
ﬁnancial contributions. The communities’ role could be enhanced if some portion of 
municipal funds were to be allocated through competitive mechanisms, when villages 
have to submit their proposals for the local funds. The control over service organizations, 
such as schools, communal enterprises, and contractors would also improve the service 
performance by increasing the communities’ inﬂuence.
The ﬁnancial empowerment of submunicipal governments depends on intergov-
ernmental ﬁscal relations. When the control of the national budget and line ministries 
is weakened, local ﬁnances will become less dependent on central decisions. Thus, they 
might re-allocate more ﬁscal competencies to the community governments. On the 
revenue side of the budget, the taxing powers and charge setting autonomy of submunicipal 
governments could be increased. Within the overall framework of local revenue policy, 
the authority for further reﬁnement of these levies, user charges, duties, and ﬁnes could 
be transferred to communities. 
Similarly, the use of devolved former state-owned property might be shared with 
submunicipal governments. That would mean limited authority over the sale of municipal 
property, because asset management should be controlled by the local government. But 
the decisions on rents, usage, possible improvements, and reconstruction can be further 
decentralized.
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As communities are usually responsible for a limited number of services, the funds 
assigned to these functions should be allocated in a transparent way. Similar to the rules 
of an ideal local government funding scheme, submunicipal government grant alloca-
tion has to be predictable and based on objective criteria. Local governments should be 
obliged to establish transparent rules for fund allocation (grants or revenue sharing), 
following the general practices of intergovernmental ﬁscal relations.
Finally, there are several ways to improve the operation and management of submu-
nicipal governments. In most of the studied countries, this is not a well-researched 
topic, so further analysis of existing practices is greatly needed. This information and 
a deeper knowledge of community governance could help in developing mechanisms 
for sharing techniques and methods of operation. This could be further developed into 
a more systematic collection of information and the designing of a self-assessment or 
peer-review-based benchmarking. 
The basic documents on establishing and managing submunicipal governments, 
and the experiments in pilot villages, could be further developed as models, then widely 
disseminated among communities. This would improve the knowledge and manage-
ment capacity of community leadership. Another way of general capacity development 
is to provide assistance to the building of associations of submunicipal governments. 
This would support submunicipal governments to inﬂuence policymaking and would 
improve their management capacity through information sharing.
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NOTES
1 The terminology used in this introductory chapter reﬂects the diversity of local govern-
ment systems and submunicipal entities in the four individual countries. Thus, when the 
administrative and public service characteristics are discussed, this entity is typically called 
a submunicipal government or mayoralty, but when the social characteristics are highlighted, 
then the term community, neighborhood, or village is used. But very often these entities are 
named in the local languages though all these terms are used interchangeably. The term 
“elected local government” usually refers to the municipality as the lowest tier of self-govern-
ment in a country, even if community leaders and village councils are also elected.
2 P. Swianiewicz 2002; SLGRP 2003; J. Adams 2004; 
3 In 51 municipality, 65 percent of local governments organized submunicipal governments.
4 In 54 municipality, 87 percent of local governments organized submunicipal governments.
5 Without the City of Belgrade, where 307 submunicipal local governments exist in 18 
municipalities (average: 17).
6 In Serbia only, the new Act on Local Governments, in December 2007, made it obligatory. 
In the Federation of BiH, the statistical data showed that only two-third of the municipali-
ties established these local communities. 
7 In Republika Srpska, however, the minimum number of citizens in a public meeting is 
connected to the number of registered voters. Below 1,000 voters the minimum number 
of citizens who have to be present at these public meetings is 30; between 1,000 and 
3,000 the number is 50; between 3,000 and 10,000 the number is 75 citizens; and for over 
10,000 voters the minimum number is 100 citizens at a public meeting (Statute of Banja 
Luka, Article 25).
8 Except in Bulgaria, where the Law on Local Elections stipulates the rules for electing both 
municipal and submunicipal mayors.
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Executive Summary
The actual participation of citizens in decision-making at the local level in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) is worryingly low. One concern for the government of BiH is meeting the 
standards of the EU concerning direct citizen participation, in accordance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
Apart from direct visits to mayors of municipalities, public discussions, and civil initia-
tives, the old participation traditions of mjesne zajednice (local communities) is poorly used. 
At the same time, governments in BiH are doing little to educate citizens about this aspect 
of their culture and make them a capable and competent partner in local development. 
Local communities in BiH have different legal status: in the Federation of BiH they are an 
obligatory segment of the local self-government while in Republika Srpska municipalities are 
deciding whether to establish local communities or not. Consequently, some municipalities 
in BiH have not established local communities. However, a different legal status does not 
create a different role for local communities in BiH’s entities—they are merely standing on 
the sidelines of the consultation processes and have no real impact on budget planning 
processes, the creation of development plans, etc. 
Poor leadership capacities, unclear and uncertain financing of local communities, 
matched with a lack of competencies over decision-making in local communities in any sense, 
are some of the key problems of local communities in BiH. It is clear that local communities 
are not a partner of local governments in BiH in the decision-making processes, and thus 
are unable to fulfill their role. An absence of sincere intentions on the part of governments 
to improve the status of the local communities is not a good short-term forecast for the 
citizens of BiH.
Despite this, local communities in BiH possess a huge potential to articulate citizen 
participation in local public business. According to surveys, over 90 percent of citizens in 
BiH recognize local communities (LCs) as a key mechanism of citizen participation—and 
these LCs are practically a “brand” of citizen participation in BiH. This potential needs to 
be developed and integrated in local self-governments. 
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1. FOCUS ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The actual, measurable participation of citizens in decision-making on the local level in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is worryingly low. Since one of the ongoing challenges 
for BiH is the realization of EU standards concerning direct participation, keeping in 
line with the European Convention on Human Rights, it is important to ensure eﬀec-
tive solutions to this problem. Participation on a local level is of key importance for the 
future of BIH because of the principle of subsidiarity,1 deeply embedded in the tradition 
of European administration.
Furthermore, there is a general lack of awareness about the participation mechanisms.
Aside from direct visits to the mayors of municipalities, public discussions, and civil 
initiatives, the mjesne zajednice  (local communities or LCs), which are the traditional 
mechanisms of civil participation, are under-utilized.
Many municipalities did not oﬃcially register all LCs in their territory.2 Due to a 
lack of information and an inability to ﬁnd suitable solutions, there is much confusion 
regarding citizens’ participation.
The diﬀerent forms of citizen’s’ participation in local self-administration units 
(LSAU) have been dealt with in earlier research,3 and as one of the most perspective 
traditional forms of participation LCs have been identiﬁed. Thus, the primary goal 
of this chapter is to estimate the level of possible autonomy of LCs in a material or 
ﬁnancial sense and assess their role and actual capacity to take over some jurisdic-
tions in the realm of local self-administration, becoming an eﬀective and recognizable 
part of LSAU. 
Because Bosnia and Herzegovina is an extremely decentralized country, it is impor-
tant to consider the potential importance of the LCs as a substitute for the present 
democratic deﬁcit (caused by the multilayered and asymmetric administrative/political 
organization of BIH), which is mandated by the constitutional arrangement of BiH 
as a state.
2. POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Local communities, as speciﬁc forms of citizen participation, are very important institu-
tions in the context of European integration. The most important European document 
related to direct participation of citizens in the administration of public aﬀairs is the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This convention is particularly 
important in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it is directly applicable in the domestic 
legal system. 
The convention states4 that the direct participation of citizens is a right that must be 
guaranteed. However, implementation mechanisms for these rights have been left to the 
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discretion of member states. An overall overview and comparison of BiH’s legal frame-
work is beyond the scope of this study. The laws analyzed within this research guarantee 
the citizens of BiH—in accordance with European and international obligations5—the 
right of direct participation in decision-making. 
Participation in the guidance of public aﬀairs has been highly appreciated by the EU, 
not only as a goal or standard, but also as way to promote and protect democracy. The 
concept of the EU citizen has been founded on the active participation of citizens and 
has been viewed as one of the fundamental and basic goals of a united Europe. All drafts 
of the European Constitution have placed value on individuals and their participation. 
Thus, this part of the constitutional agenda was not marked by contesting opinions.
In accordance with these goals, the European Union, in a recently-established 
program “Citizens for Europe,”6 has made a clear distinction between legal guaran-
tees and the need for creating speciﬁc measures with suﬃcient ﬁnancial support. The 
reasons for these EU policies are prevention and amelioration of the damage incurred 
by a population retreating from public aﬀairs.7 Therefore, the program of “Citizens for 
Europe” has been founded in cooperation with local authorities, which are the best 
entry points for citizens’ participation.
However, with regard to European goals, and standards like the promotion and 
strengthening of social cohesion and quality-of-life, the promotion of citizens’ partici-
pation is extremely important. The long-term potential of LCs in BiH is a key factor 
for choosing this mechanism as a basic form of direct citizen participation, which can 
function well with all other mechanisms.
2.1 History of Local Communities
 
Community organization in BiH can, arguably, be traced back to the Ottoman times.8 
Self-reliance caused by a harsh landscape and diﬃculties in communication and travel 
is the characteristic that connects the diﬀerent periods. The Ottoman system of mahala 
(neighborhood) organization in urban areas was deeply rooted in BiH, but that alone 
cannot be singled out as the basis for the present LC awareness. The periods of Austro-
Hungarian rule and the ﬁrst Yugoslav state introduced a number of diﬀerent local 
governance mechanisms (village and “srez,” a larger area consisting of several villages, 
etc.), though the impact of those on the present LCs is not fully researched and goes 
beyond the scope of this study.
A large expansion of LCs in the late 1970s and the beginning of 1980s was brought 
about by the increased needs of citizens, especially in rural areas. Local communities had 
a powerful position in the constitution of the former Yugoslavia. Territorial reorganiza-
tion was implemented in 1961 and the number of municipalities was reduced from 400 
to 100. The constitutional changes in the Yugoslav Federation in 19639 formalized an 
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existing communist concept from 1946, based on the existence of “peoples” boards in 
both villages and cities, by increasing the attention paid to the local governance.10 
The phenomenon of the LC development can also be attributed to the economic 
development of the whole country, and the social development that it provoked. People 
suddenly had higher disposable incomes, and especially in rural areas, wanted to enjoy 
the fruits of technological advancement, like phones and electricity. However, road 
building was the most frequent reason for increased citizens’ involvement in LCs, as 
they could most eﬀectively solve their common problems through their LC. 
What is deﬁnite is that the LCs have been used as a local self-governance mechanism 
in BiH in the 1970s more frequently than before, and that they were not implemented 
or introduced by the state. As a result of this “LC Renaissance,” the LCs had the right 
to own their own property, and a had legal standing, unlike today. 
In postwar BiH, the importance of LCs has diminished. The international commu-
nity, which led the process of “democratization” in BiH, has not taken the LCs as a serious 
solution to local democracy. Hence, there have not been any considerable programs or 
funds invested in the development and capacity-building of LCs. 
LCs as mechanisms for participation are particularly important for the represen-
tation of interests of vulnerable groups, deﬁned by regional location, such as rural 
population and returnees. This is very important, because these two groups represent 
a high percentage of the BiH population. However, the maintenance costs of LCs are 
signiﬁcantly higher than all other suggested options for participation, and the leadership’s 
legitimacy is questionable.
LCs in BiH, as prewar participation mechanisms, have not been used since. However, 
none of the new mechanisms11 are used or recognized by citizens either. Promulgation 
of information about options for participation, and monitoring by higher levels of 
government are practically nonexistent. Despite poor information sharing, most citizens 
are ready, if summoned, to participate in decision-making.12
In practice, LCs and public discussions, as common participation mechanisms, 
are closely connected in BiH. The majority of public debate is held on the premises 
of LCs and announced on their information boards. These two mechanisms function 
extremely well in combination. When there is a lack of public discussion, representation 
of vulnerable groups’ interests is the strength of LCs; whereas if there is a problem with 
LC’s legitimacy,13 then it is partially mitigated by the openness of public discussion. 
But it should be kept in mind that the institutional strength of LCs and community 
cohesion is not reﬂected in other participation mechanisms (civil initiatives, municipal 
oﬃcials in charge of public participation, or public debate).
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3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF SUBMUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
3.1 Legal Status of Local Communities
Entity and cantonal legal solutions have partially deﬁned relations between local and 
middle-level governments, by encompassing LCs as a way of organizing and encour-
aging participation of citizens at the local level.14 However, whereas the Law on Local 
Self-governance of Republika Srpska “suggests” that municipalities establish the LCs 
and arrange a system for their functioning, the new Law on Principles of Local Self-
administration in BiH allows for the possibility of the transfer of activities within the 
auspices of local governance to LCs,15 and treats them as a mandatory form of local 
self-governmental organization.16
However, municipal statutes deﬁne in detail the institution of LCs, where two 
points are most salient: First, the procedures of the establishment of LCs are described 
in detail, but with discretion left to the municipal authorities to give a ﬁnal estimate 
about the necessity of founding of new LCs; second, statutes related to the business and 
ﬁnancing of LCs render no autonomy in decision-making as to where and in which 
way funds shall be distributed.17
 
3.1.1 Republika Srpska
The Law on Local Self-governance of Republika Srpska (RS), which has been in eﬀect 
since January 2005, gives great signiﬁcance to the issue of citizens’ participation. 
Generally, this law allows RS municipalities to form (or not to form) local communities 
and to regulate the way they function within their area.18 Also, the law obligates the 
municipalities to develop other mechanisms that are not prohibited by the law. 
The statutes of all the municipalities of RS treat a local community as a special 
form of citizens’ participation in local self-governance, which can be formed when 
there are conditions regulated by the statutes of the municipalities.19 The statutes of the 
municipalities in RS develop the institute of their local community in detail as a form 
of citizen’ participation. The procedure and criteria for establishing local communities 
are processed, often with formulations that always provide local assemblies with the 
possibility to assess the need for establishing new local communities, and gives them 
the possibility to reject such initiatives regardless of the argumentation. 
This is the basis of the relationship between the LCs and the municipalities in RS, 
in the sense that it comes out from the laws and by-laws20 that the LCs in the RS func-
tion as a service to the municipalities, in that they implement the activities transferred 
to them by the municipality, which at the same time transfers to them the funds for 
those activities. 
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The legally-observed election of LC’s leadership is deﬁned by the statutes of the 
municipalities, while the laws (RS and FBiH) have allowed the municipalities freedom 
of choice for public or secret voting. 
In RS municipalities, the governing body of LC (the council) is elected directly at a 
citizens’ meeting of the local community (optionally, by secret or public voting) with a 
four years’ mandate.21 The citizens suggest candidates for members of the council. They 
are elected only by achieving a majority of votes. The election during LC is announced 
by the municipal assembly, and it is conducted by the existing council of LC. 
If the existing president of the council of a LC does not organize a citizens’ meeting 
for the election of a new council of the LC within the deﬁned time period, the meeting 
will be organized by the mayor, and the procedure for the president’s and LC council 
members’ election will be implemented by the department of municipal administrative 
service. 
3.1.2 Federation of BiH 
The municipal statutes in the Federation BiH declare referendum, civil initiative, and 
civil assemblies as the major mechanisms for the direct participation of the population in 
decision-making. Between municipalities of the Federation there are diﬀerences in stat-
utes concerning citizens’ participation in decision-making, which span from innovative 
solutions (such as Center Sarajevo municipality) to the mere mention of the mechanism 
in some other municipalities. For example, the Sarajevo Center municipality holds 
elections for members of LCs. This practice is fairly new and has only been applied 
once at the time of writing. The downside is the low turnout (around 10 percent), 
while the positive inﬂuence of direct election of representatives in the LC council is the 
connection between voters and members. 
Essentially, as in RS, the decision about the election of leadership in LCs is 
regulated by the municipal statutes, whereby each municipality can make its own arrange-
ment for the election of LC leadership: a public meeting versus a more closed process. 
The relationship of the LCs and municipalities in the Federation of BiH is diﬀerent 
compared with RS. The clear legal status, with an obligatory form of the local commu-
nity that the LCs in FBiH have, gives them a position more like a partner, compared 
to the case of RS. LCs have the possibility to implement the activities transferred from 
the host municipality, and also to perform those activities, which are beyond the direct 
responsibilities of the municipality.22
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3.1.3 Brčko District 
The Brčko District directly applies instruments from international law in this area. There 
are even concrete mechanisms which regulate the government’s quick reaction to each 
request of its citizens. However, under present circumstances, by which Brčko has an 
unusual legal status within BiH, it is not possible to conduct objective comparisons 
with the rest of BiH, since the solutions from Brčko are not applicable to the rest of 
BiH, because the legal framework diﬀers from the rest of BiH.
As for the remunerations for the work of the president of the LC council, the tendency 
is that municipalities in the Federation of BiH determine the remuneration,whereas in 
Republika Srpska and Brčko District that is not the case.23 One proposed solution is 
calculating in the municipal budgets the expenditures on previously planned, smaller 
projects, which are proposed by the president of LC council, along with other criteria, 
such as area size, the size of population, etc. 
Future solutions should consider other criteria as well, such as the level of the LC’s 
development; whether it has either a “minority” population or returnees; the justiﬁca-
tion of planned activities, and how much those correspond to the overall municipal 
plan and development policy. 
One proposal is to strengthen the position of LCs towards municipal authorities 
through common actions within forums of LCs.24 However, prior to that, it is necessary 
to professionalize key positions in LCs, which preclude correspondent remunera-
tion, education, training, and subsequent monitoring of the work of responsible 
individuals. This policy of LC’s staﬀ remuneration should be followed by a decrease 
in their number.25
3.2 Competencies of LCs 
Although the LCs in BiH entities (RS and FBiH) have diﬀerent legal status (optional 
versus obligatory), something that they have in common is a possibility to cooperate 
with the other LCs. They also can submit proposals to the local authorities for changing 
existing plans and other issues that are municipal responsibilities. The municipal statutes 
conﬁrm this right of the LCs and elaborate on it further through the legal enactment of 
lower rank (Decision on Forming LCs and the Rules of Local Communities). 
We can conclude that the LCs in BiH are free, and even encouraged to cooperate 
with the other LCs (both within one municipality and among the neighboring munici-
palities), and can submit proposals related to the development and other plans of their 
municipalities. However, the above-described possibility of cooperation among the LCs 
has certain limitations in decision-making. In the RS, cooperation among the LCs is 
characterized by consultations or voluntary campaigns, because the LCs do not have 
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responsibilities in the sense of autonomy in urban, i.e., economic, planning of their 
municipalities. At the same time the LCs in FBiH have the additional capacity to carry 
out non-municipal activities, ﬁnancing them by own resources.
3.2.1 Republika Srpska 
According to the RS Law on Local Self-Governance, it is up to the municipalities to 
regulate by their statutes the operations implemented by the LC.26 In connection with 
that, the LCs’ competencies, as deﬁned in the municipal statutes, comprise various 
citizens’ initiatives: for changing regulations and city planning, environmental concerns, 
public utility issues, and maintenance of local roads. They can organize activities related 
to the implementation of referendum or to the needs of civil protection, culture, and 
sports.27 Generally speaking, there is no autonomy when it comes to decision-making 
in the LCs. 
Similarly, there are no deﬁned competencies of LCs in managing property, because 
a LC does not have its own property, as it uses municipal property. Nor is there any 
legal basis that would enable the LCs to inﬂuence the management of public companies, 
except for submitting the requests for delivery of speciﬁc services, which are implemented 
through municipal administration. 
Finally, the municipal statutes state the own revenues of the LCs, and grants by 
individuals or companies as possible sources of ﬁnancing the LCs. It is the basis for LCs 
to manage their own budgets. Such a possibility is nevertheless questionable, because, 
according to the law, the LCs do not have the status of a legal entity, and consequently 
cannot hold their own account. 
Additionally, the municipalities stress in their statutes that the municipal admin-
istration is in charge of all ﬁnancial operations on behalf of the LCs. This means that 
possible LC own revenues (grants, self-contributions) must be paid by the LCs to the 
municipal budget. Then the municipality returns those funds to the LC through the 
ﬁnancing of a speciﬁc activity, although there is no guarantee that a municipality is 
required to return the concerned funds to the LC. In essence, the LCs do not have a 
possibility to independently manage any form of budget.
 
3.2.2 Federation of BiH 
The LCs in FBiH, based on their status as legal entities, are awarded signiﬁcantly 
more responsibilities that enable them to make their own decisions. The LCs in FBiH 
are able to directly and independently make decisions about the tasks that are trans-
ferred from the municipalities to the LCs, including decisions about the management 
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of ﬁnancial resources and the tasks ﬁnanced from the sources directly raised by 
the LCs.28 
However, when it comes to managing property and public enterprises, the situation 
is similar to the one in RS: the LCs are responsible for the maintenance and manage-
ment of the property of those facilities for culture, sport, etc., though they are owned 
by the municipality. Neither is the management of public enterprises the responsibility 
of LCs. 
3.2.3 Brčko District
According to the Law on Local Communities of Brčko District, local communities 
have the status of a citizens’ association. They can be created with the goal of allowing 
their members to participate in district-level institutions. However, local communities 
in Brčko District, despite their diﬀerent legal status, have pretty much the same func-
tions and responsibilities as the LCs in the other two BiH entities (Republika Srpska 
and Federation of BiH).29 
3.3 Number of LCs 
Though LCs have a long tradition in BiH, in the postwar period there are but a small 
number of municipalities with functional and well-organized LCs. By the year 2005, 
only 65 percent of municipalities in BiH had established LCs completely.30 The data 
below also indicates that 87 percent of RS municipalities had formed LCs, while the 
trend in the FBiH was somewhat diﬀerent. The situation in 2007 is diﬀerent, as the 
LCs are increasingly being re-registered. 
Table 1. 
Number of Local Communities in Two Entities (2007)
Entity Number of Budget of
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
LCs per local 
government
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
Republika Srpska 62 97231 18.0 EUR 
302,553 M
EUR 
2,192 M32
Federation of BiH 80 81433 10.2 EUR 
245,000 M
N/A
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The number and size of LCs varies greatly, as each municipality can form them 
according to their own needs. For example, Doboj has 75 LCs, while Doboj Jug has 
only two. Also, there is little correlation between the number of LCs and population, 
size, or entity of origin of a municipality. However, the municipalities formed during 
the war ajacent to bigger centers in one of the two entities tend to be small, rural 
municipalities with a smaller number of inhabitants and LCs. Doboj and Doboj Jug are 
one example, while the situtation is similar in some of the municipalities in RS around 
Canton Sarajevo, like Istočna Ilidža, which has only four LCs. 
3.4 Financing Local Communities
Previous ﬁndings have shown that the organs of LCs make formal decisions which do 
not have executive character, but they are rather simple proposals, presented to municipal 
authorities.34 In fact, executive decisions do not preclude funds from the municipal 
budget. Funds are provided for current expenditures for the minimal functioning of 
LCs.35 The majority of municipalities in Federation BiH allocate money to cover ongoing 
administrative expenses of LCs’ management, with the exception of the municipality of 
Livno. The situation in RS is also improving with regard to a recently adopted law on 
self-governance and the harmonization of municipal statutes with this law. 
The municipal statutes in the Federation BiH have so-called “Rules of LCs,” which 
provide funds for LCs. They are secured in accordance with the work program of the 
municipal council and municipal mayor, the appreciating needs and interests of LCs, 
and the capacity of the municipality. Provisions are usually at the discretion of the 
municipality in the case of funds earmarked for remuneration of LC council members. 
Decisions are made by the municipal council during the adoption of the budget.
By following the regulations of the new Law on Local Self-governance, municipali-
ties ensure ﬁnancial means for the work of LCs within the municipal budget. They 
are provided through services, in accordance with the work program of the municipal 
council and the mayor. Within these ﬁnancial means, remunerations for the work of 
LC councils are decided by the municipal council in the adopted budget. Municipalities 
provide work premises for LCs, whereas equipment for those premises has often been 
supplied by funds from donor funding, at least in the cases of poorer municipalities.
Administrative services of LCs are limited to the issuance of documents, such as: 
registering changes in residents’ address, issuing certiﬁcates, checking that the applicant 
has been registered in the database of social services users, issuance of phone accounts, 
child adoption, etc. All other administrative works and accompanied revenues remain 
in the possession of the municipality. 
It is a problem that there is no permanent budgetary allocation for LCs to execute 
certain types of projects. Inﬂuence of LCs on budget planning and spending is not 
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constant, but rather depends on various factors, such as disposition of power, available 
means at municipal level, development plans of the municipality, but also on the ability 
of responsible organs and leading ﬁgures in the LC.
Although new municipal statutes leave space for empowerment of LCs this process 
is limited. There is a reluctance to empower LCs to manage their own property and in 
that way partially fund their activities. 
3.5 Role of LC in Local Economic Development 
According to appropriate legal provisions (Article 12 of the RS Law on Local Self-
governance, and Article 8 of the FBiH Law on the Principles of Local Self-govern-
ance), the responsibility for local economic development in BiH was assigned to the 
municipalities (in the RS), and in FBiH to the cantons—which can be returned to the 
municipalities again.36 
Besides the mentioned law, there is no other legal or sub-legal act that provides 
additional clariﬁcation of this process in the Republika Srpska. Therefore, it is clear that 
the LCs in RS have not been appointed within the legal framework, either as obligatory 
or recommended planners of local economic development. Legally, the participation 
of LCs in local economic development in RS fully depends upon the individuals who 
manage the process of planning development in municipalities, that is to say, munici-
palities’ mayors. 
But the LCs in FBiH have been deﬁned under the municipal statute and the rules 
on LCs as obligatory participants of the process of designing development plans (Article 
44 of the Statute of Municipality Centar Sarajevo and Article 11 of the rules of LCs). 
Thus, the legal framework in the ﬁeld of local economic development has only begun to 
be formulated in the context of the transitional process and the process of approaching 
the EU integration and is still not on the agenda of BiH authorities. The existing, 
formally-deﬁned obligation of the municipalities to engage in the issues of local devel-
opment has not been accompanied by legally-regulated implementation procedures. 
The process of planning local economic development in municipalities, taking into 
account the described situation, is mainly based only on international standards37 of 
that process, which are brought by diﬀerent consulting organizations that support the 
municipalities in that process. 
3.6 Participation in Public Administration Reform
The process of the reform of public administration is the responsibility of either the higher 
authorities, entity or state, in BiH. The entities’ constitutions and the BiH Constitution 
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clearly prefer “indirect participation,” which promotes an approach whereby the citizens’ 
representatives—not the citizens themselves—have an opportunity to participate in 
policy development.38 There is a possibility of a “citizens initiative” in which the citizens 
may submit a proposal or an initiative for passing a law. In RS, a proposal for the new 
law must be initiated by at least 3,000 voters. However, in principle only one citizen 
is suﬃcient to initiate any legal act that is under the competency of the Parliament of 
RS.39
When considering that only the legislative branch of the authorities prefer such an 
approach, the situation with the executive branch (the governments and ministries) is 
unfavorable for LC participation in policy design. Basically, there are no formal proce-
dures that deﬁne the LCs as an obligatory participant in the process of designing policies. 
As there are no formal requirements, the participation of LCs in such processes depends 
on the good intentions of policy designers, so it is very uncertain or non-existent. 
The impossibility of formal participation of LCs in public administration reform 
is supported by the fact that one of the conditions for the implementation of public 
administration reform is the development of “general administrative capacities,” 
including “institutional communication-dialog that would make public inﬂuence on 
the government’s policy possible in the future.”40 
We can conclude that the legal framework neither provides nor guarantees possi-
bilities for LC participation or inﬂuence on the decentralization process in BiH (whether 
it is RS or FBiH). On the contrary, there are no indications that LCs are considered 
as partners in the process of the decentralization of government by higher levels of 
government, since there are no plans for involvement of LCs in the decentralization 
process. 
The overall analysis of policies of local authorities toward the LCs suggests that 
the local authorities are of the opinion that the decentralization issue ends with the 
municipalities,41 and that there is no need to consider a possibility of decentralization 
of the local authorities themselves in order to award certain responsibilities to the LCs. 
A contributing factor is that local authorities are unable to contribute to policy design, 
another indicator of the lack of institutional inﬂuence of local self-governments on 
policies relevant to them.42 
4. SUBMUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE 
4.1 Competencies and Autonomy in Planning
 
The legal framework for the potential cooperation between LCs in BiH suggests vast 
possibilities for LCs to initiate and implement coordinated activities. But ﬁnances are a 
limiting factor: LCs may initiate and implement activities only if they are paying from 
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their own sources. In practice, neighboring LCs frequently cooperate, primarily in 
infrastructure development like roads.43 In addition, LCs cooperate on joint initiatives 
in host municipalities in order to increase their chances for municipal investment. 
Besides the mentioned self-ﬁnancing, there are cases in which LCs enter more 
complex partnerships that include tripartite support for LCs’ projects: joint ﬁnancing 
by LCs, municipalities, and third parties, usually foreign nongovernmental organiza-
tions or agencies.44 
Box 1.
Cooperation between Municipality and Local Community—The Case of Doboj
Communication between the LCs and the municipality is unsatisfactory and this is a reason 
why Doboj Municipality joined the project “Development of Municipalities in BiH—MDP” 
as a partner to the Swiss organization Intercooperation. Those activities resulted in a number of 
cases of cooperation between the municipality and some LCs. More speciﬁcally, the program of 
leadership training covered a total of 21 LCs (a little less than 30 percent of the total number of 
LCs), which resulted in designing a total of 24 project proposals by the leaders of involved LCs, 
relating to the resolution of important problems in those communities.
4.2 Local Economic Development and Strategy Design
The practical role of an LC in local economic development (LED) follows international 
standards, almost exclusively in the sphere of planning and LED design.45 LCs mainly 
participate in the process of the identiﬁcation of needs, SWOT analysis, and in the 
discussions on strategy ﬁnalization.46 
Looking at the planning stage, one can get the impression that the LCs have signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence on the described process. However, the absence of a formal deﬁnition 
of the role of LC in the process opens up the door to various interpretations by local 
authorities. The level of participation of LCs depends on the readiness of local authorities 
to include them. Also, the selection of LCs involved in the process is usually political.
The participation of LCs in the implementation process of LED strategy is minimal 
or non-existent, too.47 Such a situation is not necessarily connected to the lack of readi-
ness of local authorities to include the LCs, but is also explained by the lack of expertise. 
The responsibility for implementing strategies is mainly delegated to local development 
agencies. The process is monitored by the mayors and municipal assemblies, based for 
the most on predeﬁned indicators and plans. 
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4.3 Participation in Public Administration Reform
The reform of public administration in BiH is based upon two important documents:
 • Reform Strategy of Public Administration in BiH, 
 • Development Strategy of Local Self-Governance. 
The Reform Strategy of Public Administration in BiH48 is a government document, 
formally adopted by all high-level authorities (state, both entities, and Brčko District) 
in mid-2006. Its goal is to reform public administration in BiH to enable it to provide 
adequate services to its citizens. This document addresses the reform of administrative 
procedures, human resources, information technologies, and other areas. However, it 
stops at those levels of government which were directly involved in the process of strategy 
design. There is a complete absence of local self-government. Nor is there reference to 
them in the document. So LCs do not participate in this process either. 
This is surely not a strong point of this strategy, nor does it not help its implemen-
tation or sustainability. The “top-down” approach was probably easier for the strategy 
designers, but it is vital for the public to take part in the decision-making process. 
The Development Strategy of Local Self-governance 49 is not a document formally 
adopted by entities’ and state authorities, although it should have been. The strategy—
created together by the heads of successful local self-governments, nongovernmental 
organizations with expertise in the ﬁeld of local self-governance, as well as the repre-
sentatives of academic community, and practitioners—responded to the problems in 
the reform of local self-governance. It was adopted in May 2006 by the representatives 
of key local actors of local self-governance, and should have been a contribution to the 
strategy of public administration reform. 
As this strategy has not been oﬃcially adopted by the higher-level authorities, it 
is hard to see how LCs can inﬂuence the reform process. Nevertheless, this strategy is 
useful in two ways: (i) as a motivating factor for the LCs, indicating that it is possible 
and useful to participate in the policy design process; (ii) as an example to the authori-
ties regarding the importance of inclusion of the LCs in the processes. 
4.4 Attitudes towards Local Communities
The fact is that a relatively small number of the population has any experience in coop-
erating with the LCs or in participating in LCs’ activities.50 This is a clear indicator of 
a prevailing lack of understanding of the work of LCs, and consequently the leader-
ship in local communities. Although the LCs’ leaders, that is the members of the local 
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community council, are mainly elected by the general public (assembly of citizens), and 
to a lesser degree by secret ballot (elections), the information on the elected leadership 
in the LCs is very limited. 
The signiﬁcant presence of political parties in the processes of electing LC51 leader-
ship is an additional burden on its relationship with the citizenry. The parties nominate 
their representatives (even entire lists for the LCs’ councils). They are engaged in active 
lobbying in LCs for the election of their candidates in these councils. This practice is 
in conﬂict with local goals of having respectable members of communities elected. 
Consequently, there is a mistrust on the part of citizens that the municipal authorities 
work for their own beneﬁt.52 
Finally, the capacities of elected LC leaders mostly do not correspond with the 
required management responsibilities. Those persons who have more free time (usually 
the older ones) take over the functions of LC leaders, though they have either obsolete or 
insuﬃcient skills in the communication process, participatory planning, representation, 
etc. This signiﬁcantly deteriorates the faith of the citizenry that the LC leaders wish to 
represent them, rather than being the puppets of local authorities. 
As for the citizens’ opinion on LCs, the situation is quite diﬀerent. As the LCs have 
quite deep roots in society, the citizens are aware of their purpose and support LCs.53 
Positive opinion concerning LCs as the institution of citizen participation is mainly 
related to good memories of LC’s quasi-decision-making powers, rather than with the 
current role of LCs. 
5. COMPARING THE PRACTICE WITH THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The diﬀerence between the condition of LCs enacted by the law and the one realized 
in practice is very clear. Critical review shows that the government implements the 
minimum of their obligations to LCs; those which have been enacted by the law. Some 
municipalities did not harmonize their statutes with the law (although they were obli-
gated to do so), and the issue of responsibility for not acting in accordance with the law 
is not considered. Other municipalities have harmonized their statutes with the law, 
though they do not implement them in practice. 
It is clear that legislators in BiH (higher level of government—entities, cantons), 
have not enacted and/or do not implement the monitoring process of the application 
of the laws passed. 
Finally, ad-hoc cooperation between local self-governments and LCs is noticeable, 
even without the processes enacted by the law. A model of preparing local development 
plans or annual budget design is a good illustration for cooperation. 
More concretely, three key conclusions can be drawn: 
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 (i) Legal solutions did not lead to the desired participation of citizens and the role 
of LCs for which they were created;
 (ii) LCs, at the moment, only have the potential to contribute to a more eﬃcient 
local self-governance;
 (iii) Nominally, rural and urban LCs are formally the same, but in practice they are 
diﬀerent. 
While compliance with the European Charter on Local Self-Governance54 was posi-
tively evaluated by the experts, the BiH laws in the ﬁeld of local self-governance treat 
LCs55 diﬀerently. Despite the legal diﬀerences in both BiH entities, problems originate 
more from poor application of these laws and low willingness of local authorities to 
make LCs more functional. However, depending on individual motivation and energy, 
LCs are still the most recognizable mechanisms of citizen participation.56 
The situation in rural LCs is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the urban ones, where citi-
zens have better access to public and communal services. There are no positive changes 
in living conditions unless the residents of rural LCs initiate them. This situation was 
similar under the socialist regime, and is similar during the development of transitional 
multiparty society. 
This resulted in contrasting perceptions of LCs in rural communities versus urban 
communities. Urban citizens see LCs as an organizational structure of local self-gover-
nance—with all the previously-mentioned problems. The citizens of rural areas see LCs 
as a tool for the articulation of cooperation among its citizens in order to solve their 
communities’ problems. Rural communities have a greater sense of ownership over LCs 
than the citizens of urban areas, since they rely on each other, either in solving their 
communities’ problems or in cooperation with local authorities. 
 
6. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF IN-COUNTRY MODELS
Very few municipalities understood that the lack of detailed legal provisions on the 
cooperation of municipalities with the LCs was an opportunity to make cooperation 
better and more meaningful. The majority of municipalities actually used that relation-
ship to marginalize the LCs. 
The issue is whether the existing model of LC, as a form of citizen participation in 
decision-making, actually serves its purpose, or whether it is an accomplice in generating 
citizens’ mistrust toward the local authorities, and politicians. Is the existing model based 
on real needs or is it simply a legacy of the past, which enjoys a positive perception of 
the citizens, that is diﬃcult to abolish. 
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6.1 Differences of Legal Bases
The existence of three diﬀerent legal bases for the work of LCs in BiH (RS, FBiH, 
and Brčko District) is indicative of a clear disharmony in the legal regulations. As they 
expect the activities delegated from the municipality in such a way, the LCs are unable to 
fulﬁll their primary role of citizen representation towards local authorities. The optional 
character of LC status implies the absence of any binding managing processes in the 
LC. This results an LC that depends upon the personal characteristics of its leadership, 
rather than on any accountable action. 
6.2 Lack of Autonomy in Decision-making 
In BiH Federation, the LCs have the possibility to manage their own funds (self-contribu-
tion, other sources of funds, etc.), as well as the funds of the municipalities in the case of 
transferred municipal responsibilities. Although this is good opportunity, LCs, in reality, 
very rarely use this right, because they simply do not have any ﬁnancial means. 
The situation in RS is both worse and clearer. There is no possibility for the LCs to 
have their own funds, therefore they do not have any opportunity to make autonomous 
decisions.57 In such circumstances, the LC leadership is only formal, without any deci-
sion-making powers. 
6.3 Influence of Political Parties on LC Leadership 
The political parties saw the LCs as their political bases. Though the election of leader-
ship is a shared matter, citizens should elect respectable members of their communities 
in public gatherings. The political parties turned that process into a political ﬁght in the 
local arena. Oﬀering the lists of candidates at the gatherings of citizens, with pre-created 
agendas for lobbying in the stage of preparation of those meetings, the political parties 
have stolen this process from the communities, and turned it into a political issue, and 
a tool that will make easier for them the future management of local self-government. 
6.4 Limited Capacities for Participatory Management
Finally, one of the key challenges of LCs ability to function in BiH is the diminished 
capability of the politically-elected leaders. Their involvement considerably reduces the 
already weakened perspectives of the LCs in contributing to community development. 
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In most cases, they have obsolete management skills, typical of the previous socialist 
system, based on uniform opinion and an absence of a participatory approach. At the 
same time, they are unwilling or unprepared to adopt new skills and knowledge (IT, 
planning processes, communication with the community, etc.).
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(i) Decentralization of power does not end at the level of municipalities/cities. The same 
principle must be applied to the level of local self-governance, and an adequate 
part of responsibilities/competencies of municipalities should be transferred to the 
local communities (LCs). The essential cooperation between the citizens and the 
local authorities will not exist until at least some power (competence, responsibility, 
resources) is delegated to the local communities themselves. 
  Currently, it is diﬃcult to specify the functions to be allocated to LCs since there is 
a sizable diﬀerence between the municipalities in BiH. Additionally, it is the inten-
tion of the BiH governments to reform the current models of local self-government, 
particularly in the areas of ﬁscal decentralization and the model of municipalities. 
The current situation, where all municipalities (big/small, rich/poor, rural/urban, 
etc.) have the same responsibilities towards citizens, is no longer sustainable and is 
in need of improvement. 
  It is possible that a broader discussion will be launched about these issues, including 
the position of LCs. Here, the key argument is that decentralization should give 
more powers to LCs, which are close to the citizens. Potential concrete initiatives 
and proposals for empowering LCs are, as follows:
 • Give some executive power to the LCs in decision-making on at least a small 
budget within every LC for solving small-scale community issues;
 • Give an opportunity to the LCs for project-based communication with their 
municipalities (LCs can create projects and apply for additional resources for 
concrete problems in LCs on a competitive basis, which would provide oppor-
tunities and would strengthen competiveness between LCs;
 • Increase the eﬀectiveness of the LCs role in the budget-planning process, as well 
as in designing the development plans within municipalities. 
 
(ii) The LCs are forums for citizen participation in BiH with signiﬁcant potential that should 
be developed further. They should not be forsaken because of their connection with 
the previous system.58 The comparative advantages of LCs are the continuity of their 
operation, the better understanding of the public purposes, and a generally positive 
public attitude towards the organization of communities due to their pre-established 
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institutional structure. The challenges of the eﬃcient functioning of the LCs in the 
ﬁeld of elections and the capacity of leadership and management comprise good 
opportunities to improve the situation during a certain time period.
(iii) The existing legal framework that deﬁnes the local self-governance in both entities of BiH 
is generally positive, but should be further upgraded. This is especially true in the ﬁelds 
of the mandatory existence of the LCs in the municipalities (in RS) and deﬁning 
responsibilities, competencies, elections, and the education of LCs’ leadership (in 
FBiH and RS). 
  The relationship between LCs and municipalities, as primarily deﬁned by the stat-
utes of the municipalities and rules of LCs, is rather formal, so obligations of the 
municipality towards LCs should be clariﬁed. There is too much discretion at the 
municipality level, which would beneﬁt from further amendments to the statutes. 
(iv) It is indispensable to empower LCs to the level of self-governing units. Their development 
must be in line with municipal policies, which ought to take the largest portion of 
responsibility for the aﬃrmation and development of LCs. In this sense, one of the 
priorities is the standardization of regulations on the establishment and functioning 
of LCs in the statutes of municipalities. 
  Through their statutes, municipalities ought to ensure support for LCs in the 
following areas: ensuring permanent communication channels with LCs; transparent 
election of leadership; a guaranteed budgetary allocation for basic LCs expenditures, 
as well as for smaller, locally important community projects; assistance to LCs in 
proposing projects to municipal branches; introducing standardized award proce-
dures in budgetary-planning allocations in poorer municipalities, which should be 
in accordance with need, and the estimated administrative expenditures; including 
mid-level government; cooperation of smaller and poorer LCs, technical and 
educational work on development of LCs; introducing forums of LC leadership 
for joint actions regarding municipal authorities, together with interested NGOs 
and donors. 
(v) Strengthening public awareness on the importance and modes of participation of citi-
zens in decision-making in general. The existence of formal mechanisms that enable 
citizens to inﬂuence the work of the authorities is important, but also almost useless 
if citizens are insuﬃciently aware of the importance and the need of participation 
in the decision-making processes. Public awareness is developed gradually and is a 
demanding process in terms of time, unless the society makes eﬀorts in a targeted 
manner to support and accelerate that process. Educational campaigns as well as 
a systematic upgrading of the education system can signiﬁcantly contribute to the 
improvement of this process. 
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NOTES
1 The subsidiarity principle envisages decision-making at the levels closest to the citizen 
whenever that level can fulﬁll that role and its obligation to the citizens. 
2 Local communities developed very quickly in BiH during the 1970s through a very eﬀective 
governance mechanism in rural areas where the citizens used them for building of roads, 
sewage, and water systems, etc. 
3 Centri Civilnih Inicijativa report from 2006, Open Society Fund fellowship 2006, UNDP 
Human Development Report from 2004, and other relevant research. 
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4 Article 3 of ECHR guarantees this right.
5 Beside ECHR, BiH has signed and ratiﬁed the ICCPR, which deﬁnes the right to direct 
participation in Article 25 in a similar manner to ECHR. The right to participation guar-
antees that every citizen has the right and possibility to take part, directly or indirectly 
through freely elected representatives, in the conduct of public aﬀairs. ICCPR Article 25, 
UDHR Article 21, ECHR, Article 3, Protocol 1, CEDAW Articles 12 and 14, Committee 
for Human Rights General Comment 25. 
6 The goal of this program is to promote active European citizenship. 
7 Due to the fact that the EU has thus far been the community of governments, requests for 
a new European Constitution have a strong resonance among citizen associations which 
advocate inclusion of citizens in governance processes in EU.
8 The diﬀerences in views on local self-governance in BiH essentially lie in the diﬀerent inter-
pretations of the source of the communist system on the local level. There are those, like Mr. 
Zdravko Zlokapa, who think that the strength of the municipal, or local, is derived from the 
system established by the Communist Party which wanted to consolidate its control. There 
also is a more classical view based on the historical reliance on local elite from Ottoman 
times, and its control over life through the local units. This second view is not only speciﬁc 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is applied to other post-Ottoman societies as well. 
9 See 1963 Constitution of Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Available at: http://
sr.wikisource.org/sr-el. 
10 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia developed a peculiar system of socioeconomic gover-
nance, so-called “self-management” which relied on creating local elites in each of the 
municipalities. The peak of the Yugoslav economic boom happened in the 1980s and the 
power located at the local level grew considerably because of the connectedness of the local 
power-holders within the party and the enterprises which were run by the local elite. 
11 “BiH Municipalities and EU: Direct citizen participation in policy making at local level,” 
OSF Policy Fellowship Program 2005/2006, pp. 37–41: all together four participation 
mechanisms were analyzed whereby the LCs have been identiﬁed as a good solution in 
terms of representation of rural and returees communities. Also, LCs have the long-term 
capacity to become a strategic partner of NGOs. Besides these advantages, the LCs are the 
most recognizable and understandeable entities to citizens, which is why they are most often 
used and easily identiﬁed. The other advantage is that they are physically most accessible 
where they exist. 
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid; LCs major weaknesses are maintenance costs and weak legitimacy of leadership caused 
by strong polarization along party lines. 
14 “Where Does the Decentralization of Authorities in BiH End?” CCI, September 2006, 
p. 7. The report on the research states: “RS Law on Local Self-government which has been 
applicable since the beginning of 2005, deals to a good measure with the citizen participa-
tion.” Local governments are obliged to develop various mechanisms for citizen partici-
pation, and besides the suggested measures it suggests that municipalities develop other 
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mechanisms not forbidden by the law. It speciﬁcally treats LCs, leaving the municipalities 
the possibility to form them and regulate their functioning (Local Self-governance Law RS, 
Articles 106–109). 
15 Law on Principles of Local Self-government FBiH 2006, Article 30. 
16 Ibid, p. 24.
17 “Where Does the Decentralization of Authorities in BiH End?” CCI, September 2006, 
p. 10.
18 The Law on Local Self-governance of RS, Articles 106–109.
19 Before the analysis we have to include a methodological remark. All analyzed municipal 
statutes in RS are very similar and contain almost the same solutions although they have not 
been done in the same, typical form. The high level of similarity of the statutes we analyzed 
leads us to believe that other statutes are also similar, and that the conclusions we made can 
be generalized. 
20 RS Law on Local Self-governance; Statute of the Municipality; Decision on Forming the 
LCs.
21 See the Statute of Laktasi Municipality, Article 79 from 2005—available online: http://www.
laktasi.net/Dokumenti/PDF/statut.pdf.
22 Article 37 of the Statute of Municipality Centar Sarajevo.
23 Ibid, 2006, p. 12.
24 Ibid, 2006, p. 13.
25 Ibid, 2006, p. 20.
26 RS Law on Local Self-governance, Article 107, paragraph 2. 
27 See Article 77 of the Statute of Laktasi Municipality, available online: http://www.laktasi.
net/Dokumenti/PDF/statut.pdf.
28 Article 36 of the Statute of Municipality Centar Sarajevo, and Article 20 of the Rules of the 
Local Community of Municipality Sarajevo Centar. Aavailable online: http://www.centar.
ba/images/pdf/Ostalo/Statut%20OC%202002.pdf.
29 Dr. Zdravko Zlokapa (2005)”Constitutional, Legal and Other Regulations That Deﬁne 
Citizens’ Participation in BiH.” March 2005. 
30 “Where Does the Decentralization of Authorities in BiH End?” CCI, September 2006, 
p. 10. 
31 In 54 local governments, as eight do not have local communities.
32 12 local governments do not have LC budgets. 
33 29 local govenrments did not report on the number of LCs.
34 Ibid, 2006.
35 Ibid, 2006. Within this research the following was found: “...that within municipal budgets 
it is necessary to, on the basis of the size of LCs, number of inhabitants, and practice from 
earlier years, allocate minimum of resources for solving of non-capital but mainly urgent 
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problems, on which the LC council will directly decide and allocate the resources. The 
amount of those resources is estimated between BAM 5,000–10,000 depending on the 
size of LC.”
36 See “Lessons (not) Learned from LED Case Studies in BiH,” EDA Banja Luka, 2007, 
p. 13. Available online: http://www.edabl.org. 
37 These are the planning aspects: participatory planning (partnership of the public, private, 
and civil sectors; focus on the issues and problems to be resolved; detailed implementation 
plans for the implementation; and the indicators for monitoring (Swianiewicz 2004). 
38 Speaking of the entity level, in the Republika Srpska, indirect participation also represents 
a mainstay of the political system, though it is possible to complement it with direct forms 
even if the National Assembly deems it necessary. However, issues do not have to be (obliga-
tory) exposed in front of the citizens. 
39 This is logical interpretation of the Article 170 of the Operating Procedures of the National 
Assembly of RS. Its literal interpretation refers to the conclusion that at least two citizens 
are necessary for starting an initiative, or two municipal assemblies, or two associations, 
since this article has been written in the way that it can be interpreted diﬀerently, and so far 
nobody has requested its genuine interpretation. The disputable Article says: “An initiative 
for passing laws or other acts within the competence of the National Assembly can be given 
by municipal assemblies, ﬁrms, other organisations, political organisations, associations, and 
citizens.” All potential authors of initiatives are listed in plural; this may be grammatically 
more correct than in singular, but this other way would not cause confusion.
40 See “Brief Overview of the Strategy of Reform of Public Administration,” p. 3. Available 
online: http://www.cstp.undp.ba/download.aspx?id=594. 
41 See CCI’s Report “Where Does the Decentralization of Authorities in BiH End,” September 
2006. Available online: http://www.ccibh.org. 
42 “It is noteworthy that the municipalities were enabled for the ﬁrst time to participate in 
the drafting of the law at this stage.” See full text available online: http://www.sogfbih.
ba/Federation-Bos/Partners_and_projects/GAP. 
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Executive Summary
Since the adoption of the first Financial Decentralization Program in 2002 in Bulgaria, 
the implementation of the decentralization reforms has marked positive changes in local 
governments such as an increase in the municipal own revenues, clear division of service 
delivery responsibilities, simplification of the intergovernmental transfer systems, and an 
increase of municipal investment, thus contributing to the attainment of the reform objec-
tives. However, the reforms impose policy choices regarding the role of the submunicipal 
structures in the process of decentralization and provide challenges and opportunities that 
introducing further decentralization of local governance imply. 
The municipality is the main administrative and territorial unit of the local self-govern-
ment. The submunicipal territorial structures that contribute to the better provision of local 
services are the mayoralties. They are typically small—under 1,000 inhabitants. Mayoralties 
have very limited powers. The legislation treats them as deconcentrated structures of the 
municipality. The municipal council determines the specific powers of the mayoralty’s mayor 
and the mayor of the municipality may assign some of his/her functions to the mayoralty’s 
mayor. Though elected by the population, the mayors of the mayoralties may only control 
the implementation of activities within their territory for which the municipality has made 
a decision. 
The relations of mayoralties with the municipality are in all competencies of the local 
governments and the broadest area includes the planning, implementation, and reporting of 
the municipal budget in its section regarding the mayoralty. What characterizes the relations 
between the local government and the mayoralties is the different extent to which powers 
have been transferred in different municipalities. Usually, mayoralties are administratively 
dependent on the municipal government. There are individual examples where they are 
given greater authority to make decisions, appoint staff, determine compensations, etc. With 
respect to financial decentralization, two models exists. Under the typical model of service 
and finance management, the mayoralties do not have their own budgets, even analytical 
ones, and do not provide administrative or technical services. An alternative model exists in 
a few municipalities, where the municipal council grants powers to the mayoralty’s mayor 
to determine the level of fiscal and service delivery autonomy at the mayoralty level. Good 
practices also exist regarding the participation of the population in decision-making at the 
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level of mayoralties and the participation of the mayoralties’ mayors in making decisions 
by the municipality on issues related to the development of the mayoralty.
The decentralization process should be further developed to raise the status of the 
mayoralty to a basic self-governing community. Obviously, such reform will require more 
time, political will, and action. Some measures—such as the dissemination of the existing 
good practices in the interaction between municipality and mayoralties and the transfer of 
services, resources, and powers to mayoralties—could be implemented within the framework 
of existing legislation and in the short to medium term. 
The further progress of these interactions will require changes in the laws regulating 
the administrative, territorial structure, and the functioning of local self-government in the 
country and will be marked by long-term measures. 
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1. REVIEW OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION REFORM 
 SINCE 2002 AND ITS IMPACT ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
This section describes the progress made since 2002 in implementing ﬁscal decen-
tralization reforms, their impact on the local sector, and the need for adequate eﬀorts 
towards further decentralization below the municipality level. The changes envisaged 
in the government’s two consecutive Financial Decentralization Programs (2002–2005 
and 2006–2009) created conditions for: (a) an increase of municipal own revenue; 
(b) a clear division of service delivery responsibilities; (c) a simpliﬁcation of the intergov-
ernmental transfer system; (d) an increase of municipal investment, thus contributing 
to the attainment of the reform objectives. 
1.1 Main Outcomes
 • Past mechanisms used to reduce state transfers when municipal own revenues 
marked growth were eliminated, thus removing the factor which was a main 
disincentive for the generation of municipal own revenues;
 • The local governments were granted full powers to deﬁne the base and rates of 
local fees, and to grant tax exemptions for speciﬁc population groups; 
 • Deﬁnite advancement was scored in respect to local governments’ authority to 
administer local taxes and fees;
 • A substantial increase in the use of debt for municipal infrastructure after 
2004;
 • A stable, simple, and predicable system of transfers was achieved;
 • A proposal for the expansion of the real-estate tax base was introduced to allow 
a further increase of municipal revenue;
 • The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria was amended in 2007, allowing 
municipal taxing powers as of the beginning of 2008.
1.2 Key Qualitative Characteristics
Municipal own revenues increased by 57 percent in 2004, compared to 2002, and by 
39 percent for 2006–2004. Own revenues also increased at a higher rate compared to 
all municipal revenues, which has led to an increase of the share of own revenues in 
total revenues. This share was 23.7 percent in 2002, 30.5 percent in 2004, and reached 
34.8 percent in 2006. 
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Transfers are speciﬁed by law in a predictable way (80 percent of grants). The only 
exception is the targeted subsidy for investments the amount of which is set annually 
by the State Budget Act. 
Investment expenditures of the municipalities increased substantially during this 
period. They reached 21 percent of the total expenditures of the municipalities in 
2006. By comparison, in 2003, their portion was 10.7 percent, and in 2004 was 11.3 
percent.
1.3 Disparities across Municipalities 
Table 1.
 Grouping Municipalities by Population Size
Groups of municipalities 
by inhabitants
Number of 
municipalities
Relative portion of the number 
of the municipalities (%)
Relative portion of 
the population (%)
Sofia 1 0.4 15.5
Over 100,000 10 3.8 23.3
50,000–100,000 22 8.3 19.6
30,000–50,000 19 7.2 8.9
10,000–30,000 113 42.8 25.0
5,000–10,000 69 26.1 6.4
Below 5,000 30 11.4 1.3
Total 264 100.0 100.0
1.3.1 Own Revenues Per Capita
The variation coeﬃcient has increased from 77.8 percent in 2002, to 108.2 percent in 
2004. There is a direct correlation between the extent of disparity and local government 
powers. The intermunicipal disparities in terms of tax revenues are the lowest—starting 
from 59.7 percent in 2002, they increased by 28 percent to reach 76.4 percent in 2004. 
The variation coeﬃcient for the local fees was 76.3 percent in 2002, and 99.8 percent 
in 2004. The other non-tax revenues are characterized by the biggest disparities—the 
variation coeﬃcient has increased from 126.5 percent to 181.1 percent.
The large and small municipalities have more own revenues per capita, due to other 
non-tax revenues. However, local tax revenues and revenues from local fees increase with 
population size. The relationship between own revenues per capita and the population 
size is presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. 
Own Revenues Per Capita for 2004 by Groups of Municipalities
1.3.2 Municipal Net-cash Balance
Net-cash balance is calculated as the diﬀerence of budget revenues (budget plus overdue 
receivables) and expenditures (budget plus overdue liabilities). At the national level, 
the municipalities closed the ﬁscal year 2005 with a positive net balance of BGN 
187.2 million, which was an increase of about BGN 20 million compared to 2004. It 
is comprised of a positive balance of BGN 214.8 million in 209 municipalities, and a 
negative one of BGN 27.6 million in the other 55 municipalities (Table 2).
Table 2.
Cash Balance
Groups of municipalities
by inhabitants
Net-cash balance
BGN/ 
capita
Positive Negative
BGN/capita Number of 
municipalities
BGN/capita Number of 
municipalities
Sofia 32.9 32.9 1 0.0 0
Over 100,000 29.5 37.1 9 –99.0 1
50,000–100,000 11.8 22.1 17 –21.9 5
30,000–50,000 21.0 26.8 16 –15.3 3
10,000–30,000 23.4 32.6 91 –16.9 22
5,000–10,000 22.3 36.1 51 –13.5 18
Below 5,000 42.8 58.3 24 –13.1 6
Total 24.0 31.9 209 –25.6 55
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The data shows that, with the exception of Soﬁa, each group includes municipalities 
with surplus and deﬁcit. For all groups the compensated result is positive. The deﬁcit 
amount is increasing in all groups, with the exception of the municipalities with popu-
lations of between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants.
A smaller number of municipalities have a larger surplus on average. In 2004, there 
were 214 such municipalities, and the average surplus was BGN 27.3 per capita. The 
average deﬁcit also increased, namely BGN –25.6 per capita, compared to BGN –20.4 
per capita in 2004. We can conclude that, according to this indicator, the diﬀerence 
among the municipalities is increasing.
1.3.3 Municipal Expenditures for Education Per Student
The cost of education services shows that the smaller the municipality, the “more expen-
sive” a student. In general, in the reviewed period (2003–2005) the growth of per-capita 
education costs was higher in the smaller municipalities.
Table 3.
Expenditures Per Student in Comprehensive Schools by Groups of Municipalities
Groups of municipalities
by inhabitants
Expenditures per student in BGN Change in percent
2003 2004 2005 2004–2003 2005–2004 2005–2003
Sofia 767 792 845 3.3 6.7 10.2
Over 100,000 647 703 792 8.7 12.6 22.4
50,000–100,000 710 777 862 9.4 11.0 21.5
30,000–50,000 722 823 889 14.0 8.0 23.2
10,000–30,000 749 871 956 16.3 9.8 27.6
5,000–10,000 778 944 1,027 21.3 8.8 32.0
Below 5,000 875 1,150 1,137 31.4 –1.1 29.9
Total 719 801 880 11.4 9.9 22.4
2. DEVELOPMENT, FORMS, AND FUNCTIONS OF MAYORALTIES 
2.1 Historical Review1
Daily community life creates common needs, goals, and actions. The political system 
aims at identifying those needs and arranging for their satisfaction. The goal of a contem-
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porary state is to support the life of individuals through satisfaction of their common 
needs. Some of these needs are local in nature and directly related to historical, cultural, 
climatic, and other local factors. Their satisfaction involves the existence of local authori-
ties, whose jurisdiction spreads over the boundaries of such territorially-established 
groups of people. The state delegates a part of its powers to those authorities and allows 
them independent actions within these powers. In this sense, one can talk about local 
governments. The self-governing institutions are territorially-limited, legal persons with 
powers to provide a range of public services and compulsory powers to collect incomes 
and make expenditures within the limits of their competence.
The state theory on self-governance deﬁnes the functions of a municipality as 
an expedient division of public action, and the municipality itself as a subordinated 
authority whose powers derive from the state authority. Nevertheless, as a union of 
neighbors, which performs tasks, ensued from common life, the municipality is older 
than the state. 
The history of the self-governance in Bulgarian territory stems from the Slavs’ lack 
of a unitary state. They lived in their own communities and discussed all common 
problems at community assemblies. 
At that time, public organization was a federation of regions with preserved identity 
and autonomy. All villages paid taxes to the regional rulers and to the jupans. The villagers 
elected an elder (stareishina), a holder of the administrative, police, and judicial powers. 
The jupa was an intermediate self-governing association representing the autonomous 
public organization of the tribe. The common issues of both the village and the jupa 
were decided at assemblies. The administrative center of the jupa was the town fortress. 
The jupan was elected. Several jupas formed a region, governed by a prince. The jupan 
and the regional ruler had the power to impose taxes and natural duties. Each village 
or jupa bore joint responsibility for the crimes or the duties of its members.
When they settled in these lands, the Bulgars uniﬁed the separated regions and, at 
the same time, kept their autonomous self-governance. The relationship between the 
supreme power and the regions was expressed through the taxes that the regions were 
paying, and through their participation in the wars under the commandment of the 
supreme power. 
The Byzantine yoke did not have a direct impact on Bulgarian self-governance. 
A structure called pronia appeared. Pronias were villages ceded to honored persons. 
The proniar was not an owner of the pronia; he only took use of it when executing his 
responsibilities. The proniar collected the taxes for himself and for the state. Later, the 
pronia were inherited. 
These trends increased during the Second Bulgarian State. The jupas and the regions 
gradually disappeared and were supplanted by pronias. Only the villages preserved part 
of their self-governing powers. Free villages exercised their previous judicial, economic, 
and ﬁnancial autonomous competent powers. 
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The pronias further developed under the Turkish yoke. The independence of the 
villages and the towns almost disappeared. In the second half of 19th century, Sultan 
Abdul Asis issued the law on vilayets (1867) and the law on the general administration 
of the vilayets (1871). According to their provisions, the municipality (a settlement with 
more than 50 houses) became the main administrative unit. Each municipality was 
managed by a council of elders—from four to twelve elected persons. The functions of the 
municipal council were: to support cleanliness and hygiene; to elect and appoint guards 
for agricultural lands and forests and the chief of the municipal police; to contribute 
to the development of agriculture and trade in the village; to decide on an equitable 
allocation of the tax burden to villages; to receive and properly use donations for the 
village; to take care of orphans and the property of deceased persons whose heirs were 
absent; to inform the authority about uncultivated lands; to monitor the administration 
of charitable institutions and village schools; to select workers for road duty; to ﬁght 
crime and deliver perpetrators to the proper authority; to inform the authorities about 
misbehavior and abuses on behalf of the representative of the central government.
The second self-governing unit was the kaaza. The administrative council of the 
kaaza performed the following functions: control over the incomes and the expendi-
tures of the kaaza, audit of the savings accounts, allocation of taxes among villages and 
quarters, preservation of public health, and maintenance of country roads. The larger 
sandjik and vilayet were the other administrative territorial units. 
Immediately after the Russian-Turkish War, Russia started to build the state structure 
of the newly liberated territories. This task was assigned to the former mayor of Moscow, 
Prince Cherkaski. Originally, he maintained the Turkish administrative and territorial 
division—municipality, nahia (okolia, for at this level local government did not exist), 
kaaza (district), and others, except for the vilayets. Later, these administrative structures 
developed towards local self-government. 
Article 3 of the Constitution of the thereafter liberated Bulgaria divided the terri-
tory into okrazi (provinces), okolii (districts), and municipalities. The municipalities 
won recognition as the main self-governing structures. Subsequently, the okolia only 
remained an administrative unit, while the municipalities and the okrazi became levels 
of local government. The adopted laws set two types of municipalities: town and rural. 
Research from the1930s showed that the municipalities were too small to undertake 
the necessary economic and social functions and the services provided by them were 
quite ineﬀective. Two types of municipalities existed: self-contained (one settlement) and 
composite that included several settlements.
The okrag (province) was the second level of local government. Its council was elected 
by the citizens and were responsible for the cultural and economic development of the 
respective territory. In the middle of the 1940s, these structures were declared ineﬀective 
and were discontinued. The oblasts were established in their place, where institutions of 
the central government operated. 
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2.2 Current Status of the Submunicipal Democratic Model 
2.2.1 Main Demographic Characteristics of the Mayoralties
The municipality is the main administrative and territorial unit of the local self-govern-
ment. Bulgarian municipalities are relatively large. On average, a municipality has 
around 25,000 residents, 20 settlements, and 420 square kilometers of territory. This 
scale necessitates the establishment of internal, submunicipal territorial structures to 
contribute to the better provision of local services. The mayoralties are such structures. A 
mayoralty has a territory, boundaries, a title, and an administrative center. It comprises 
one or more settlements. In order to be established, a mayoralty should have a popula-
tion of at least 250 residents. 
Bulgaria counts 2,560 mayoralties, according to the most recent data from September 
2007. The average number of the population in the mayoralties is 821 persons. 
Mayoralties can be established in settlements outside of the administrative center of 
the municipality. The population living in mayoralties numbers 2.1 million residents 
and represents 27.4 percent of the total population of the country. The diﬀerences by 
regions are presented in the table below. 
Table 4.
 Data on the Mayoralties2
EU regions Number of Population of
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
North-Central 41 363 1,129,729 360,045
North-East 49 575 1,264,101 399,409
North-West 32 218 484,623 167,853
South-Central 68 769 1,912,542 611,252
South-East 22 289 771,504 233,300
South-West 52 346 2,116,791 330,074
Total 264 2,560 7,679,290 2,101,933
The data show that the average number of mayoralties is 10 per municipality, 90 
per district, and 426 in a EU planning region. The population living in mayoralties 
represents 27 percent of the total population of Bulgaria.
By the number of the population, the mayoralties in the country could be grouped 
as follows (see Table 5).
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 Table 5. 
Groups of Mayoralties by Number of Residents (2006)
Demographic groups 
by population 
Number of 
mayoralties
Share of 
mayoralties (%)
Population Population 
share (%)
Over 5,000 2 0.1 13,200 0.6
4,000–4,999 17 0.7 74,891 3.6
3,000–3,999 32 1.3 110,074 5.2
2,000–2,999 120 4.7 288,315 13.7
1,000–1,999 482 18.8 662,542 31.5
500–999 833 32.5 592,387 28.2
250–499 874 34.1 323,817 15.4
Under 250 200 7.8 36,707 1.7
Total 2,560 100.0 2,101,933 100.0
The data show that only two mayoralties in the country have over 5,000 resi-
dents—the village Lozen, near Soﬁa, and the village Aydemir, in the Silistra District. If 
mayoralties with over 3,000 residents are regarded as “large” ones, then they represent 
just two percent of all mayoralties with 9.4 percent of the total population of mayoral-
ties in the country. Mayoralties with population between 1,000 and 3,000 residents 
could be deﬁned as “medium.” They represent 23.5 percent of all mayoralties and their 
population represents 45.2 percent of the population of all mayoralties. As seen from 
the data, the predominant mayoralties are “small”—with a population of under 1,000. 
Such mayoralties represent almost three quarters of all mayoralties; 45.3 percent of the 
population live there.
3. ASSESSMENT OF THE SUBMUNICIPAL DEMOCRACY MODEL 
3.1 Political Representation 
According the Law on the Administrative and Territorial Structure of the Republic of 
Bulgaria, the necessary conditions for the establishment of a mayoralty are as follows:
 • A motivated request by at least 25 percent of the votes in the relevant settle-
ments;
 • Review of the request by the municipal council, and initiating a referendum 
among the population;
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 • The decision of the municipal council for the establishment of a mayoralty (in 
the case of a positive referendum);
 • Judgment of the district governor for the legal compliance of the procedure;
 • Promulgation in the State Gazette.
The mayors of the mayoralties (the municipal mayors as well), are elected directly 
by the population for a four-year term. The municipal council, on the other hand, is 
constituted on the basis of proportional votes (political parties’ lists). The election rules 
for both the municipal and mayoralty mayors are the same, but in terms of political 
representation, the kmetstvo mayor is completely subordinated to the municipal one. 
The mayor represents the mayoralty to the population, public, political organizations, 
and to other mayoralties. The mayor of the mayoralty issues orders in performing his 
powers. The mayor of the municipality controls the legal compliance of the acts and 
actions of the mayors of mayoralties in performance of their powers. He has the right 
to cancel their orders. 
Obviously, there are political disagreements between the two mayors. As a rule, they 
pertain to the way municipal resources are allocated. Formal means for dealing with 
these disagreements do not exist. 
The mayoralty mayor has the right to make formal proposals before the municipal 
council only through the municipal mayor. As a general rule, the kmetstvo mayor is 
part of the budgeting process. Issues such as local investments, public transportation 
to the municipal center, and local social-welfare establishments are among the most 
frequently discussed topics. 
The municipal council adopts rules for the organization and operation of the 
municipal council. These rules regulate the rights of the mayoralties’ mayors referring 
to the possibility of making decisions for the development of the mayoralties. 
Often mayoralties are deconcentrated units of the municipality. Though elected by 
the population, the mayors of the municipalities may only control the implementa-
tion of activities within their territory for which the municipality has made a decision. 
The good practices in that respect may be classiﬁed in two groups: involvement of the 
population in decision-making at the level of mayoralties, and participation of the 
mayoralties’ mayors in making decisions by the municipality on issues related to the 
development of the mayoralty.
The mayor of the mayoralty annually reports to the citizens on his/her activites. 
There is a possibility that the mayoralty’s general assembly elect the mayor’s advisers 
proposed by the relevant mayor. These advisers have consultative functions and support 
the mayor in the performance of his/her duties. The mayoralty mayor may not submit 
proposals for the municipal council decision, if they are not ﬁrst discussed by the board 
of mayor’s advisers. 
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The mayoralty mayor participates in decision-making at the municipal level. 
There is a possibility for the mayoralties’ mayors to submit proposals for decision at 
the municipal council directly, and not via the municipal mayor as intermediary. The 
mayors of mayoralties can participate in sessions of the statutory committees, and they 
are allowed to make inquiries. The session of mayoralties gives a secondary authoriza-
tion on municipal credits and regulates their powers, including their relations with the 
municipal mayor and the council. There are regular meetings of the municipal mayor 
with mayors of the mayoralties. Representatives of the administration also attend these 
meetings, depending on the issues raised by the mayors.
3.2 Relationships between the Different Levels of Governance 
The mayoralties, as structural units of the municipality, have intensive management 
relations with the municipality and the mayoralty’s citizens. The relations with the 
municipality are in all competencies of the local governments. The municipal council 
deﬁnes the concrete powers of the mayoralty’s mayor. The municipal council assigns its 
functions to the mayor of mayoralty, performs control on his/her activities, and has the 
power to cancel his/her initiatives. The broadest area of relations of the mayoralty with 
the municipality includes the planning, implementation, and reporting of the municipal 
budget in its section regarding the mayoralty. The mayor of mayoralty is responsible for 
the management of the municipal property assigned by the municipal council. He/she 
appoints and dismisses the oﬃcials and the secretary in the mayoralty. 
It is an important matter whether one mayoralty is determined as a secondary 
authorizer of budget credits by a municipal council decision, or by an ordinance of the 
municipal mayor. In the ﬁrst instance, the mayoralty is relatively independent in giving 
greater powers to the mayor and having its own budget. Otherwise, the mayoralties are 
typical deconcentrated units, without budget or powers to plan and manage activities 
and services. Each item of their expenditures is veriﬁed only after permission is given 
by the ﬁnancial controller of the relevant municipal administration. Their powers are 
limited to making proposals, cooperating with activities performed by the municipality, 
and controlling the activities of the sub-contractors working on the mayoralty’s territory 
under contracts concluded with the municipality. 
Regardless of whether they are secondary authorizers of budget credits, the mayors of 
mayoralties have duties regarding the drafting and discussion of the municipal budget. 
The Municipal Budgets Act regulates that the “draft municipal budget is prepared also 
according to the proposals of the mayors of mayoralties….”
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (Articles 136 and 140), 
the municipality is a legal entity and is entitled to property, which it may use for the 
beneﬁt of the local community. The acquisition, management, and arrangement of real 
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estate and movable property owned by the municipalities are settled by the Municipal 
Property Act. Several special laws, such as the Law on Forests, Law on Water, and the Law 
on the Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land, are also related to municipal property. 
The powers of the mayors of mayoralties in relation to the acquisition, management, 
and arrangement of municipal property are deﬁned with and ordinance that is adopted 
by the municipal council. 
There are municipalities where the municipal councils have granted to the mayors of 
mayoralties extended authority with respect to service provision. This practice, however, 
is typical of no more than 10 percent of the municipalities in Bulgaria.
What characterizes the relations between the local government and the kmetstva is 
the diﬀering extent to which powers have been transferred in diﬀerent municipalities. 
The kmetstva are administratively dependent on the municipal government. There are 
individual examples where they are given greater authority to make decisions, appoint 
staﬀ, determine compensations, etc. With respect to ﬁnancial decentralization, the 
practices also vary—ranging from cases where no information is given about available 
ﬁnancial resources, to cases where they have separate budgets, property rights, and 
generate their own resources. 
The level of political decentralization is characterized by weak citizen participation in 
decision-making. The main problems in the relations between the mayors and municipal 
councils and the mayors of kmetstva could be summarized as follows:
 • Service delivery eﬃciency at municipal level versus kmetstva’s interest for serving 
the constituents better;
 • The mayoralties do not have powers to deﬁne the type and scope of the services 
they deliver;
 • The mayoralties have very limited budget authorities, particularly with regards 
to the expenditure section;
 • Most frequently, their budget is a separate portion of the municipal budget, 
and their expenditure authorities are very small; 
 • The mayoralties do not have any property of their own and cannot generate 
own revenue;
 • Weak involvement of the local community in the decision-making process.
The mayors of mayoralties have a relationship with the deconcentrated units of the 
central government regarding the realization of their competencies, or competencies 
delegated by the municipal council, or the municipal mayor based on special laws. The 
most important of them are:
 • Maintenance of civil registers and issuance of civil status acts—with the regional 
units of the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works;
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 • Public order protection activities—with the Ministry of Interior;
 • Improvement and restoration of the environment—with the Ministry of 
Environment and Water.
The mayors of mayoralties also have powers under other special laws: to perform 
some speciﬁc notary actions, some forestation activities, and supply of the population 
with wood for heating according to the Law on Forests. 
In general, the mayoralties do not have a management or ﬁnancial relationship with 
the service establishments. By performing their functions, the mayoralties contribute to 
the operation of these establishments on their territory. For example, the mayoralties 
are responsible for street cleaning, lighting, and maintenance; public order protection; 
etc. In certain mayoralties, however, the ﬁnancial resources of the service establishments 
are part of the mayoralty’s budget, and the mayor appoints the director of the relevant 
establishment. These are, for example, the kindergartens. It is a common practice the 
mayors of mayoralties to directly organize and ﬁnance the clubs of the pensioners and 
disabled people. 
4. SERVICE PROVISION RESPONSIBILITIES 
The services provided by the mayoralties can be divided into three groups: 
Group One
The mayoralty delivers or intermediates the delivery of services, and executes activities 
on behalf and for the account of the municipality. These are services used by the local 
population which can be made solely by the municipality in its role as an independent 
and self-governing institution. In this case, the mayoralty, as a representative of the 
municipality, issues or intermediates the issuance of oﬃcial documents, permits, licenses, 
and the like to its population. 
 Other activities performed by the mayoralty, as a representative of the municipality, 
cover: the arrangements for elections, the transfer of funds for the transportation of 
conscripted soldiers, the collection of local taxes and charges, as well as exercising onsite 
oversight (of construction, environment, roads). The goals are related to saving citizens’ 
time and money. It is not necessary that they travel to the center of the municipality 
for the issuance of documents if this can be done through oﬃcial channels. This also 
refers to the municipal oﬃcers. They do not need to travel to the villages where oﬃcers 
of the mayoralty can perform a certain activity.
 Table 6 shows a list of mandatory activities, performed by the mayoralty on behalf 
and for the account of the municipality:
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Table 6.
Mandatory Activities Performed by the Mayorality
1. Administrative services, including collection of local taxes and charges
2. Technical services
3. Police, internal order, and security (regional inspector)
4. State and municipal bodies and activities related to elections 
5. Management, control, and regulation of housing construction, and regional development 
6. Management, control, and regulation of activities related to transport and roads 
7. Management, control, and regulation of activities on environment protection 
8. Other defense activities (conscript soldiers)
In summary, three types of deconcentrated activities, assigned-by-law, are performed 
by the mayoralty: (i) activities assigned by the state to the municipality—elections, civil 
registration, conscript soldiers; (ii) issuance of oﬃcial documents—birth certiﬁcates, 
death certiﬁcates, marriage certiﬁcates, heir certiﬁcates, permits, licenses, etc; (iii) control 
of construction, environment, and the like. 
Group Two
The mayoralty arranges locally-delegated services for which the municipality is respon-
sible, and for which their delivery is mandatory. The costs of these services are allo-
cated to the mayoralties through an objective mechanism. Therefore, the municipality 
performs the activities related to the allocation of resources and control of performance. 
The mayoralties perform functions such as activities planning, operating planning and 
ﬁnancing, while observing municipal guidelines as to the types of services, quality, 
access, and the like.
Table 7 shows the services that may be delegated by the municipality to the mayoralty.
Table 7.
Services Delegated to the Mayoralty
1. Other healthcare activities (de-lousing and prophylaxis) 
2. Water supply and sewage, maintenance of fountains and other natural water sources 
3. Other activities on residential construction and territorial development 
4. Cleaning, garbage collection, village waste, etc.
5. Other activities on community improvements and environmental protection 
6. Physical education and sports
7. Ceremonial houses and halls
8. Offices and activities on maintenance, repairs, and road construction 
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Group Three
The consumers of speciﬁc local services live within the mayoralty and, depending upon 
the local populations’ wishes, these services may or may not be delivered. The eﬀects 
are related to the opportunity of local residents to make a decision, which is more 
appropriate to their needs, and to the release of the municipal administration from the 
responsibility of planning, ﬁnancing, and managing activities that could be executed 
at a lower level. The ﬁnal, oﬃcial decision, including the budgetary one, is taken by 
the municipal council. If the kmetstvo has its own budget, then, as a rule, the council 
approves the budget allocation proposed by the kmetstvo mayor. 
Box 1.
Razgrad Municipality
General meetings of the village are organized with representatives of the municipality and in 
the presence of the village mayor for the regular discussions of the budget and other signiﬁcant 
issues. At these meetings, the local population states its position and makes proposals. For 
example, in 2006, the municipality assumed a debt of BGN ﬁve million for street-repair of the 
whole municipality; the distribution of funds by the village was approved at a meeting of the 
municipal council, but the village meetings determined exactly which streets were to be subject 
to repair work. 
The managers of establishments that provide local services are assigned by the mayors 
of mayoralties. The types of local services are presented in the table below:
Table 8.
Types of Local Services Assigned by Mayors 
1. Half-day and seasonal kindergartens
2. Social Assistance Directorate, soup kitchens, and other social services 
3. Clubs for pensioners and disabled
4. Lighting 
5. Baths and laundries
6. Landscaping
7. Orchestras and ensembles
8. Museums and galleries of local character
9. Other cultural activities
10. Municipal markets
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The remaining services, such as homes for children deprived of parental care, centers 
for social rehabilitation of disabled people, centers for drug-addicted individuals, etc., 
used by the mayoralty’s population, are provided by service establishments. They are not 
administratively, methodically, or ﬁnancially subordinated to mayoralties. However, the 
discussions regarding their localization, and the access of the local population to them, 
are a question of local policies. Presently, this is subject to the relationship between the 
municipality and the service establishments. The services delivered by these establish-
ments are mass ones, i.e., they cover all mayoralties, the funds for them are allocated 
to establishments at the municipality level, and part of them should satisfy criteria 
formulated by the state. 
5. SERVICE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCING MODELS 
The Local Self-government and Local Administration Act (LSLDA) treats the mayoralty 
as a deconcentrated structure of the municipality. The municipal council determines the 
speciﬁc powers of the mayoralty’s mayor. The mayor of the municipality assigns some 
of his/her functions to the mayoralty’s mayor, exercises control over the activities of the 
latter, and has the right to cancel his/her regulations. 
Within the boundaries of the deconcentrated structure, there are also minimal 
statutory powers of the mayoralty’s mayor. The mayor assigns and dismisses oﬃcers 
and the secretary of the mayoralty. The mayor is responsible for the managing of the 
municipal property determined by the municipal council. He/she executes the budget 
of the municipality in the portion concerning the mayoralty. 
The services provided by the mayoralty are reduced to the following: 
 • administrative services, performed directly by the administration—keeping the 
inhabitants’ registers and the delivery of administrative services; 
 • public safety—mayors execute certain police functions; they organize protection 
in the case of calamities, failures, and the safeguarding of ﬁled property; 
 • public works, environmental improvement, and protection. 
The mayoralties’ mayors also have powers under special laws—to perform certain 
notary actions, forestation, and supplying the inhabitants with ﬁrewood under the 
Forests Act. 
Diﬀerent laws give the municipalities’ mayors the power to assign other functions to 
the kmetstvas’ mayors. For example, these can be powers transferred from the mayor of 
the municipality regarding conscript soldiers, the issuance of documents for ownership 
of animals, the organization and control of environmental protection, etc.
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Basically, the scope of services provided at the kmetsvo level depends on a munici-
pality’s political will. There are two models of relationships driving the kmetstvo’s service 
delivery responsibilities. 
5.1 Typical/Centralized Model
The mayoralties do not have their own budgets, even analytical ones. They do not provide 
administrative or technical services. The services that are delivered by the kmetstva are 
ﬁnanced from the municipal budget. The municipality ﬁnances the salaries of the mayor 
and of the secretary who assists on behalf of the municipality in the organization of elec-
tion, and exercises control over construction works. In the ﬁeld of environment protec-
tion, the mayoralty exercises control and proposes penalties for violations such as: illegal 
dumping, collection and transportation of household and construction waste, etc. 
The mayoralty’s mayors do not participate in setting the location of service establish-
ments. Mayoralties do not have property and do not gain their own revenue. They may 
not outsource activities or organize tenders. The municipality directly funds all local 
activities and the budget of the mayoralty is from the result of the expenses incurred 
on the respective territory. 
The participation of the inhabitants of the mayoralties is direct—through written 
proposals, questionnaires, discussions at general meetings, and meetings with the 
management of the municipality and the municipal councilors. Usually, these refer to 
repairs and construction projects in the ﬁeld of community improvements: streets, water 
supply, sewage and the like. There are no formal civil organizations. 
5.2 Advanced Model
The municipal council grants powers to the mayoralty’s mayor to determine the level of 
ﬁscal and service delivery autonomy at kmetstva level. Typically, the following activities 
are executed and services are delivered by the mayoralties: 
 1. Administration;
 2. Full-day kindergartens;
 3. Clubs of pensioners, disabled people, etc.;
 4. Water supply and sewage;
 5. Lighting of streets and squares;
 6. Cleaning;
69
S u b m u n i c i p a l  G o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  i n  B u l g a r i a
 7. Services and activities for the maintenance, repair, and construction of roads; 
 8. Other economic activities;
 9. Temporary employment programs;
 10. Other healthcare activities (healthcare services provided);
 11. Ceremony venues and halls.
The mayoralties’ administration provides almost all administrative services and 
a limited number of technical services. It assists in the organization of elections 
and exercises control over construction works, environmental protection, roads, and 
other areas. 
In the municipalities, applying the advanced model, the mayoralties perform 
approximately seven percent of all services delivered by the whole municipal administra-
tion. Their share is prevailing in the organization of clubs for pensioners and disabled 
people—69 percent, and the temporary employment programs—76 percent, as well as 
the lighting of streets and squares—69 percent. The mayoralties manage about 20 percent 
of the municipal activities on public cleaning and perform 15 percent of the activities on 
maintenance, repairs, and construction of roads. They manage 26 percent of the full-day 
kindergartens and united establishments on the territory of the municipality. 
The municipal council is entitled to open and close activities or services and decide on 
where and what establishments can function. The mayoralty’s mayor participates in the 
meetings of the municipal council and expresses the position of the local community. 
Box 2.
Troyan Municipality
On an annual basis, the general meetings of the inhabitants of the respective mayoralty assess the 
executed activities, and give their proposals on the type and number of services to be included 
in the next year’s budget. Representatives of the territorial principle are elected at these meetings 
to form the mayor’s council. The number of members of the mayor’s council are subject to vote. 
The elected mayor’s councils in the mayoralties and the substitutes in the Troyan municipality 
are from ﬁve to 11 members. All requests of the mayoralty’s mayor to the municipality council 
should be supported by the mayor’s council. This council provides support to the mayor in plan-
ning, organizing, and management of activities subject to its competences.
The mayoralties do not have their own property, though they manage certain 
municipal property, as assigned by the municipal council. In the case of eﬃciency gains, 
the mayoralties receive part of the additional income. 
Mayoralties may not procure, but as a rule they may take part in the commission 
established at the municipal level. The mayoralty’s mayors may not outsource activities. 
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The municipal council is authorized to do this. They plan, organize, and manage the 
respective activities, and pay directly to the assignees. 
Usually, these mayoralties have separate bank accounts and budgets adopted by 
the municipal council. The mayoralty has the power to allocate the costs planned and 
approved by the municipal council by items and/or activities within each function. 
The planned activities are ﬁnanced through a municipal subsidy, which is transferred 
on a monthly basis to the mayoralty. The mayoralty does not have its own income except 
for the assets from eﬃciency gains.
Aside from current expenses on costs and salaries, the mayoralty’s budget also 
includes a small amount for investment. This is usually intended for repairs of streets 
and roads, water supply, sewage, and other small repairs. The mayoralty’s budget also 
includes expenses for establishments that provide local services (kindergartens, clubs 
of pensioners, etc.). 
In the course of the ﬁnancial year, the mayor has the right to re-distribute the 
funds in the respective budget only from maintenance costs to investments and vice-
versa. The amount determined for employment costs cannot be changed. In the case 
of a savings from one activity of the mayoralty, the funds can be transferred to another 
activity, but only within the same function. The annual savings (transitional balance) 
are centralized.
On an annual basis, the general meetings of the inhabitants of the respective mayor-
alty assess the executed activities, and give their proposals on the type and number of 
services to be included in the next year’s budget. Representatives of the territorial principle 
are elected at these meetings to form the mayor’s council. This council advises the mayor 
in planning, organizing, and management of activities subject to its competences.
6. CAPACITY AND PERFORMANCE 
The mayor of mayoralty is employer to the oﬃcials in the mayoralty administration. 
In this sense, he/she appoints and dismisses them. The most important position is that 
of the secretary of the mayoralty, who is a civil servant, according to the Civil Servant 
Act. The other servants are employed based on the regulations of the Labor Code. Their 
number depends on the size of the mayoralty. Usually, one accountant/ﬁnancial expert 
and several technical experts work in each of the mayoralties. In this respect, the human 
resource capacity of the mayoralties may be considered limited. 
This is similar to the situation of the disposable ﬁnancial resources. As mentioned 
above: if the mayoralty is determined as a secondary authorizer of budget credits by 
the municipal council, then it does not have its own budget, and all expenditures are 
performed directly through the municipal budget. In this case, the mayoralty’s budget 
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may be seen only as reported municipal expenditures on the mayoralty’s territory. In 
the second case, if the mayoralty has its own budget, it then covers the assigned powers 
for the provision of local services. These are small amounts going mainly for wages. The 
fact that the mayoralties cannot save funds indicates that insuﬃcient funds are provided, 
and in the case of a deﬁcit, additional funds are given. The lack of ﬁnancial capacity also 
results from the inability of the mayoralties to raise own revenues. 
In summary: the available capacity of the mayoralties corresponds to their limited 
service provision powers. The decentralization of a part of the municipal powers and 
their assignment to the mayoralties should also be accompanied by an adequate transfer 
of powers and resources. 
7. MAIN ISSUES AND PROPOSALS FOR POLICY CHANGES 
The political discussion about the second level of subnational governance are arising due 
to two factors: (i) EU recommendations which are not binding and (ii) decentralization 
programs including measures which are aimed at exploring the opportunities for the 
second level of subnational governance up to 2009. 
Most politicians see the second level above the current municipal one, at the existing 
district level. They argue that this would increase the capacity for the use of EU funds 
and also allow them to compete with local European governments. They quote examples 
of various small and weak local governments. 
The author of this paper shares the view that a second level of self-governance is 
unnecessary. It would be a costly and ineﬃcient solution. The higher level of self-gover-
nance would absorb most of the current municipal service responsibilities and very few 
of the territorial deconcentrated functions of the state. The author does not ignore the 
fact that some small and weak local governments should be merged into neighboring 
local governments. 
Bulgarian municipalities are large enough (populations of around 30,000), according 
to the EU average, to comply with the economy of scale principle. But Bulgaria missed 
the opportunity to build more responsive and accountable communities. The size-related 
accountability issue can be resolved if the government gets closer to the constituents 
in two ways:
 (i) The existing small and low capacity local governments should be amalgamated 
and some additional regional service responsibilities, currently performed by 
the state, could be handed over to them. 
 (ii) Decentralizing typical local functions from municipal to kmetstvo level in a way 
that strengthens the link between the local authority and the citizens.
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This approach will resolve the two main issues in a cost-eﬃcient manner: stronger 
and competitive local governments, and accountable and responsive kmetstva. The 
starting point of change is based on the present state of the interactions between the 
municipality and the mayoralties, as summarized in the main conclusions from the 
analysis and assessment of the status. 
The changes are aimed at the desired parameters for allocation of services, powers, 
and resources between the municipality and the mayoralties, as stated in the described 
model. The proposals are intended to move the system from the starting (present) to 
the ﬁnal (model) point. These two points are presented in the table below.
Table 9.
Current Status Versus Proposed Model 
Current status Proposed model
State Municipality Mayoralty State Municipality Mayoralty
Administrative decentralization
Policy formation X X X X X
Operating management X X X X X
Fiscal decentralization
Setting the resources X X X X X
Funds allocation X X X X X
Revenue-related powers X X X X X
Expenses-related powers X X X X X
Political decentralization
Civil participation X X X
Civil control X X X
The current status is characterized by a strong centralization of management and 
ﬁnancial powers in the central authorities. As a result of ﬁscal decentralization reform 
(2003–2005), the municipalities succeeded in obtaining certain powers throughout 
the entire range of changes. However, it seems that the reform has ceased at this point. 
Mayoralties in general have very limited powers in the area of operating management, 
mostly through their control functions on activities that have been organized, managed, 
and ﬁnanced by the municipality. 
The second part of the table shows the intended characteristics of allocation of powers 
between the bodies of various territorial levels of management. Matching them with the 
present state powers shows the main directions of change, which include: 
 • transfer of national state operating management powers of activities and services 
delivered by municipalities; 
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 • decrease the powers of the state to determine the allocation rules of municipal 
appropriations; 
 • increase the management and ﬁnancial powers of municipalities; 
 • a transfer of management and ﬁnancial powers from the municipality to mayor-
alties, and strengthening the political forms of decentralization by increasing 
participation of institutions and citizens in local decision-making, and control 
over the activities of mayoralty. 
Within this context, the focus of public sector reforms within the municipalities 
described here will be limited to the last of the above-stated directions. 
In the short-term perspective (2007–2009), the objective is to disseminate the existing 
good practices in the interaction between municipality and mayoralties. In the medium-
term perspective (2010–2013), it is realistic that the municipality may transfer to the 
mayoralty the services, powers, and resources stated in the model. These activities should 
be within the framework of the present regulatory powers of local authorities or should 
require certain changes in the national legislation. 
The model of allocation of services, resources, and powers between municipality and 
mayoralties refers to the period of implementation of short- and medium-term measures. 
The further progress of these interactions is marked in the long-term measures. Their 
implementation is proposed to begin from 2014. The main objective of the measures 
in the long term is to raise the status of the mayoralty to a basic self-governing commu-
nity. This requires materials changes in the laws regulating the administrative, territorial 
structure, and the functioning of local self-government in the country. 
7.1 Proposed Measures 
All measures hete envisage the reallocation of services, resources, and powers by the 
municipality to the mayoralties, as well as an increase in local participation in deci-
sion-making. 
7.1.1 Short Term
The primary objective is the dissemination of the existing good practices in the inter-
action between the municipality and mayoralties. A reallocation of services would focus 
on intermediary services (administrative and some technical services, like the issuance 
of permits, licenses, and other documents); meal delivery to socially vulnerable people; 
social assistance; public order protection (police, safeguarding of agricultural and forest 
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property); kindergartens and pensioner clubs; ceremony houses and halls; cleaning; 
lighting, park maintenance; orchestras and museums.
 It would require a reallocation of resources by an increasing of the number of 
mayoralties with analytical budgets and of those secondary authorizers with relatively 
separate budgets within the municipal budget. This would mean leaving rentals and 
other forms of management of municipal property in the budget of the mayoralties, as 
well as part of sales revenue. 
A reallocation of administrative powers would assign more powers to the mayoralty’s 
mayor regarding personnel size and salary amounts. Financial powers would encompass 
planning the mayoralty’s budget, distribution of expenses by item and activity; the 
transfer of savings from one activity/item to another one within the framework of the 
budget year; year-end balances could be transferred to the next year; using municipal 
subsidies for compensating expenses on intermediary services (administrative, technical, 
permits, licenses, conscripts transportation costs, and election costs); development of 
standard costs for local activities. 
Local decision-making should be made more inclusive. The mayoralty’s budget 
and other strategic decisions have to be discussed with the citizens. There should be a 
dissemination of the good practice of the mayor’s council, which is elected on a territorial 
principle. The mayoralty’s mayor is allowed to submit proposals to the municipal council 
only if they have been discussed locally and if they are supported by the local population. 
The mayoralty’s mayor should participate in the decision-making at municipal level on 
the localization of the activities of service enterprises; on setting investment projects; 
on the establishment of a transport scheme. 
By transferring services, resources, and powers, the municipality introduces a system 
of accountability and control in the activity of the mayoralties. A similar system for 
monitoring and performance assessment of the mayoralties’ activities is used also by 
civil organizations. 
7.1.2 Medium Term 
The objective is to transfer municipal services, powers, and resources to mayoralties. 
It would mean a reallocation of intermediary services (technical, permit issuance, 
licenses, and other documents); protection of public order (ﬁre brigade, emergencies) 
and municipal markets. It would include a reallocation of resources to mayoralties, with 
relatively separate budgets within the municipal budget, as well as assigning fees and 
charges, e.g., on a meal delivery service to socially vulnerable people, cleaning, kinder-
gartens and nurseries, markets, and graveyards to the budget of the mayoralty. 
The reallocation of administrative powers means that the mayoralty would become 
a legal entity, similar to its schools and community centers. They could then outsource 
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services (e.g., social assistance) and would have the authority to open and to close local 
activities, and to appoint their managers. 
Financial powers would mean to determine the total amount of all the mayoralties’ 
revenue from delegated activities; the allocation of municipal subsidy to mayoralties 
on the basis of standard costs of local services; and using municipal subsidies for local 
activities. They should have the power to propose the amount of local fees, charges, 
and rents. 
The scope of participation in local decision-making could be increased, allowing 
mayoralty’s mayors participation in the municipal council. Establishing a municipal 
committee, jointly with the representatives of the mayoralty’s mayors and the municipal 
administration, to determine the activities delegated to the mayoralties and the standard 
costs, while their funding is approved by the municipal council. A mayor’s council should 
be established in all mayoralties. 
7.1.3 Long Term
The long-term objective is to raise the mayoralty’s status to that of the basic self-govern-
ment community. This would mean the reallocation of services, resources, and powers 
between municipalities and mayoralties (creating of mayoralty property), and an election 
for the mayor’s council on territorial principle. 
The reallocation of services would target water supply and sewage; physical culture 
and sports; sports and tourism facilities; and recreation and social activities. A re-assign-
ment of resources should allow all mayoralties to have their own budgets, as well as 
rents allocated to the mayoralty’s budget, and a separation of mayoralty’s property. The 
author recommends a reallocation of administrative powers by establishing a mayoralty 
in the municipal center, thus authorizing mayoralty to become basic-level, local self-
government, and the introduction of an obligatory election of the mayor’s council on 
the territorial principle. Financial empowerment means the determination of the rate 
of local fees, charges, rate of property tax, and revenues from management of mayoralty 
property and sales. 
Participation in local decision-making should be exercised through referendums on 
issues of crucial importance to local development and civil control over the activities 
of the mayoralties. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1.
Number and Size of Local Governments and Subnational Governments 
by Districts (2006)
 EU Region District Number of Population of
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
North-Central Veliko Tyrnovo 10 101 280,883 98,230
Gabrovo 4 31 134,490 21,208
Lovech 8 64 157,407 53,203
Pleven 11 103 301,634 118,515
Ruse 8 64 255,315 68,889
North-East Varna 12 92 456,915 76,507
Dobrich 8 100 204,738 55,012
Razgrad 7 87 137,853 71,041
Silistra 7 76 132,699 68,156
Tyrgovishte 5 107 134,264 59,145
Shumen 10 113 197,632 69,548
North-West Vidin 11 52 114,769 35,241
Vratza 10 92 205,797 80,933
Montana 11 74 164,057 51,679
South-Central Kyrdjali 7 215 157,463 87,556
Pazardjik 11 87 296,281 121,802
Plovdiv 18 146 706,413 184,995
Smolyan 10 78 129,731 47,782
Stara Zagora 11 110 358,342 100,917
Haskovo 11 133 264,312 68,200
South-East Bourgas 13 144 417,810 117,564
Sliven 4 81 209,169 73,897
Yambol 5 64 144,525 41,839
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 EU Region District Number of Population of
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
local 
governments
submunicipal 
governments
South-West Blagoevdrad 14 135 330,034 125,857
Kustendil 9 48 150,792 38,162
Pernik 6 31 139,677 24,594
Sofia city 1 33 1,237,891 57,913
Sofia region 22 99 258,397 83,548
Country total 264 2,560 7,679,290 2,101,933
Maximum/largest — — 1,237,891 184,995
Minimum/smallest — — 114,769 21,208
NOTES
1 Based on Stancho Cholakov’s Science of Local Governance, 1936.
2 More detailed information about the size and population of mayoralties by districts is avail-
able in the Appendix. 
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Executive Summary
Submunicipal local governments are the topic of this chapter on Poland that illuminates 
some of the opportunities for further strengthening democratic institutions at local 
level. Solectwo or submunicipal local governments are a traditional institution dating 
to the Middle Ages when village heads were representatives of feudal rulers and had 
responsibilities for the well being, law, and order of their communities. This institution has 
both increased and decreased in influence over time and enjoyed its strongest role during 
the Second Republic of Poland. During communism, this institution was replaced with 
municipal national councils, fully in control of the centralized state. 
The solectwo that are the focus of this chapter are typical of rural areas as well as being 
present in some urban areas, where districts and boroughs are the norm. Of the 53,000 
villages and towns in rural areas in Poland, a little more than three-quarters have the status 
of solectwo. They vary in size, composition, and concentration with the population density 
of the area concerned. Importantly, the solectwo are auxiliary units of local government 
(gmina), as determined by the Act on Municipal Government of March 8, 1990, and their 
status is determined by the decision of the said gmina, that in effect may decentralize itself 
as local conditions may or may not require, i.e., it is not compulsory. Gmina also have the 
power to define or limit the solectwo’s activities and tasks, ranging from participation in 
the local council to property ownership. 
To recap, though formally invested with local government power and elected by the 
village, the solectwo and village head may not actually have much power at all other than 
that of a facilitator for local projects and adviser to the local council. What competences 
it does have is determined in a municipal statute and there is no guarantee that its voice 
will be heard. Often, the statutes that spell out these competences are merely templates 
without any terms specific to the local environment, while the financing of solectwo 
activities remains with municipal council budgets, exacerbating the solectwo’s weak and 
arbitrary position. Some solectwo have skirted these barriers by organizing local activities 
that generate own revenues for which to fund local projects (in addition to earmarked 
grants from the local council for this purpose) as well as remunerate the village head, 
usually an unpaid position.  
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A village head has a mixture of roles: a village head may be a representative of the 
municipality in the village; a village head may act as a representative of the village in 
contacts with external institutions, especially the local government; and a village head 
may also be a local leader among his or her own community. A village meeting where 
such a village head is elected is a democratic, legislative body, acting in the form of direct 
democracy.
The current Polish model has both advantages and disadvantages, of which their 
omnipresence is the main trait: out of 2,171 rural and mixed rural-urban municipalities, 
only 10 have no submunicipal local government. Legislation is vague about the potential 
of this institution and how it is used. It is at the discretion of local governments to use 
solectwo as a form of internal decentralization to tailor local tasks to individual needs (only 
a few do) and in general it a weak institution with low autonomy. Indeed, much of their 
work seems purely like volunteerism, even if they may act in some capacity as a democratic 
check on the authorities and even may be a good tool to activate village communities as 
fully bottom-up institutions. At the same time, they suffer from poor skills and a lack of 
public participation even if they may organize common public works in their villages or 
manage grants to accomplish this. However, the vague legal environment and few funds 
for their operation are not necessarily negative, although this chapter does recommend 
more autonomy for these traditional submunicipal units. Grants are an important way to 
activate them and harness their self-organizing power. This form of local governance is an 
indigenous solution, not a western model, that can work further to include communities 
in the context of new democratic institutions in Poland. 
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1. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF SUBMUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS 
 IN POLAND
Polish municipalities, being relatively large, provide ample opportunity for decentraliza-
tion within local government (Swianiewicz 2001). The Act on Municipal Governments, 
constituted in 1990, gives such a possibility to local governments. Furthermore, the 
existence of a “village head” (soltys) is an old tradition in Poland. While today it does 
not have a strong institutionalized position, it is still important and respected.
The practice of a village head and a submunicipal local government date back to 
the Middle Ages. Initially, they appeared in documents concerning settlements based 
on the so-called “German Town Law.” This law regulated the principles of establishing 
and administering new villages that settled in previously uninhabited areas. A village 
head was a person who organized and led the new group of settlers when locating to 
a new area. The village head was a representative of the feudal lord and ruled over the 
inhabitants of his village. He had a farm bigger than the rest of the villagers, and he 
collected taxes and tenancy from the inhabitants. He also collected shares from them, 
and often had the privilege of running an inn or a mill. He also participated in the 
system of justice concerning smaller oﬀences committed by the villagers. The post of 
the village head was hereditary (Sołectwo i sołtys w historii 2001).
From the 15th century onwards, the rights of the village heads started to diminish. 
Village heads were, to a larger and larger extent, supervisors of serfdom labor and 
helpers of the village owners. It was diﬀerent under each subsequent partition of Poland. 
Apparently, the greatest autonomy and the widest legal leverage were enjoyed by local 
governments under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Among others, the Austro-Hungarian 
Municipality Act of 1866 mentioned goods belonging to villages and the principles of 
their use. These records are reﬂected in Polish legislation from 1933, concerning local 
government. This act, pointing to the municipal property in regions under former 
Prussian and Russian partition, applies only to common law, and as far as the Austrian 
partition is concerned, to common law and legislation made on the basis of the above 
mentioned act (Podwiński and Typiak 1936).
In the Second Republic of Poland, the submunicipal local governments (gromadas in 
the old terminology) and the village heads were a crucial element in the administrative 
organization of the country. The gromada was brought into being by an act of March 
23, 1933 on the partial change of territorial local government (Oﬃcial Journal No. 35, 
294). Its functioning was regulated by a number of decrees issued by the Ministry of 
Internal Aﬀairs. The institution of the village head, however, was referred to even earlier 
by a number of acts, most often indicating the subjects responsible to lead various 
controls and records on the village level (e.g., alerts on epidemiological dangers, regis-
tering inhabitants, collecting taxes, etc.). 
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The rights and obligations of the gromada and the village head substantially expanded 
to the rights and obligations they enjoy today. The number of regulations and the 
fact that they were formed on the state level and not delegated to lower levels of local 
government show what a high importance the Second Republic of Poland ascribed to 
these institutions. 
According to the Almanac for Village Heads and Gromada Councillors for 1936
—prepared by the employees of the then Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs, the Department 
Head and the Regional Inspector of the Local Government Association, Stanisław 
Podwiński and Piotr Typiak, respectively—the gromada before the Second World War 
was deﬁned as an auxiliary unit of the community, while at the same time, “a basic unit 
of the public life of the state.” Unlike today, its rights and obligations were determined in 
an act of law (at present its determination is delegated to the community). The gromada 
also had its own property and income and could decide on their use alone. It also had 
a gromada council that—in contrast to the village councils existing today—was not an 
advisory body but a legislative one, entitled to make binding decisions in the name of 
the gromada (except for gromadas having less than 200 inhabitants, where no councils 
were created and decisions were still made by village meetings alone). It was a body of 
intermediate democracy replacing the direct, contemporary form of village meetings.
The Almanac speaks of the cooperation with the local government in carrying out 
its tasks, as well as to the administration and usage of gromada property as its most 
important objective. The authors also enumerate many particular tasks concerning the 
village infrastructure and the well-being of its inhabitants, in particular:
 a) Establishing and maintaining roads, streets, pavement, and wayside trees;
 b) Establishing and maintaining common rooms and libraries;
 c) Taking care of the sanitary condition of the housing estates and their inhabit-
ants;
 d) Taking care of the poor, orphans, etc.;
 e) Taking care of agricultural development; 
 f ) Organizing and supporting local ﬁre units.
They also attributed them various tasks that might be described as general attempts 
at village modernization and organization. These attempts included encouraging people 
to form cooperatives, village housewives’ circles, etc., depositing money in savings 
accounts, using modern solutions in agriculture, educating themselves, getting books and 
magazines to the village, or establishing welfare institutions for the poor. The gromada 
was supposed to fulﬁll its tasks using its own property and income.
The village head united two separate functions. He was both an executive organ 
of the gromada as well as an auxiliary organ of the board of the gmina. He was elected 
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by the gromada council, in indirect elections.3 At the same time, he was subordinate to 
the mayor and he fulﬁlled his duties concerned with public administration under the 
mayor’s supervision. As an auxiliary organ of municipal management, the village head 
was the lowest executive organ of public administration. As such, he carried out the 
orders of the mayor, but also helped other state and regional oﬃcials. His most frequent 
obligations included announcing the authorities’ decrees, delivering summons and 
oﬃcial documents to the inhabitants of the gromada, and helping the inhabitants with 
information and advice on all matters concerning public administration. 
The act delineated many speciﬁc tasks attributed to the village head. They included 
functions that mainly concerned public safety and order, such as helping the state 
police, preserving peace and order in the gromada, taking care of the safety and the 
property of inhabitants, receiving reports, informing the municipal authorities on 
various oﬀences, and so on. According to the act, the village head also executed various 
functions concerned with population records, road supervision, social welfare, collecting 
land taxes, road charges, municipal compensatory taxes and other taxes imposed by the 
municipality, organizing means of transport (paid then by the persons using it) for the 
representatives of the authorities and military, and a few others.
The village head received remuneration from the gromada treasury in the amount 
determined by the gromada council. He had a status of a public oﬃcial, which involved 
criminal responsibility for possible malpractice or corruption. 
The submunicipal local government (gromada) was practically the lowest local 
government level during the Second Republic of Poland. The village head had the role 
of an auxiliary organ to the municipality, due to his responsibility for various auxiliary 
tasks in relation to the administration—both municipal and of higher levels. This role 
was fulﬁlled—it should be added—parallel to the executive role of the gromada. The 
institution of the mayor, who united the function of the local government head and the 
role of the executor of orders from higher levels of the state and the local government 
institutions, was similarly constructed. It is diﬃcult to overlook the many functions 
related to watching over public order and observance of law in the area of the submu-
nicipal local government. The village head was, to some extent, a state representative in 
the village and, therefore, had the status of a public oﬃcial. 
We do not have satisfactory sources of information on the status of the submunicipal 
local government in Poland after 1945. In the ﬁrst years after the Second World War, 
prewar regulations were used in the case of the submunicipal local government, which 
can be found in the Act on the Field Organs of the Uniform State Power of March 
20, 1950. The new political system for the local authorities was introduced by the Act 
of National Councils of January 25, 1958, which introduced the so-called municipal 
national councils in place of municipal local government. Formally, they were local 
government institutions though, in practice, they were fully controlled by the state. 
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The local governmental character was also theoretically preserved by submunicipal 
local governments institutions. The act preserved the institution of the village meeting 
and gave it the right to elect the village head (Article 83). It also determined the range 
of topics that could be discussed during the village meeting (Article 89, point 4). In 
particular, they were topics connected with “fulﬁlling the obligations in relation to the 
state,” but also topics concerning the current problems of the village, similar to those 
determined by the act of 1933. The act, however, did not provide for the existence of a 
submunicipal council and did not pinpoint a subject as an executive organ for resolution 
of the village meeting. The act pinpointed the management of the municipal national 
council as the subject supervising its execution (Article 89, point 5).
The submunicipal unit thus lost the status of the lowest level of local government or 
local power, and became a part of the centralized political and administrative system. But 
the institution itself did not cease to exist. It just did not have any systematic function 
attributed to it by the prewar act. It can be assumed, however, that the submunicipal 
local government remained the center of self-organization of the village community 
and the village head. The act did not limit the possibility of such a self-organization: 
on the contrary, it expected that the village local government would work towards a 
better economic and social situation in the village, maintain the infrastructure, support 
education, and explain “the policy of the state” to the village inhabitants. The act also 
stated that the municipal national council could delegate some decisions to the village 
meetings, unless they concerned decisions reserved for the municipal national council. 
It also authorized the national council to allow the village meetings ﬁnancial resources 
(from fees) to realize its resolutions and pinpointed the village head as the person super-
vising the resources (Article 89, point 7).
Thus, the tradition of the submunicipal local government did not cease to exist 
during the People’s Republic of Poland, though it certainly was less embedded in law 
than in the prewar period. The village head, however, had some tools at his disposal to 
serve his community. Winning particular goods for the local community was one of 
them: for instance, socially useful investments or materials to be used in community 
service by the inhabitants themselves. It has to be noted, however, that this role had to 
be reduced during the period of economic crisis that prevailed in Poland from the mid-
1970s until the fall of communism. But as far as the functioning of the submunicipal local 
governments is concerned, 1990, when the act restoring local government institutions 
was passed, was not a groundbreaking year from the point of view of the submunicipal 
local governments: in as far as new possibilities that opened before the village heads are 
concerned or regarding the useful tools that were taken from them.
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2. GENERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNING SUBMUNICIPAL 
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The submunicipal local governments (solectwa) focused on in this chapter are typical in 
rural areas. There are only 13 urban local governments where these entities (solectwa) 
can be found (Table 1); however, in these areas, there are boroughs (dzielnica) and 
districts (osiedle), which play the role of submunicipal local government. There are 
40,348 submunicipal local governments in Poland (as of 2006), which means 16 per 
local government (gmina) on average. Almost half (43 percent) of all rural and mixed 
rural/urban local governments have created between 11 and 20 submunicipal local 
governments each (Figure 1). In only 11 local governments are there no auxiliary units, 
and there is but one with 71 entities. As there are more than 53,000 villages and towns 
(miejscowosci) in rural areas in Poland, it follows that 76 percent of rural villages have 
the status of a submunicipal local government. 
Figure 1.
Average Number of Submunicipal Local Governments in Rural and 
Mixed Rural-Urban Local Governments in Poland (2006)
Source: Author’s own research based on the data of the Central Statistical Oﬃce (GUS).
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Table 1.
Average Number of Submunicipal Local Governments (solectwo) 
in Diﬀerent Types of Local Governments in Poland (2006)
Number of submunicipal 
local government (solectwo)*
Type of municipality (gmina)
Urban Rural Mixed urban/rural
0 294  11   0
1–5 10  75  23
6–10 3 259  85
11–15 0 374 119
16–20 0 329 117
21–25 0 225  88
26–30 0 140  68
31–35 0  87  39
36–40 0  44  20
More than 40 0  45  23
Number of local governments of each type 307 1,589 582
* dzielnica (borough) and osiedle (district), which are two other types of submunicipal local governments
typical of urban areas are not included.
The size of the submunicipal local governments, as well as the number of these entities 
in local governments diﬀer across Poland (Figures 2 and 3). As it turns out, in regions 
with a high-density population, submunicipal local governments are numerous. While 
in the regions with a low-density population, it happens that they are made up in villages 
consisting only of a few farms. As a result, according to our (approximate) calculations, 
the average size of submunicipal local governments in the Śląskie region, where they 
are densely populated, is nine times higher than the average size of submunicipal local 
governments in the Podlaskie region, where the average number of inhabitant of the 
submunicipal local government is the smallest. Larger submunicipal local governments 
in the Śląskie region correspond to the population of many small municipalities in 
other regions of Poland. It is hard to imagine that this has no inﬂuence on the practical 
functioning of submunicipal local governments in these areas. Unfortunately, these 
variations in the scale of the whole state have yet to be studied.
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Figure 2.
Average Number of Citizens in One Submunicipal Local Government 
in Rural Local Governments in 2005
Source: Author’s own research based on the data of the Central Statistical Oﬃce (GUS).
Figure 3.
Average Number of Submunicipal Local Governments in Rural Local Governments 
in Polish Regions in 2005
Source: Author’s own research based on the data of the Central Statistical Oﬃce (GUS).
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2.1 Legal Status of Submunicipal Local Government 
Today, the act that constitutes the existence of submunicipal local government is the Act 
on Municipal Government of March 8, 1990 (Ustawa o samorządzie gminnym). Article 
5 of this act states that the local government (gmina) can constitute an auxiliary unit 
(jednostka pomocnicza). The act lists three kinds of auxiliary units: dzielnica (borough), 
osiedle (district), and sołectwo (submunicipal local government). Although the act does 
not express this precisely, the submunicipal local government exists in rural areas, while 
districts and boroughs exist in urban areas. 
Their modes of organization in these areas are diﬀerent. In districts and boroughs, 
the inhabitants appoint district councils (rada osiedlowa) which are the legislative organ, 
and establish a management board (zarząd)—the executive organ. In submunicipal 
local units, however, a village meeting is the legislative organ, not the council. We are 
dealing here with an institution of direct democracy. The village meeting elects, in direct 
elections, the village head and village council. The village head is the executive organ 
of the submunicipal local government, and the council fulﬁls only auxiliary functions 
(Article 36). 
The way of organizing of auxiliary units is not regulated in the act in detail. First, a 
municipal local government has the opportunity to create an auxiliary unit, but there is 
no obligation; it is not compulsory. Auxiliary units are created by the municipal (gmina) 
council by means of a local act, after consultations with citizens or by their own initia-
tive. The rules of constituting, amalgamating, splitting, or dismantling a submunicipal 
local government are deﬁned in the statute of the local government (Article 5). There 
are two possible ways of constituting such an entity: a top-down initiative, taken by the 
local government, or bottom-up initiative, taken by the citizens.
Second, the municipal council is responsible not only for the existence of submu-
nicipal local governments, but also for determining the scope of activity of the 
auxiliary units, and the rules of transferring communal property that can be utilized 
and for transferring budget funds indispensable for realization its tasks (Article 18). 
The municipal council also controls its activity by means of a special commission 
(Article 18a).4 
The regulations concerning the organization and scope of activity of the auxiliary 
units are in accordance with Article 35 of the act, determined in the statute of the 
auxiliary unit. It is then passed by the municipal council after consultation with the 
inhabitants. Theoretically, they have some inﬂuence on its shape. In practice, however, 
they use this opportunity to a limited extent.
The intention of the lawmakers, who only generally determined the status of the 
submunicipal local government, was quite clear. The problem was to give the local 
government independent decision-making powers concerning how they would enter 
into relations with their auxiliary units, and to leave the possibility to adjust the 
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submunicipal local governments to local traditions and needs. This solution seems 
to be apt, in that the activity and the possibilities of submunicipal local governments 
are actually diﬀerent in diﬀerent parts of the country. The obligatory giving up of one’s 
rights in favor of submunicipal local governments was risky, since many submunicipal 
local governments were unable to bear such a burden. Therefore, in Poland, the level of 
decentralization depends on local governments’ decisions. They “decentralize themselves” 
as per their individual needs. They give, however, many functions and funds they deem 
ﬁt to the submunicipal local governments. 
However, local governments are not uniformly interested in sharing rights and 
resources, even if submunicipal local governments are active and can establish a repre-
sentation able to participate in the management of the problems of the local society. 
Submunicipal local governments are too weak to demand them. In consequence, even 
if some customs concerning the rights of submunicipal local governments survived 
through communism, they are not always reﬂected in the statutes and practice of today’s 
municipalities.
This problem can be illustrated through the example of the property of 
submunicipal local governments. Historically, the village, i.e., submunicipal local 
government, owned its own buildings, forests, pastures, and other goods aimed at 
common usage. Components of such village property were administered by village 
heads, and the revenue from it was used for the beneﬁt of the village. These rights sur-
vived to the present day, partially in common law; however, it was not often reﬂected 
in mortgage or other documents. In 1990, when the Act of Territorial Local Government 
was passed, municipalities, but not submunicipal local governments, received legal 
recognition, and, in consequence, no place was made for any mortgaging of the prop-
erty of submunicipal local governments. In practice, the components of the property 
of submunicipal local governments formally became the property of the municipalities. 
That is why each time we speak about the property of submunicipal local government, 
we use the term “customary property,” as it is not property by strict deﬁnition.5
Box 1. 
An Overambitious Mayor in Niepołomice
One of the respondents from the Niepołomice in the Małopolska region reports that the mayor 
sold the investment land belonging to the submunicipal local government, not knowing to whom 
it belonged. The village did not react in time and claimed its rights only when construction 
workers appeared on its land. The agreement to sell the land could not be cancelled, however. 
The mayor acknowledged the claims of the submunicipal local government, and the conﬂict was 
solved in such a way that the submunicipal local government received material compensation 
for lost goods. 
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The question of “village possessions” concerns not only the land owned for centu-
ries by the submunicipal local government. These days, there have been goods that are 
recognized as belonging to the village by common law. Most often they are various 
structures (bus stops, ﬁre stations, common rooms) that were built or renovated with 
the help of means gathered by the inhabitants on the basis of voluntary collections and 
public works. In particular, many such structures erected during communism were built 
by the inhabitants, and are understood to belong to the village by common law. Also, 
in these cases, deriving beneﬁts from of these possessions by the village can be diﬃcult 
at times, because they are appropriated by the municipality. This occurs because local 
leaders often do not have enough legal awareness to draft an appropriate law.
The act also gives the local governments the opportunity to authorize auxiliary units 
to perform tasks from the domain of public administration (Article 39, p. 4). Despite 
the fact that such possibilities exist in many municipalities, such tasks are not given 
over to submunicipal local governments.
 The right of village head to participate in the proceedings of the municipal council, 
without the right to vote, already introduced into the ﬁrst draft of the act (Article 37a), 
is often not utilized by the municipalities. The village heads were not invited to the 
sessions and they were denied the right to travel or other allowances (Iwanicka 2000). 
Such repeated instances precipitated (among other things) some records specifying the 
rights of submunicipal local governments and village heads to be introduced into the 
amended act of local government of the April 11, 2001. For example, an article about 
the possibility of the village head to participate in the council was supplemented by 
an additional record obliging the council chairman to inform the village head of every 
council meeting and to send him the agenda (Iwanicka 2001).
2.2 Government and Elections 
In rural areas, the activity of a submunicipal local government is led by a village head 
(soltys), who has executive power. He takes part in all municipal (gmina) council meet-
ings; however, he has no right to vote. His activity is supported by a village council (rada 
solecka). It is only an advisory body that helps the village head in making decisions and 
supports his activity. The most important decisions of submunicipal local government 
are made in a direct way by a meeting of all the inhabitants of a village, called a “village 
meeting,” which has legislative power.6 Additionally, a community is not represented 
in the decision-making process, though citizens can make decisions themselves—of 
course, to a limited extent, which the village is granted by a municipal council. This is 
a very good example of direct democracy.
The village head, as well as village council, are elected in direct elections.7 The mayor 
is responsible for organizing the elections for submunicipal local governments. The course 
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and rules of the elections are determined by the individual statutes of the submunicipal 
local governments. The Act on Municipal Government states only that, “the village head 
and village council are elected in secret, direct elections, among an undeﬁned number of 
candidates, by permanent inhabitants of the village entitled to vote” (Article 36).8 There 
exists no special electoral law concerning elections on the submunicipal local government 
level and, as one of the mayors we interviewed remarked, possible disputes may only be 
settled by resorting to analogies with electoral laws to the local government.
In practice, and according to tradition, elections are usually held during a village 
meeting in which all village inhabitants entitled to vote can participate. The date of the 
election meeting is determined by the municipal council and announced by the village 
administration or the mayor. The candidates are appointed directly by the meeting 
participants among the persons entitled to vote. The statutes of the submunicipal local 
governments state what percentage of village inhabitants must attend the meeting 
for a valid election. Usually this is approximately 10 to 30 percent of the inhabitants, 
although in the village of Łagiewniki Nowe (the municipality of Zgierz) the presence of 
10 persons is suﬃcient. If there is no quorum, another meeting is called for at a future 
date (a common practice is a meeting later on the same day, e.g., after approximately 
30 minutes) and a quorum is not necessary then.
Conversely, there are submunicipal local governments where the elections take the 
form of common elections with a ballot box available for the whole day and under the 
control of the village election commission (for example, in Lgota and Rząska) (Iwanicka 
2006, Protokół z zebrania wiejskiego nr 2007).
The possible need to dismiss the village head is a question worth examining. It 
happens that the municipal councils usurp the right to dismiss the village head or set 
the commissioner’s rule when the village head does not fulﬁll his duties or misuses 
funds. These are isolated cases. It should be remembered, however, that they are justi-
ﬁed by years of practice both in communist Poland, as well as in the Poland’s Second 
Republic, where the local authorities of higher level (as state representatives), had control 
over submunicipal local governments and were also entitled to dismiss village heads 
(Podwiński and Typiak 1936; Obwieszczenie Prezesa Rady Ministrów…).
The elections usually proceed the elections to local governments. The term of oﬃce 
of the village authorities is usually four years. 
2.3 Statute
According to the Act on Municipal Government, each submunicipal local govern-
ment should have its own statute. This is an important document, as it speciﬁes all the 
competencies and rules of its existence, especially: 
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 • name and geographical borders of a submunicipal local government;
 • procedure of elections of local representatives;
 • organization form and precise competencies; 
 • functions transferred by a local government to a submunicipal local government 
and how they should be realized; 
 • scope and forms of control of local government over the activity of a submu-
nicipal local government (Article 35, Act on Municipal Government).
However, we must emphasize that the statute is voted on by a municipal council 
(and only after consultations with citizens). The state legislature leaves the determination 
of the detailed rules of the functioning of submunicipal local governments to munici-
palities. It assumes that the regulations concerning the functioning of the municipality 
should be adjusted to local traditions and habits. In order to fulﬁll this function properly, 
the statutes should indicate in detail the rights and obligations of submunicipal local 
governments, e.g., the components of customary property that they are entitled to. In 
practice, the legal consciousness of the actors at the level of submunicipal local govern-
ments is too weak, and questions are not regulated in a satisfactory way. Submunicipal 
local governments are usually not able to formulate themselves or hire a lawyer to write 
the statue that describes speciﬁc common laws prevailing in the village. 
Therefore, the common practice is to pass statutes that are “universal” and reproduce 
only legal records, without containing any new content. As the results from the interviews 
we conducted show, village heads willingly use templates they either receive from the 
municipality (that commissions a lawyer to write such a template) or ﬁnd in a handbook. 
Statutes that are passed in this way are the reason that, in practice, submunicipal local 
governments do not have a strong legal basis that codiﬁes their traditional rights. Even 
if they are respected (as with the above-mentioned case of Niepołomice).
To summarize, there are three acts of law which deﬁne the status and functioning 
of a submunicipal local government: 
 • the Act on Municipal Government, as discussed above, which provides only 
very general laws; 
 • a statute of a local government, which provides rules of constituting, amal-
gamating, splitting, or dismantling a submunicipal local government, as well 
as rights to provide the submunicipal local government’s budget;
 • a statute of a submunicipal local government, voted on by a local government, 
which deﬁnes all other rights, functions, rules, and laws of an entity. Each statute 
is prepared for another entity, and the name of an entity should be included in 
a statute.
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3. TASKS, DUTIES, AND LAWS OF SUBMUNICIPAL LOCAL 
 GOVERNMENTS IN SELECTED LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
The only tasks of a submunicipal local government named in the Act on Municipal 
Government are the administrative tasks of a local government that can be transferred 
to a village head (Article 39). According to Article 35, it is a statute of a submunicipal 
local government which gives precise tasks and duties to a submunicipal local govern-
ment. Additionally, such a statute is a key document in directing how submunicipal 
local governments function in Poland. P. Chmielnicki (2004) proposes a “model statute,” 
stating that such a document should include the following tasks of a submunicipal local 
government in Poland:
 • cooperation with local government in carrying out its tasks for citizens of a 
submunicipal local government;
 • representing a submunicipal local government’s citizens’ interests before the 
local government; 
 • creating favorable conditions for citizens to allow them to fully participate in 
the public life of a submunicipal local government;
 • submitting proposals and projects of building, extension, and renovation of 
the following items to a local government: roads and bridges, water supply and 
sewage systems, bus stops, kindergartens and primary schools, monuments, and 
tourist infrastructure;
 • submitting projects of initiatives to a local government concerning cooperation 
with the police and ﬁre brigade to keep the security and order in the area of a 
submunicipal local government, cooperation with NGOs to protect the environ-
ment and green areas, social consultations concerning the local council’s duties, 
social welfare (especially proposing precise forms of help), and the organization 
and schedule of public services so that it suits locals;
 • management of communal property transferred by a local government to a 
submunicipal local government;
 • realization of expenses from a local government’s budget to an extent which is 
stipulated in a statute of the local government;
 • dealing with public service tasks stipulated in a statute of a local government, 
as well as in other local actions;
 • keeping order and cleanliness in the area of a submunicipal local government;
 • giving opinions at the request of the municipal council, especially concerning: a 
plan of conditions and directions for physical planning (studium uwarunkowan 
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i kierunków zagospodarowania przestrzennego) and local physical master plans 
(miejscowe plany zagospodarowania przestrzennego), changes in a statute of a 
local government, as well as a statute of a submunicipal local government, 
safety regulations, regulations about where and when alcohol can be sold in 
the area; kindergartens and primary schools in the area, rules of management 
of communal property in the area, and ﬁnally changes of names of the streets, 
squares, and villages in the area.
It seems that the number of tasks a submunicipal local government can undertake 
is great. Although none of them is speciﬁed in the Act on Municipal Government, 
some of them are obviously within the submunicipal local government’s respons-
ibility (for example, keeping order and cleanliness or cooperating with local govern-
ment). In fact, most of the tasks listed above are local governments’ tasks. Transferring 
them to a submunicipal local government is consistent with the subsidiarity principle. 
But the problem remains that a submunicipal local government does not have the 
right to directly undertake any speciﬁc activities concerning infrastructure. Rather 
they must give opinions, submit proposals and projects, take initiatives, etc. There is 
no guarantee that its voice will be heard. It is also constrained by its small and very 
limited budget. 
 The above list of submunicipal local government’s tasks is only one specialist’s 
proposition (P. Chmielnicki). What kind of functions do local governments use to 
transfer to their submunicipal local governments in practice? We have chosen 20 diﬀerent 
statutes of 20 diﬀerent local governments to do empirical research and answer this ques-
tion. They were chosen from diﬀerent Polish regions. There was also a diﬀerentiation 
when it comes to numbers of citizens (from 1,740 to 25,866 people).9 Of course, with 
20 diﬀerent local governments, we are unable to analyze what is the role of location or 
make any conclusions concerning regional diﬀerentiation. The reason why we decided 
to choose local governments from all over Poland was to be sure that location or size of 
an entity does not have any signiﬁcant meaning for the conclusions made on the basis 
of analyzing the chosen statutes.
 We have chosen 20 statutes from 20 local governments, as it appeared that most, 
if not all, local governments have the same statute for every submunicipal local govern-
ment in its area. Sometimes one can even ﬁnd a statute of one entity on the local 
government’s website and information saying that all other statutes have got the same 
content, except the name of a submunicipal local government. However, according to 
Article 35 of the Act on Municipal Government, “organization and forms of activity 
of a submunicipal local government are deﬁned by Municipal Council in a diﬀerent 
statute, after consultations with citizens.” This means that a diﬀerent document should 
have been prepared for each entity, so each, in theory, could be individualized. Entry: 
“consultations with citizens” appeared in the Act on Municipal Government in 2001, 
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and before that moment the municipal councils only decided about statutes by them-
selves (Iwanicka 2001). 
What’s more, it seems that there are a few “model statutes” which local governments 
use for their purposes. When reading these 20 statutes we can see that not only the 
structure and vocabulary are similar, but there is also a group of tasks and duties that 
are repeated. Understandably it is diﬃcult to write a legal document, and that is why a 
local governments base theirs on one prepared by a specialist. However, if local govern-
ment accepts a form of a proposed statute as it exists, for example, by a specialist, it can 
mean that tasks, duties, and laws are not relevant or appropriate to a local community; 
they do not seem to be a result of real consultations about what community wants to 
do by themselves, but only a proposal of what tasks should be accomplished. Also, it 
does not reﬂect a locale’s speciﬁcity. The question arises of how these “model tasks” are 
in fact fulﬁlled if they do not depend on the real needs of citizens?
What tasks, duties, and laws do submunicipal local governments have according 
to their statutes? None of the analyzed documents pointed to as many tasks as P. 
Chmielnicki has proposed. Firstly, in most of them, there is a task called “helping 
neighbors” and “creating help for neighbors.” In this case, “neighbors” mean citizens 
living in a submunicipal local government. A group of people who live close to one 
another should take care of their lives and their problems. A local government in Poland 
is often so big that people do not know each other very well. It is much easier in a village 
that constitutes a submunicipal local government. So, although this task of “helping 
neighbors” seems prosaic and obvious, it is a rule mandated on paper. 
Besides generally-formulated tasks and avoiding referring to practice, such as the 
task “to shape the rules of social conduct,” more precisely-determined areas of activity 
also appear in statutes, such as, the need for “participation in dealing with social prob-
lems, culture, healthcare, sports, recreation, and other tasks connected with the place 
of living.” This is a very frequently noted task that appears in most statutes (75 percent 
of the analyzed documents), and almost always using the same wording. There is no 
precise statement as to what extent the submunicipal local government should help, or 
how, but we can assume that this is about helping the local government.
Another task that appears in a few statutes (verbatim) is “a social control on service 
delivery units (such as schools, kindergartens, libraries; jednostki organizacyjne) inter-
related with the conditions of life in rural areas.” 
Another task frequently listed is the organization of common works in the village 
and the submunicipal local unit. This is also a traditional and important function of the 
village head. As we have already mentioned, the village can obtain things like building 
materials for some investments, whereby the village inhabitants become the workforce. 
The job of the village head (and the village council) is to then organize such an under-
taking. In practice, such organization of cooperation is probably the most important 
public task fulﬁlled by the submunicipal local government.
98
M I N D  Y O U R  O W N  B U S I N E S S !
Other tasks which appear in few statutes are:
 • management of communal property transferred by a local government to a 
submunicipal local government (which is a duty given to a submunicipal local 
government in the Act on Municipal Government);
 • giving opinions on all important issues concerning citizens, especially: projects 
of solutions of a local government’s entities that relates to a submunicipal local 
government, local law, local physical master plans, changes of borders, amalga-
mation or splitting of a submunicipal local government;
 • giving opinions about the municipal council’s actions which concern a submu-
nicipal local government or, in other cases, at the request of the council;
 • asking the municipal council to solve public issues which cannot be solved by 
a submunicipal local government itself;
 • cooperation with local councilors, especially enabling meetings with voters;
 • initiating activities of local government’s own tasks (zadania wlasne) as well as 
participation in realizing them;
 • activities for a submunicipal local government’s development.
A short review of tasks that appear in the statutes of the Polish submunicipal local 
governments lets us draw some conclusions. First, all tasks which appear in the statutes 
are very general. From 20 chosen documents we did not ﬁnd a single well-deﬁned task. 
Second, there are no tasks that pertain to a speciﬁc or individual feature of an entity. 
Reading all of them together, they can each be viewed as tasks relevant to any sub-
municipal local government in Poland. They do not reﬂect any local aspects. Finally, 
they are not tasks leading to any form of decentralization; “helping people,” “giving 
opinions,” “cooperation,” etc., deﬁnitely are not tasks that would mean decentralization 
of functions within local government. 
It is obvious that 20 out of more than 40,000 statutes (or almost 2,500 if we assume 
that statutes in every local government are the same) is not a representative group. We 
cannot draw conclusions about all submunicipal local governments in Poland based 
on this number. However, it gives us some information about a speciﬁc phenomenon. 
What’s more, even a “model statute,” recommended by specialists, does not create 
more individual tasks that reﬂect some speciﬁc local aspects. It does not encourage the 
decentralization of local governments’ tasks either.
This problem is also recognized by J. Iwanicka, director of the Journal of Submunicipal 
Local Governments (“Gazeta Sołecka”) and a member of a village council in a submu-
nicipal local government near Warsaw. She claims that many village heads, mayors, and 
councilors often ask diﬀerent organizations, including her journal, for a “model statute.” 
“We do not have it and we should not have it, because each submunicipal local govern-
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ment should have its own, individual, diﬀerent statute, carefully thought out, which 
considers local aspects of local government and submunicipal local government,” says 
J. Iwanicka (2003: 37). Not every entity is able to fulﬁll the same tasks transferred by a 
local government. At ﬁrst, some of the submunicipal local governments are very active, 
and some of them are not, as the local community is not active itself. Secondly, the 
communal property that is at the submunicipal local governments’ disposal (customary 
property) diﬀers very much. Its status depends on what customary property was in its 
hands by 1990 (gifted or purchased by work). Third, there are diﬀerent submunicipal 
local governments’ possibilities to provide its own budget within local government’s 
budget. This depends on the wealth of the local government, as well as on good will of 
local authorities. 
Although J. Iwanicka is not a supporter of giving one universal, “model” statute, 
she proposes a statute that would be perfect for the submunicipal local government 
she governs and lives in (Iwanicka 2003). This statute is quite diﬀerent from all others 
analyzed in this paper, especially in terms of its details. As far as the tasks of a submu-
nicipal local government are concerned, there is one main diﬀerence: apart from the 
tasks of an entity speciﬁed in one place (similar to the ones detailed above), there is 
also a list of tasks transferred by a local government speciﬁed in another place. This is a 
very interesting proposition that is related to the idea of decentralization, and therefore 
worth looking into. 
Iwanicka’s statute states that submunicipal local government’s tasks, voted on as 
local acts by the municipal council, comprise the following tasks: 
 • street lighting (especially buying and changing old lamps for new ones, 
exchanging old street bulbs for energy-eﬃcient ones, installing lamps in places 
without them, paying for energy);
 • signing contracts with companies responsible for snow removal, sanding and 
salting icy and snowy streets, and paying for these services;
 • signing contracts with companies responsible for waste collection and disposal 
and litter collection from public spaces; activities for the promotion of recycling 
waste and initiating the action “cleaning the world” for citizens (especially 
children and youth);
 • supporting and publicizing the idea of local government and promotion of a 
submunicipal local government by publishing information about an entity.
The ﬁnal problem is the management of communal property. This task appears in the 
Act on Municipal Government in Article 48: “Submunicipal local government manages 
and uses communal property and manages revenues out of it to the extent that is stated 
in the statute.” The task also appears in P. Chmielnicki’s “model statute” and in some of 
20 analyzed statutes. However, there are no details concerning the customary property 
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of the submunicipal local government (or any indication of speciﬁc plots, buildings, 
or other beneﬁts from it) in any of the documents. In this case, a document presented 
by J. Iwanicka diﬀers, as it enumerates buildings and lands that constitute a customary 
property of an entity in question. 
4. FINANCING SUBMUNICIPAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 AND HOW IT WORKS IN PRACTICE 
According to the Act on Municipal Government, it is a statute of the local government 
that states whether a submunicipal local government can manage its own ﬁnances. It 
cannot be a completely separate budget, but only a budget “within the municipality’s 
budget” (Article 51). Sometimes a submunicipal local government has its own bank 
account, though this is not common. According to one of our respondents, due to 
not being legal entities, current submunicipal local governments have problems just 
with opening bank accounts. Traditional banks in rural areas, however, do not make a 
problem of this.
Neither this act nor any other legal document directly describe the source of 
income of the submunicipal local government. The act only states that the income of 
the submunicipal local government can come from managing and using the customary 
property. The precise extent of these possibilities is speciﬁed in the statute of the munici-
pality regardless. All other regulations concerning the income of the submunicipal local 
government are an individual issue and depend on the goodwill of the municipal 
council and local tradition. On the basis of interviews, document analysis (statutes of 
the submunicipal local governments and reports on their activities, among others) and 
research of the literature, we divided the potential income of the submunicipal local 
governments into groups which we will describe brieﬂy. They are used by local authori-
ties jointly or separately.
4.1 Money and Revenue Flows Put at the Disposal of the 
 Submunicipal Local Government
Whether the local government puts any money at the disposal of the submunicipal 
local government depends only on its good will. On the basis of the data available, 
it is diﬃcult to assess how often this happens. There is no national, aggregate ﬁscal 
information on municipal spending at the level of submunicipal local governments. 
According to a survey conducted in 2001, where 395 village heads were interviewed 
(Swianiewicz and Herbst 2002), local governments allocated small amounts of their 
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budgets for minor village investments, to be both decided upon and managed locally, 
in almost half of the cases (47 percent). On the other hand, according to results from 
the interviews we conducted with the representatives of the village heads’ associations, 
no separate fund intended for the submunicipal local governments was created in the 
majority of municipalities in Poland. The interviews also showed that the amount of 
the funds can be very diﬀerent in diﬀerent municipalities. However, in most cases, these 
funds are low and insuﬃcient for investment.10
Box 2. 
High Funds for Submunicipal Government
The Czerwionka Leszczyny municipality in the Śląskie region is an interesting case. As results from 
the reports of the submunicipal local governments to the municipality (http://www.czerwionka-
leszczyny.com.pl), the municipality puts at the disposal of the submunicipal local governments 
the sum of approximately PLN 70,000 per village (EUR 19,022). This allows them to undertake 
serious investments in the village infrastructure. The president of the regional association of the 
village heads could also list three Silesian municipalities with relatively high village funds. They 
were: Toszek, Zbrosławice, and Lyski. In the opinion of this respondent, except for Silesia, such 
high funds for submunicipal local governments are also found in some municipalities in the 
Małopolska region and in the Wielkopolska region. However, these cases are rare.
According to the study quoted by P. Swianiewicz and M. Herbst, the money at the 
disposal of the submunicipal local governments comes from the local taxes collected in 
their area, most often an agricultural tax, in 33 percent of cases. However, our research 
shows that this solution is not used that often, and even if it is, the mode of calculating 
the means the submunicipal local governments are due depends on many factors, not 
only on the size of local taxes.
Box 3. 
Determining Village Funds
As we learned from the President of the Social and Cultural Association of the Village Heads of the 
Śląskie region, the amount of the possible means allocated to the submunicipal local governments 
is decided each year in a budgetary resolution of the municipality. If such means are dispensed 
from the municipal budget, their amount is determined arbitrarily by the municipality. Only the 
way of allocating this amount between villages is calculated according to special algorithms that 
vary between municipalities and that take into account the amount of taxes collected locally. In 
the Toszek municipality, this algorithm depended on the number of inhabitants and the amount 
of agriculture tax collected in a given village. In other municipalities, other methods were used, 
also taking into account the area of the given unit.
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In some of the municipalities we investigated, the diversity of the amounts given to 
the submunicipal local governments depended upon the number of their inhabitants. 
However, the amount of the resources given per capita was very diﬀerent in diﬀerent 
places. We also came across municipalities where the amounts allocated to particular 
submunicipal local governments were equal and did not depend on their size.
Box 4. 
Arbitrary Distribution of Funds to Villages
The Jonkowo municipality in Warmińsko-Mazurskie region, where we conducted our interviews, 
gives the submunicipal local government approximately PLN 0.8  (about EUR 0.15) per capita 
every year, which adds up to approximately PLN 500 (EUR 136) per village, on average. On 
the other hand, in the Pleszew municipality in the Wielkopolska region, the means put at the 
disposal of the submunicipal local governments usually amount to PLN 10 (EUR 3) per capita, 
which in a very small village of Zawady gives PLN 600 (EUR 163), and in the biggest village of 
Kowalew—as much as PLN 16,000 (EUR 4,348) (Działalność jednostek pomocniczych gminy… 
2004). 
It should be added that from the reports on the activities of the submunicipal local 
governments in the municipalities mentioned above (those having village funds), it is 
evident that the village funds are clearly separate in relation to the municipal budget. 
Their use was determined at village meetings. During the meetings, the village head 
informed the persons present on the passed municipal budget. He then made a sugges-
tion, prepared by the village council, of how the funds should be allocated. As we learned 
from the quoted member of the Association of the Village Heads in the Śląskie region, 
the resolution of the village meeting on the allocation of village expenses is handed 
over to the municipal oﬃce. Its decisions, however, are not endorsed by the municipal 
authorities.
4.2 Income from the Customary Property of the Submunicipal 
 Local Governments 
Another source of income for the submunicipal local governments comes from the sale 
of communal property at the disposal of the submunicipal local government (customary 
property). However, as we have already mentioned, respect of the village customary 
property rights by the municipal authorities is often problematic, since these rights have 
only a customary character (the Act on Local Government gives the submunicipal local 
government only the right to use and manage the customary property described in the 
statute, and in the light of the law, this property is a communal, municipal property).
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Box 5. 
Village Own Revenues from Property Sales
In the municipality of Zabierzów in the Małopolska region, a plot belonging to the submunicipal 
local government was sold (to a private citizen). In this case, the fund of the submunicipal local 
government was supplied with a sum of 50 percent of the income from the sale, the rest of the 
money was transferred to the municipal budget. The way this money was divided was regulated 
by the municipal statute (Protokół nr 1/2006…). 
The submunicipal local governments are supposed to supply their budgets with the 
income coming not only from the sale but also from the management and usage of the 
customary property they own. 
Box 6. 
The Car Fair
One of the respondents gave us an example of a submunicipal local government that used the 
income from their forest holdings for its needs. In one of the reports on the activities of the 
submunicipal local governments that we investigated (Protokół z zebrania… 2005), we came 
across a situation where the submunicipal local government had an income in the amount of 
PLN 35,000 (approximately EUR 9,511) from an annual car fair taking place in the village.
Some submunicipal local governments also include in their budgets income from 
events they organize with the use of the village customary property, for example, village 
festivals or events organized in village buildings. However, as results from the interviews 
we conducted reveal, in the majority of municipalities the right of the submunicipal 
local governments to such income is not respected by the municipalities. As one of 
the respondents explained to us, the income from this kind of event is usually wholly 
appropriated by the local government (which is the rightful owner of the customary 
village property), and the local government chooses to overlook the fact that the village 
head does not account for this income in its entirety, using but a small amount for the 
needs of the village. 
4.3 Other Sources of Income 
Aside from situations where the submunicipal local government is free to allocate 
the means received from the municipality, there are also municipal subsidies that are 
intended for a speciﬁc aim (municipal speciﬁc grants). During our investigations we 
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came across two submunicipal local governments that list intentional subsidies from 
the municipal budget as a source of their income in their statutes (Statut  Wilków 1992, 
Statut Wizna 2003).
A traditional form of obtaining funds for the activity of the submunicipal local 
government is a voluntary collection from the village inhabitants. In most cases, however, 
this collection is informal and is not recorded. “Free collections from natural and legal 
persons” appeared even in the statutory sources of income of the submunicipal local 
government, as was the case in eight out of 20 statutes we investigated. The existence of 
this form of fund raising is conﬁrmed by our respondents, who claim that it is mostly 
directed towards various works in the aid of the village, for example, the purchase of 
building materials.
In one case, we came across a description of a voluntary collection for a particular 
purpose in the village of Żegocina in the Małopolska region, where the village council 
collected money for the family of a deceased village inhabitant (Sprawozdanie z 
działalności… 2006). When this money has to be entered into books, it must be paid 
into the account of the municipality, which can then allow the submunicipal local 
government to use it only at its discretion.
The participation in various nongovernmental programs directed at villages can 
also be a source of ﬁnancial means for the submunicipal local government. However, 
the participation of the submunicipal local government in such a program must be 
mediated by some legal entity: the municipality, a municipal institution, church, 
or a nongovernmental organization, for example, the principles of participation in 
the program “Restoration and Development of the Countryside” (Kamiński et al. 
2007: 103).
4.4 Financial Management by the Municipality 
In all the places where we conducted direct interviews on the ﬁnancing of submunicipal 
local governments, the means making up the village fund were, from the formal point 
of view, a property of the municipality. In order to account for the money, the village 
heads wrote out invoices from their municipality without having separate account 
books. This situation results from the fact that the submunicipal local governments are 
not legal entities, a position with both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the 
submunicipal local government is not burdened with bureaucratic obligations. Also, it is 
consistent with the rule of the budgetary unity and could negatively aﬀect the use of the 
means at the municipality’s disposal. On the other hand, it makes the submunicipal local 
government to some extent dependent on the good will of the municipality, because it 
does not have a formal possibility to generate income independently. As a result, if the 
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submunicipal local government wants to take on any ﬁnancial activity of its own, without 
the agency of the municipality, it has to register as an association of the constituents of 
the village, which could thus play the role of a ﬁnancial subject. 
Thus, legal regulations make the submunicipal local government unable to perform 
certain types of activities. In practice, however, this does not seem to be an obstacle. 
The results from the reports on the activities of the submunicipal local governments 
show that the “the activity of the submunicipal local government” is unclear, taken for 
granted, and could include anything that happens in the village. This conclusion is 
drawn from a report of the village of Chwaszczyno, mentioned above, in which a car 
fair generates income for the submunicipal local government and is formally run by 
the Municipal Cooperative “Samopomoc Chlopska”; in other reports on the activities 
of the submunicipal local governments we also found information on various activities 
in which the formal patron were other village organizations.
4.5 Remuneration of the Village Head
Generally, the function of the village head is not remunerated. However, this function 
sometimes requires some income. The form and the amount of the remuneration are 
diﬀerent according to the municipality. 
First, as previously mentioned, the village head is usually the collector of agriculture, 
forestry, and real estate taxes (taxes from natural persons only) as well as dog license 
taxes, of which he receives a small percentage as commission. In the cases we analyzed, 
the commission amounted to from two percent up to as much as 30 percent in the case 
of the dog license tax. This is legally regulated by local acts. It can be assumed that the 
village heads receive their remuneration in the form of a commission from taxes wherever 
they fulﬁll such a function, presumably in the majority of municipalities in Poland.
Second, the municipal council can decide to pay him an allowance (per diem) and 
refund business trip expenses, such as for attending a meeting of the municipal council. 
A common practice is oﬀering an allowance during attendance of the meeting of the 
municipal council (the village head is then treated equally as a councilor), or simply 
an allowance for holding the post of the village head. In practice, municipalities pay 
only one of these allowances. In the statutes of the submunicipal local governments we 
analyzed, the village heads received some kind of an allowance in 17 out of 20 cases. 
However, it is probable that such a practice is more common in the wealthier and more 
active municipalities which publish their local acts on their internet pages. It is rarer 
in less active municipalities. As is conﬁrmed by our respondents, the presidents of the 
associations of village heads in the Podlasie and Podkarpacie regions claim that paying 
out allowances for village heads is uncommon.
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Box 7. 
Remunerating Village Heads
In the submunicipal local governments we analyzed, the money received by the village heads 
for attendance at municipal councils and the remuneration for serving as a village head ranges 
from PLN 40 (approximately EUR 11 in the Ulanów municipality), up to PLN 100 in many 
municipalities (EUR 27 EUR in the Stronie Śląskie, Studzienice, Rewal municipality), to PLN 
160 (EUR 44 in the Zgierz municipality). It happens that the allowances are diversiﬁed for 
diﬀerent submunicipal local governments in the municipality and depend on the number of 
village inhabitants. In Zielona Góra, in villages of more than 2,000 inhabitants, the village head 
receives PLN 350 monthly (EUR 95), in villages of 1,001 to 2,000 inhabitants, PLN 300 (EUR 
82), and in villages of up to 1,000 inhabitants, PLN 200 (EUR 54). In the Gostycyn munici-
pality, the village heads receive from PLN 161 to PLN 296 monthly; this sum is diminished by 
PLN 68 if the village head is absent from the municipal council meeting. On the other hand, in 
Kolsk, the sum of PLN 80 monthly was determined as the allowance for the village heads and 
PLN 60 additionally for the participation in the municipal council meetings. This sum may also 
be calculated on a quarterly basis (as in the municipality of Jonkowo).
 An interesting solution was discovered in the municipality of Jonkowo in the Warmińsko-
Mazurskie region. The municipality put one or more workers at the disposal of the submunicipal 
local government to perform simple cleaning tasks. These workers were registered as unemployed 
but were employed by the Employment Oﬃce for intervention works. In such a situation, the 
village heads also received remuneration for the supervision of these workers—to the amount 
of PLN 108 (approximately EUR 29) for each worker. Although we came across the phenom-
enon of delegating “intervention” workers for the needs of the submunicipal local governments 
in other municipalities as well, the municipality of Jonkowo was the only one remunerating 
the village heads for the supervision over their work. Finally, another element of the personal 
income of the village head in this municipality was a remuneration received sporadically due to 
other works performed by the village head, e.g., for the engagement of construction works in 
the village. It is evident that even in a municipality that is quite generous to its village heads, the 
level of personal income of the village head is relatively low, so that it does not change the basic 
unproﬁtable character of this function.
As one of the respondents claims, it happens in some municipalities that a common 
form of remunerating the village head is a (free) handover of some farming land owned 
by the municipality. Within the studies we conducted, we did not come across this type 
of solution.
Generally, the remuneration of the village head is low, and this function is based on 
an engagement that is not ﬁnancially compensated. As we also observed in the inter-
views, the boundary between the personal income of the village head, as determined 
by the municipality, and the means given to the village fund in small villages is blurred, 
as the village heads we interviewed were often confused about which of the small sums 
they received from the municipality belonged to them personally, and which were the 
property of the village. It is beyond question that the village heads, when organizing 
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village events, sometimes cover the expenses out of their own pocket (Sprawozdanie z 
działalności sołtysa… 2004).
5. VILLAGE HEADS, REPRESENTATIVES, 
 AND VILLAGE MEETINGS
Although it can be assumed that there are many more diﬀerences in the functioning of 
submunicipal local governments in diﬀerent regions of Poland, with the main diﬀer-
ence concerning the actual activity of these units, this topic is still poorly studied and 
described. Literature on the present submunicipal local government virtually does not 
exist, and collecting any information of a cross-sectional character would have required 
separate studies. We found only three empirical studies devoted to submunicipal local 
governments (Ostrowski 1995 and 1999, Styk and Węgierkiewicz 2006), which also have 
quite a fragmented character and do not fulﬁll all the needs of this paper. We will come 
back to their results at the end of this section. Therefore, our knowledge is based on the 
descriptions of single cases received in the course of the interviews we conducted, and on 
the (randomly selected) reports on the activities of submunicipal local governments, as 
well as on the descriptions of good practices in a monthly paper, Gazeta Sołecka, directed 
to village heads, and in a biweekly, Wspólnota, aimed at local governments.
The functions fulﬁlled by the village heads can be divided into three groups:
 • village head as a representative of the municipality in the village;
 • village head as a representative of the village in contacts with external institu-
tions, especially the local government;
 • village head as a local leader among his own community. 
Fulﬁlling the functions of the ﬁrst group, the village heads are subservient to 
municipal authorities. Their role consists of mediating between the municipality and the 
village inhabitants. It is fulﬁlled by almost all village heads—at least to some extent. The 
functions of the second and third group are more important, from the point of view of 
submunicipal local governments, as an element of the local democracy. However, they 
are not fulﬁlled so frequently. To fulﬁll them properly requires from the village head a 
certain initiative, and from the municipal authorities an understanding of bottom-up 
initiative. 
All these functions are, of course, interdependent. We are now, however, going to 
try to describe each of them separately.
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5.1 A Representative of the Municipality in the Submunicipal 
 Local Government
Even the “passive” village heads can boast that their function is to deliver tax writs and 
collect taxes from the village inhabitants. In fact, the interviews we conducted show that 
this is the most basic function of the village head, performed almost in all submunicipal 
local governments. A questionnaire conducted with 11 village heads in the Mazowsze 
region showed that this is the most often quoted task of the municipality realized by 
the village heads.11
Another important function of the village head, making him a representative of 
the local government, is delivering the village inhabitants information on the most 
important events and initiatives of the municipality. The village heads are also sources 
of information of the municipal authorities on the actual needs of the given village. This 
results from the reports on the activities of the submunicipal local governments when 
(like before the Second World War) the village heads suggest the municipal authorities 
the existence of various needs. 
Box 8. 
Road Repair and Village Heads
In a report on activities, the village head of Książenica relates that he would bring municipal and 
powiat (county) oﬃcials (responsible for municipal and powiat roads) to the village to inspect 
road damage, and subsequently brought about their repair. The same village head also partici-
pated in the yearly inspection of local roads. He also took part in the acceptance procedure of 
the community service works performed in the village (Sprawozdanie… Książenice 2004). On 
the other hand, the village head of Stanowice relates in his report that not only does he control 
the acceptance procedure of the works in his municipality, but also tenders concerning the works 
in his village (Sprawozdanie… Stanowice 2004).
The village head also performs many other tasks of mediation in dealing with the 
oﬃcial matters of the village inhabitants. They concern tax matters, sanitary protection 
of the village, records of people and animals, reporting on the breakdown of communal 
infrastructure, or on problems connected with the relationship with other subjects than 
local government authorities. 
The village head is a person relatively better oriented in oﬃcial matters than the rest 
of the inhabitants. Although this task has a more informal character, the village head 
often helps the neighbors in writing oﬃcial documents, applications, and the like. This 
conclusion is also conﬁrmed in the above-quoted studies conducted with the 11 village 
heads in the Mazowsze region.
109
P o l i s h  S o l e c t w o — A  L a t e n t  F i e l d  f o r  R u r a l  G o v e r n a n c e
The obligations of the village head also include informing and opining on the needs 
requiring social help in the municipality. As a person with the best knowledge of the local 
community, the village head is usually a partner of the Municipal Center for Social Help, 
designating persons requiring help or giving an opinion of the applications for such help 
(Mielczarek and Domańska 1999). However, as results from the studies conducted by the 
Polish Institute of Economics of Agriculture and Food Industry show, the social functions 
of the submunicipal local governments are becoming restricted—both in comparison 
with the period before 1989 and the beginning of 1990s (Ostrowski 1999). This is also 
inﬂuenced by the Act on the Processing of Personal Data, which prohibits village heads 
from viewing oﬃcial information on the material situation of village inhabitants. The 
village heads, who previously had wider access to the information, often perceive this 
as a marginalization of their role.
Aside from the obligation of keeping in contact with the municipality, there are 
other tasks that put the village head in the position of an oﬃcial of the lowest level of 
the state administration. The village heads used to perform these tasks in prewar Poland, 
as well as in the period of communism. Similarly, the village head is designated as the 
performer of various acts concerning the given domain, but not connected with local 
government matters. A part of these functions is, at the same time, connected with the 
natural role of the village head as a head of the submunicipal local government—or the 
person responsible for the safety and well-being of his village. These functions pertain 
to (Zell 1999:74–75): securing the sanitary state of the village, ﬁre safety, delivering 
conscription cards, and some others.
5.2 Village Representative
In the villages where we observed active submunicipal local governments, a crucial 
area of this activity was winning the means and the realization of infrastructure invest-
ments. Because submunicipal local governments do not have much money, they try 
through external institutions. A natural driver in procuring these investments is the 
municipality. Earlier, we pointed out that the local government receives up-to-date 
information on the state of the roads and other needs of the village through the village 
head. However, the role of the village head does not have to consist in reporting alone, 
but also in acting so that investments enhancing the living standards of the inhabitancy 
are realized in the village. Interviews, reports of the submunicipal local governments, 
and a list of achievements of the village heads published in Gazeta Sołecka (a paper that 
presents the achievements of the submunicipal local governments in each issue) shows 
that the ability to win investments for the village is one of the main factors in the job 
evaluation of the village head.
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Most often the subject of the endeavors of the submunicipal local governments are 
infrastructure investments, such as construction and repair works: of roads, pavement, 
parking lots, pipelines, sewage systems, lighting, bus shelters, common rooms, cultural 
houses, kindergartens, and the like. The village heads also strive for support of their 
local organizations from the village, such as, volunteer ﬁre brigades, village housewives 
circles, sports clubs, and cultural organizations. Finally, the subject of the endeavors 
of the village heads is winning the means for organized village events: harvest homes, 
women’s day, anniversary ceremonies, and cultural events.
Box 9.
Active Submunicipal Governments
More active submunicipal local governments strive for municipal investment in a more system-
atic way. Before the municipal budget for a given year is prepared, more active village councils 
make a list of postulates of the village to the municipal budget. In the cases we are familiar with 
(Wnioski do budżetu… Rząska 2007, Plan Inwestycyjny… Jonkowo, 2007), this document does 
not contain the expected costs of the investments, just a list of needs. This document is oﬃcially 
ﬁled in the municipality before the deadline negotiated with the authorities. It does not force the 
municipality authorities to execute the indicated investments. It is but a list of needs and one of 
the factors inﬂuencing the budget plan. 
Another tool used to inﬂuence municipal decisions is the participation of the village 
heads in the meetings of the municipal councils. As Z. Zell (2001: 54) writes, “municipal 
councils in great majority allow the village head participation in the meetings with 
the so-called advisory vote, which means the entitlement to speak in the name of the 
submunicipal local government.”
However, the most frequent practice is probably classic lobbying—personal visits of 
the village head to the mayor and other oﬃcials having inﬂuence on the decisions that 
are important for the village. These oﬃcials are both municipal oﬃcials and representa-
tives of other subjects that may be important to the municipality.
5.3 A Host and a Local Leader
The social role of the village head is generally that of the submunicipal local government, 
a person who strives for the interests of the local community. In the previous section, 
we pointed to the fact that one of the most important roles of the village head is the 
winning of material and ﬁnancial means for the village, enabling the running of socially 
useful investments and local enterprises. However, according to centuries of tradition, 
the majority of village investments are performed by the village inhabitants themselves, 
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and only a small percentage is fully ﬁnanced from the budgetary means, without using 
the work of the village inhabitants. 
The role of the village heads does not consist only in lobbying with decision-makers 
who can procure the village means for investments, but also in mobilizing the local 
community to take up common works. The local community’s ability to undertake 
use of the subsidy is usually a contingency for its grant. It is frequently the case that 
the subsidy from the local government authorities covers the costs of the materials, 
and the village provides the workforce. The person initiating such a project is usually 
the village head. The village council then determines the actual aims of the activities, 
and tries to get the material means and mobilize the inhabitants to participate in the 
public works.
Local activity needing the participation of community service is often stimulated 
through various competitions, such as for “the most beautiful village,” organized by the 
regional government, region heads, regional organizations, associations, local govern-
ments, etc. While participating in such schemes, village inhabitants perform certain 
cleaning works together, build or renovate structures serving public needs (playground, 
bus stops, pavement), and generally upkeep their villages.12
Box 10. 
The Most Beautiful Village Competition
The competition for the most beautiful village started one of the biggest programs addressed 
especially to submunicipal local governments: “Revival of the village, and the preservation and 
protection of cultural heritage.” It was initiated in 1996 in the Opolskie region by the regional 
authorities. Its realization was modeled on an analogous German program realized in North 
Rhine-Westphalia (a partner region of the Opolskie region). The program consists of intensive 
training programs aimed at local communities on the level of submunicipal local governments, in 
encouraging village communities to create strategies of development on the level of submunicipal 
local governments, and in allocating signiﬁcant resources for investment in the village. These 
activities are directed at the submunicipal level, whereby village meetings and the submunicipal 
local government should be the initiators of these activities. The investments are realized with 
the participation of the village inhabitants.13 At present, this program is realized in three regions 
(Opolskie, Śląskie, and Zachodniopomorskie region), and the yearly expenditure for its realiza-
tion in the Śląskie region, where we sought information on this topic, amounts to PLN three 
million (EUR 833,000). 
Submunicipal local governments can also be recipients of small grants from other 
sources. The representatives of the Rural Development Foundation, the biggest Polish 
NGO addressing its resources to village communities, claim that approximately 10 
percent of the applications submitted to the foundation concern projects realized 
by submunicipal local governments. The total yearly budget allocated by the Rural 
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Development Foundation for small grants amounted to PLN 3.4 million (EUR one 
million) in 2007.
The submunicipal local government and the village head are forms of natural leader-
ship of bottom-up, self-organization in Polish villages. Cooperation in the construction 
of the village infrastructures is tradition. 
The problem, however, is the poverty of Polish villages, and the lack of means in 
communities that could be handed over for the activities of the submunicipal local 
government, as well as a pervasive dislike of the municipal authorities in the matters of 
delegating the decision to allocate the means to submunicipal local governments. 
5.4 Actors in Local Politics
Only persons esteemed by the village are elected village heads. Where submunicipal 
local governments are passive, the authority of the village head does not play a distinc-
tive role. In villages where we conducted interviews with “passive” village heads, our 
respondents were certainly not participating in the local politics. They admitted that 
there are not many volunteers to perform the function of a village head. 
However, in active submunicipal local governments, the village heads were important 
persons in their villages. As the mayor of a municipality told us, where the activity of 
the submunicipal local governments did not leave any doubts, there are usually a few 
candidates in the elections for the village head and the voters expect from the elected 
person proof of some achievement. The respondent, however, also pointed to the fact 
that a successful village head usually keeps his post for many terms. This is also conﬁrmed 
by Gazeta sołecka, which publishes the proﬁles of distinguished village heads in each 
issue. In many cases, they are long-term holders of the position.
While the village head, as a local leader, is a conspicuous person in the village, 
the village council is less visible. In a small-scale study conducted by the Association 
Foundations of a Strong State (Stowarzyszenie Fundamenty Silnego Państwa) in the 
Komorniki municipality in the Wielkopolska region, 80 percent of the respondents 
claimed they knew where the village head lived and 66 percent knew his name. 
According to the results of the same studies, more than a half of the municipality 
inhabitants did not know that there was also a village council in their village, and only 
12 percent were able to name any of its members (Reich 2006). In two interviews, 
when we were able to talk to the village heads about the functioning of the council, 
they claimed its task foremost consists of helping the village head in reaching various 
communities, with whom the village head does not necessarily have daily contact. 
Undoubtedly, however, the village council is a group of people cooperating with the 
village head and not playing (as councilors of the submunicipal local government) a 
particular individual role.
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Aside from the village head, the other salient person in the village is undoubtedly 
the councilor. (Although a councilor may represent more than one submunicipal local 
government). From the interviews we conducted, it is clear that his function is diﬀerent 
than that of the village head. The village head is undoubtedly concerned with the ques-
tions of the submunicipal local government and mobilizing the local community. The 
village head works in his own village, and it often happens that he simply performs many 
activities by himself. He/she can be compared with the councilor only when he/she comes 
into the municipality. Currently, the village head and the councilor are allies, because 
they lobby to their own villages. Although, theoretically, the councilor should take into 
account the interests of the whole municipality, he usually does not forget to represent 
the voters from his own ward, which often coincides with the village (Dzieniszewska-
Naroska 2004). It does not change the fact that the area of his interest is usually much 
larger. As our research shows, the village heads may be councilors; however, this is not 
common in practice. We also came across a village head who became the mayor. This 
is not common practice either, as the function of the village head is usually not the 
beginning of a political career. 
Although an active village head is an important person in his village and often has 
some inﬂuence in the local government and local institutions, he participates in local 
politics only to a small extent. Although he can, and he should, strive for decisions favor-
able for his village, he does not have direct inﬂuence on them with the local government 
authorities. He participates in decision-making as an advisory body at most. In respect 
to the municipal authorities, he is rather a messenger gathering local proposals, and 
writing down problems observed during ﬁeldwork, though he is not a person having 
at his disposal real political inﬂuence on solutions. Moreover, the village head does not 
usually have enough education and competence to be able to control the activities of 
the local authorities. He is rather inferior in relation to them and is seen as a person 
who should strive for solving local problems in the name of his village.
5.5 Village Meeting as a Form of Direct Democracy
The village meeting is the highest local organ of the submunicipal local government. 
It is called according to the statute of the submunicipal local government, from the 
initiative of both the village head and municipal authorities or inhabitants. The village 
meeting usually has the right to choose the village head, make decision on the allocation 
of resources in the disposal of the submunicipal local government, formulate postulate 
for the municipal budget, accept the report from the activity of the village head, and 
make other decisions concerning matters important for the village. It is then, undoubt-
edly, a form of direct participation of the inhabitants in the ruling over the life of their 
own village. 
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According to the meeting minutes we analyzed, not more than 100 persons usually 
participate in each meeting. As previously mentioned, if this is not enough for the 
quorum required by the statute, the rule of “the second date” is used. The second date 
of the meeting is often given along with the ﬁrst, anticipating in advance that those 
entitled to vote will not come in the number required by the regulations. Although, in 
practice, the determination of the quorum is ﬁctional, it is quite common, and does 
not harm the rules of democracy.
It can be assumed that the village meeting in passive submunicipal local govern-
ments has only a formal character: it is restricted to the elections of the village head and 
the approval of the report he submits. A very limited number of persons participate 
in the meeting. In more active submunicipal local governments, a few or a few dozen 
percentage of participation of the village inhabitants in the meetings means that only 
the more active part of the inhabitant participate. In the submunicipal local govern-
ments we observed, there undoubtedly exists a division into persons participating in 
the activity of the submunicipal local government, and those who do not take part in 
the life of the village. 
Analyzing the minutes from the village meetings, we also observed that they are 
quite often an opportunity for a political agitation by the councilors and municipal 
authorities. The village administrator or the village councilor show up at the village 
meeting in order to present, for example, a plan of the municipal budget, and future 
investments in the village in order to promote their program in the upcoming elections. 
The presentation of the candidates for councilor may also be a point on the agenda 
(Protokół nr 2/2006… Rząska).
The minutes from the village meetings does not indicate that they are a forum of 
actual heated debate on civic matters. We did not come across any situation where 
the authorities of the submunicipal local government had a problem with accounting 
for their activity before the village meeting. It can be assumed that in many cases, the 
meeting is just a formal obligation to take and accept some initiatives, and the actual 
discussion on the forms and aims of the activities takes place during informal meetings 
between the inhabitants. 
This does not change the fact that a village meeting is an institution of direct 
democracy: a place where the local community can be mobilized to action, and start 
a discussion on the needs of the village, and the activities that should be taken. It is 
regretful that the use of this institution is quite limited in many Polish submunicipal 
local governments. There are two reasons for this. First, the municipalities are quite 
unwilling to delegate the responsibility of making decisions to submunicipal local 
governments, which is why there is not much to discuss during village meetings. Second, 
there is a low level of civil activity in rural areas and many inhabitants do not feel the 
need to participate in decision-making and are unwilling to strive for the legitimacy of 
initiatives in questions.
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In none of the cases we analyzed did we come across information concerning any 
conﬂict in the villages as to the representation of various groups of the rural community, 
including under-representation, for instance, of local ethnic or religious minorities. In 
a relatively ethnically homogenous Poland this problem does not seem signiﬁcant. A 
much more signiﬁcant variation is the attitude towards submunicipal institutions of the 
“new” minorities appearing more and more frequently in Polish villages, especially in the 
outskirts of large metropolises: people emigrating from cities and living in nearby rural 
areas. We know from both the literature (Figiel 2006), and from our own observations, 
that such groups integrate poorly with the village community, and are not interested 
in the institutions the villages have developed. Even those prone to active participation 
in the local ﬁeld are not often interested in participating in village meeting or events 
organized by submunicipal local governments. Instead of a traditional organizational 
framework, submunicipal local governments choose new ones: associations (NGOs). 
An association is a form of activity that is both culturally closer to them as well as more 
universal, because it has a legal status exclusive of the submunicipal local government.
5.6 Activities of Village Heads and Submunicipal 
 Local Governments: Findings from Empirical Research
 
In describing the various functions of the village head and the submunicipal local govern-
ment, it is diﬃcult to unambiguously evaluate what actual tasks are managed by village 
heads, and with what eﬃcacy and to what extent. We are not able to determine how 
many active, and how many passive village heads there actually are in Poland. Studies 
concerning the activity of submunicipal local governments are scarce. In order to clarify 
these issues we will quote the results of three diﬀerent cases
Data collected for 20 years by the Institute of Economics of Agriculture and Food 
Industry, from studies conducted on a sample of 74 villages, indicate the extent to which 
the public works were used to realize projects for the common good of the village. They 
show that public works were organized in 92 percent of the villages during 1985–1988 
(the last years of communism) and 32 percent of them realized four investments or 
more. During 1989–1992 (in the ﬁrst years after the collapse of communism) the 
number of public works decreased. They were realized only in 78 percent of the villages 
under investigation, and 10 percent of them concerned more than three investments. 
Another study concerned the years 1992–1994. It showed an increase in the number of 
public works in rural areas. In the time period under investigation, public works were 
conducted in 93 percent of the villages, and in 26 percent of them four investments 
or more were realized (Ostrowski 1995). On the basis of this data, we cannot state 
concretely whether these investments were realized upon the initiative of the village head, 
and whether they were achieved by the village head’s actions. However, one can expect 
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that if such public works were organized, were at least conducted with the cooperation 
of the village head.
Table 2. 
Undertakings Managed by the Village Councils in 1992, 1994, and 1996
1992 1994 1996
Number of villages under investigation 72 72 73
Number of villages where undertakings managed by the council were distinct 41 64 61
Number of undertakings in total 87 180 101
Construction and repair of roads, bridges, and street lighting 40% 30% 28%
Construction of water-supply system, sewage system, sewage treatment plant, 
and gas-supply system
13% 20% 26%
Construction of a bus stop, other improvements of public communication, 
establishment of phone lines
9% 10% 20%
Construction and repair of educational, cultural, and healthcare institutions 20% 16% 13%
Problems of agricultural production 6% — —
Commerce and services 1% 1% —
Social care 5% 11% —
Other 6% 12% 13%
Source:  Ostrowski 1999. 
In another passage, the same author quotes data describing what actions were 
organized in 1992, 1994, and 1996 by village councils (Ostrowski 1999). As Table 2 
shows, where submunicipal local governments are highly active, they concentrate their 
activity on the development of village infrastructure. This proves that very concrete and 
detailed matters concerning the village are discussed in submunicipal local governments, 
despite a quite general formulation of the tasks of submunicipal local governments in 
their statutes referred to earlier in this chapter. Village councils manage social care to a 
much smaller extent. Neighborhood help or activities concerned with culture are not 
included in their tasks at all. 
It is worth noting that the village head and village council are included in public 
works realized in the village, if there are any, whether or not that submunicipal local 
governments are actively pursuing investments. Moreover, this study only reﬂects the 
work of the village council, whereas there are probably more activities performed by the 
village head. This applies only to these matters that had to be tackled collegially, such 
as larger undertakings concerning the whole village. It can also be speculated that the 
submunicipal local government was not in all cases the initiator of the realization of a 
particular task—one can suppose that even in those situations where the investments 
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were initiated without the active participation of the village head and the village council, 
it was necessary to include these subjects for the realization of these investments.
The study conducted by the students of the Faculty of Geography and Regional 
Studies at the University of Warsaw of 11 submunicipal local governments in the 
Mazowsze region might not be totally representative, though it provides some insights 
into the problem under investigation.
 It is worth noting that the majority of village heads studied use their opportunity 
for participation in the meeting of the municipal council: six respondents claim that 
they always participate, three participate often, and only two attend from time to time 
or rarely. Moreover, according to the village statutes, the respondents declare that they 
organized some works that beneﬁted the village and that village inhabitants participated 
in them with no remuneration: seven out of 11 village heads responded in this way. This 
conﬁrms the function of the village head as a local leader. The village head also helps 
the inhabitants deal with various oﬃcial matters (ﬁve do so often, and ﬁve from time to 
time), and to organize various tasks concerning the care of the ill and elderly (ﬁve out 
of 11 respondents), which corresponds to the task of neighborhood help mentioned in 
the village statutes. 
All village heads also admitted that the local government commissions them to 
perform some of their tasks. The main task that nine out of 11 village heads speciﬁed 
was the collection of local taxes. Seven village heads declared they take care of the beau-
tiﬁcation and cleanliness of the village. Five respondents said that the submunicipal local 
government realize small investments on their own. The ﬁnal task worth mentioning is 
the organization of free time for children and teenagers (four village heads).
However, it is diﬃcult to say to what extent these tasks are actually relegated to 
the submunicipal local government by the municipally and to what extent they are 
taken up at the initiative of the village heads. Ultimately, they correspond, in a sense, 
with the tasks of the village head presented above in the statutes of submunicipal local 
governments.
The third relevant study was conducted in the municipality of Komorniki in the 
Wielkopolska region (Styk and Węgierkiewicz 2006). Interestingly, the question about 
the activity of village heads was posed to the inhabitants of the municipality. Every ﬁfth 
respondent answered that he/she does not know what the village head in his village 
does. More than 40 percent of them indicated that the main activity of the village head 
is tax collection. The other activity is taking care of the cleanliness and order of the 
village—this answer was chosen by almost every ﬁfth respondent. Interestingly, these 
answers correspond to two of the main types of activity declared by the village heads 
themselves in the study of the Mazowsze region. Only every seventh inhabitant observes 
that the village head takes care of the good of the village and its inhabitants. Neither 
this study, nor the study of the village head in the Mazowsze region, conﬁrmed that one 
of the main activities of the village head is the development of village infrastructure, as 
discussed so frequently by the village councils, according to L. Ostrowski (1999).
118
M I N D  Y O U R  O W N  B U S I N E S S !
Table 3. 
Activities of the Village Head According to the Inhabitants 
of the Municipality of Komorniki
Activity Percent of responses
Tax collection 41
Taking care of cleanliness and order of the village 18
Taking care of the good of the village and its inhabitants 15
Infrastructure 13
Organizing events 10
Organizing meetings 6
Taking care of safety in the village 4
Other 36
I do not know 22
Source: Figiel 2006.
 
Undoubtedly, studies on the activity of submunicipal local government and 
village heads, their role in local societies, and the extent of their cooperation the local 
government are still topics rarely tackled by the researchers in Poland dealing with 
local government, and especially with local governance. In spite of the fact that the 
data we managed to collect on this topic may seem modest, we did make a thorough 
overview of the existing sources. We can state with certainty that empirical data devoted 
to the functioning of submunicipal local governments in Poland are scarce. Though 
the data we collected indicate that this functioning varies from municipality to muni-
cipality throughout diﬀerent parts of Poland, the size of this diﬀerentiation is hard to 
evaluate.
5.7 National Association of Village Heads
In discussing the functioning of submunicipal local governments and village heads in 
Poland, the association movement should be mentioned. There are numerous regional 
associations of the village heads (only one region, Warmia and Mazury region, does not 
have its own regional association), which in turn are gathered in one National Association 
of Village Heads (Krajowe Stowarzyszenie Soltysow). This organization is made up of 
approximately 15,000 village heads and members of village councils from throughout 
Poland. On a regional scale, this association has existed from 1992, and on a national 
scale the association has existed from 1994. 
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The National Association of Village Heads edits two magazines. The yearly Poradnik 
Sołtysa i Radnego (Village heads and councilors’ guidebook), which (according to the 
organization) is distributed among all municipalities in Poland in the amount of 40,000 
issues, in addition to the monthly Gazeta Sołecka (45,000). Both magazines clearly try 
to guide and inﬂuence the attitudes of its readership. Among other things, they clearly 
disseminate the ideas of strengthening the role of submunicipal local governments, and 
delegating tasks to them by the local government.
A particular strength of these magazines are their legal counsels. Above all, the 
magazines of the association try to persuade the village heads to regulate the rights of 
the submunicipal local government in individualized statutes, and try to conﬁrm, in a 
legal way, the right to beneﬁt from the village customary property. They also disseminate 
knowledge about various programs helping to ﬁnance village investments, and propagate 
good practices of active submunicipal local governments and village heads. 
The association also organizes trainings and cooperates with various programs 
directed at rural areas. Both the advice in the magazines and the trainings are designed 
to create the bottom-up activity of submunicipal local governments, and strengthen the 
position of submunicipal local governments in respect to the municipal authorities.
Regional associations cooperate with the administration and local authorities in 
their respective regions. They organize regional and national conferences concerning the 
problems of the rural areas. On the national level, the association also tries to lobby for 
legislative initiatives in strengthening the position of submunicipal local governments 
and village heads. 
 
6. CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POLISH MODEL: 
 ACCOUNTABILITY AND PUBLIC SERVICE EFFICIENCY 
The village head and submunicipal local government are traditional institutions of 
self-organization of the inhabitants of the Polish village. Their potential does not result 
from legal regulations or from any actual inﬂuence enjoyed by the village head. This 
results from the traditional placement of this institution in village societies, in other words, 
from the fact that submunicipal local governments actually exist in all municipalities in 
rural areas across Poland. In this sense, the submunicipal local government is rather a 
“natural” and not a “functional” institution (Swianiewicz 2004). It exists not because it 
is a cheaper and more eﬀective institution, but because such is rural tradition. 
This is also reason for submunicipal local governments existence despite their inac-
tivity. In the whole of Poland there are only 10 municipalities (out of 2,171 rural and 
mixed rural-urban municipalities) without submunicipal local governments. They exist 
even in villages established in place of the former state-owned farms, and in communi-
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ties where the natural continuity of rural customs and traditions has been interrupted 
(Fenrych 2004, Iwanicka 2004). 
At the same time, the legal system leaves a lot of freedom as far as the usage of this 
potential is concerned. There are no records in the Act of Local Governments either 
imposing the establishment of submunicipal local governments or regulating the tasks 
they should tackle. The legislative body left these questions to the local governments 
and, to some extent, the submunicipal local government and village inhabitants. For 
example, village inhabitants themselves can present an initiative to the village council 
of establishing submunicipal local government, which seems to be a very good applica-
tion of the act.
The information we collected shows that the local and submunicipal local governments 
use the possibilities given to them by the legislative body to various extents. The situation 
and the level of activity of the submunicipal local governments vary in Poland—a large 
majority of submunicipal local governments do not show any activity at all. Talking 
about submunicipal local governments as tools of decentralization of local government, 
it is rather a hypothetical potential, and does not reﬂect reality. Therefore, it seems that 
legislation that is open to the question of submunicipal local government is a good solution, 
and would enable adjustment of the local tasks to individual needs.
In practice, it turns out that only a few local governments use submunicipal local govern-
ments as a form of internal decentralization. Among the tasks fulﬁlled by village heads, 
the most dominant are tax collection, taking care of the cleanliness and beauty of the 
village, or informing the municipality of the state of the roads and street lighting. It is 
therefore hard to talk about public service eﬃciency if an average submunicipal local 
government performs very few public services. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that a system based on using village inhabit-
ants as the workforce for achieving village investments is economically eﬀective. The 
municipality then bears the costs of the materials and saves on the workforce. The 
village head organizes the works. The organization of such undertakings is a vital role 
of submunicipal local governments.
The Polish system theoretically gives the possibility for great accountability, thanks 
to the form of direct democracy that is found in submunicipal local governments. The 
village meeting as a legislative body theoretically enables control of the activity of the 
village leader, and jointly-made decisions concerning the village, though, in practice, it 
turns out that it is underutilized, due to low social engagement. The restricted possibili-
ties of the activity of submunicipal local governments make it harder to evaluate their 
activity in terms of accountability in practice. It is a very weak institution and has a very 
restricted autonomy. 
In the cases we observed closely, the means that were at the disposal of the village 
heads were so small that their work has a character of sheer volunteer work. No one 
entrusted them with any substantial means to realize their tasks. However, it seems that 
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the form of direct democracy as a tool (in Poland, a potential rather than an utilized 
tool) is suitable for eﬀective accountability.
The function of the village head may also be considered in terms of a tool of social 
control over the municipal council. In this sense, it is undoubtedly a useful institution. 
The village head acts as a lobbyist of local interests and a person observing the work of 
the local government from outside of the local power system. At the same time, he or 
she fulﬁlls the role of a control subject, and to some extent, ensures contact between the 
municipality and the village. However, we cannot evaluate to what extent this function 
is actually fulﬁlled in practice.
Village meetings organized by submunicipal local governments or meetings with 
councilors are also tools of democratic control of the local authorities. However, it is not 
their function of control that seems to be the key role of the village head as an element of 
local democracy. A much more important role is that of self-organization and mobiliza-
tion—the fact that village meetings or common undertakings are areas of cooperation 
and social activity of village inhabitants. Submunicipal local governments should not 
be judged just as an element of the local power system, but rather as a potential tool to 
activate village communities.
This power-to-activate is the Polish submunicipal local governments’ greatest poten-
tial. They do not have a legal status that guarantees them means of obtaining action 
without their own eﬀort. In this sense, the submunicipal local governments are fully 
bottom-up institutions, based on the civic activity of the local community. This makes 
them an institution analogous, to a large extent, to a nongovernmental organization that 
can get outside support (under the condition they can obtain partners by themselves 
and convince them to invest in their undertakings).
The submunicipal local governments are used precisely in this way. First, they 
organize traditional public works: with resources obtained from the outside (building 
materials, tools) or without them, the local community dedicates their own labor to 
beneﬁt the village. Second, they participate in grant competitions, where they often 
apply for means directed for NGOs. In this case, they are in a diﬃcult position, as they 
are not legal entities and need to procure the cooperation of some other legal entity (e.g., 
a local government) and thus can formally participate in the competition.
The actual weakness of submunicipal local governments does not result from their 
weak legal position. The real problem is the low social activity and lack of proper knowledge 
among village inhabitants. As L. Ostrowski (1999) points out, there are usually but a 
few educated people on village councils, and the percentage of doctors or teachers in the 
councils is decreasing (the study comes from the 1990s). The problem of uneducated 
local leaders puts barriers both in situations when the submunicipal local government 
must negotiate a favorable status in the municipality, and when it looks for support from 
the outside. Ostrowski also points to the fact that the change of the political system 
also changed the methods that can be used by the village when seeking subventions. 
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Today, the sources of possible subsidies are often various institutions and foundations 
working in favor of the third sector and located in cities. Village leaders do not often 
have knowledge about where to apply for such means or how to go about it. Moreover, 
they cannot even obtain this knowledge in the municipality.
Finally, we would like to quote the results of the studies conducted in the munici-
pality of Komorniki. The studies showed that more than 80 percent of the inhabitants 
knew where the village head lived, and 66 percent knew his name. At the same time, 
the inhabitants could not list the obligations of the village head, talking about them 
in reference to the whole municipality without distinguishing between the two levels 
(Styk and Węgierkiewicz 2006). This shows that the submunicipal local government in 
Poland is, above all, a traditional village institution. It fulﬁlls an important function in 
protecting village pride and identity. As P. Swianiewicz and M. Herbst (2002) observe, 
“the Polish soltys (village head) is an important local leader and his presence, together with 
a formal recognition of the ‘village meeting’ institution, clearly contributes to the strength of 
local democracy in rural areas.” However, his real tasks are often very limited and mostly 
symbolic. And this is the result not of bad laws, but of the weakness of civic society in 
Poland. 
7. POLICY ADVICE
The system of the submunicipal local governments in Poland has many advantages as 
well as disadvantages. It seems that policy advice concerning the functioning of submu-
nicipal local governments, both in Poland and in other countries, can be formulated on 
this basis. Therefore, how can their activity be improved?
 • First, we must stress that the submunicipal local government is a very important 
institution for local democracy. It should be promoted and protected because of 
its long-embedded tradition and its important role in creating the feeling of 
identity for inhabitants.
 • Polish submunicipal local governments are examples of an institution that can 
successfully fulﬁll two important functions at once. These are the function of 
an auxiliary unit of the municipality, which is the basic level of local govern-
ment, and the function of implementing local democracy, and encouraging the 
inhabitants to participate in activities for the common good, even the lowest level, 
that of the level of individual villages. It seems certain that submunicipal local 
governments fulﬁll both these functions. 
 • One should not make an eﬀort to introduce submunicipal local governments as 
the lowest level of local government; this is not the aim of these entities. Therefore, 
attempts to create a separate budget of the submunicipal local government, 
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independent from the local government, or that submunicipal local govern-
ments become legal entities, do not seem justiﬁed, even though in some cases 
this would facilitate and improve their abilities. 
 • The local government must not be deprived of its basic competences. On 
the other hand, some autonomy of the auxiliary units is also a worthy aim. 
A situation where submunicipal local governments have their own, democratic 
legislative body (acting in the form of direct democracy), an executive body that 
is responsible to it, and have some means for their activity at their disposal, is 
justiﬁed. The existence of democratic institutions at the level of the village is a 
form of how civic society works. It necessitates that the inhabitants participate 
in decision-making about the matters that concern them directly, and ﬁnally 
favors social control over the decision of the local governments by enhancing 
its accountability.
 • The legal solution implemented in Poland (the solution to transfer the decision 
about the range of activity and means given at the disposal of auxiliary units in 
rural areas to local governments) also seems correct, providing that the initiative 
will be taken by the inhabitants of the given area. In reality, it often happens 
that submunicipal local governments cannot take up the role of the key actor 
of decentralized local policy. The actual weakness of the submunicipal local 
governments is the reason why a legal strengthening of their position should 
not be obligatory. Only a general framework of the functioning of a submunicipal 
local government should be left at the level of legislation, so that their functioning 
can be adjusted to local customs, tradition, and civic engagement. 
 • The same reason makes it unwise that local governments should be forced to transfer 
the obligatorily ﬁnancial means to the submunicipal local governments. This would 
negate the rule of the budgetary unity and could negatively aﬀect the use of means 
at the disposal of the municipality. But the transferring by the municipalities of 
even some of the means that the submunicipal local governments can administer 
would be a very good practice, especially in the cases where these units are active 
and able to use the money for their own beneﬁt. It seems advisable to promote 
and encourage municipalities towards such solutions.
 • An important step would be towards educational and promotional work. In 
Poland, this issue was taken up by the National Association of Village Heads, 
especially by the magazines it publishes. As we have written earlier, their aim 
is to make the village leaders aware of the legal instruments submunicipal local 
governments have at their disposal to build cooperation with municipalities, 
while at the same time maintaining their autonomy, supporting them in looking 
for money, and encouraging them to take up activities at the local level. It seems 
appropriate that ﬁnancing of the activity of submunicipal local governments, 
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from the municipal budget or from other sources, is sensible only when these 
subjects are really active. 
 • It is worthwhile to refer to traditional institutions in the context of designing 
new democratic solutions. Promoting modern Polish democracy tends to imitate 
and propagate solutions tested in western democracies, and not to implement 
traditional solutions, even though they might be useful. Take the example of 
city inhabitants settling in villages, who—even when they intend on acting in 
the beneﬁt of their new place of living—prefer “urban” and “modern” forms 
of action: NGOs. Furthermore, they are not interested in participating in the 
structures of submunicipal local governments. We can guess that the lack of 
scientiﬁc studies and publications on submunicipal local governments is the 
result of the same trend. The submunicipal local government does not seem, in 
modern Polish culture, an attractive institution that can be included into the 
context of new democratic institutions, which ensure Poland European stan-
dards. The promotion of this institution, especially in the context of its potential of 
bottom-up democracy and decentralization, is much desired, for no other reason 
than the need to make it clear to village leaders that there are possibilities for 
inclusion in the existing institutional environment of a democratic state.
 • However, the potential of the submunicipal local governments will not be real-
ized if active subjects do not obtain means for action. Therefore, the existence 
of grant programs—such as the program Village Revitalization (realized by the 
National Association of Village Heads) or the program Village Head in Europe 
(realized by the Foundation for the Development of Local Democracy)—are 
a favorable phenomenon. An unfavorable aspect of using grants is the fact 
that—because of not being legal entities—submunicipal local governments 
must use an institutional “umbrella” given by the municipality or a third-sector 
organization. However, this does not appear to undermine the traditional form 
of functioning of submunicipal local governments, which have always cooper-
ated with the majority of subjects on the area of their inﬂuence, and have not 
paid special attention to who the oﬃcial organizer of the event is.
 • The system of organizing competitions, besides securing ﬁnancial means for the 
submunicipal local government to function, is also a mobilization to action; it 
helps the village to self-organize. A very good example is the competition for 
the “most beautiful village” described earlier in this paper.
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APPENDIX
Research on Submunicipal Governments
In order to supplement the information available in the literature, the authors completed 
the following additional research:
 1) In-depth interviews with:
  • Four village heads
  • Two mayors
  • Two heads of the regional organizations of the Village Heads Associations
  • One activist of the National Association of Village Heads 
  • The Editor-in-Chief of the review Gazeta Sołecka
 2) Questionnaire-based research was conducted with 11 village heads in the 
Mazowsze region (one village head from each municipality). The interviews were 
conducted by students of the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the 
University of Warsaw in the frame of a course on “the role and organization of 
local government.”
Table A1.
Statistical Data Used for Figure 1
Number of submunicipal local governments 
(solectwo)
Number of municipalities 
(rural and mixed urban-rural)
0 11
1–5 98
6–10 344
11–15 493
16–20 446
21–25 313
26–30 208
31–35 126
36–40 64
More than 40 68
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Table A2.
Statistical Data for Figures 2 and 3
Region Average number of citizens in one 
submunicipal local government in 
rural local governments in 2005
Average number of submunicipal 
local governments in rural local 
governments in Polish regions in 2005
Dolnośląskie 439 17
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 404 17
Lubelskie 332 19
Lubuskie 407 14
Łódzkie 300 21
Małopolskie 1,080 11
Mazowieckie 274 26
Opolskie 620 12
Podkarpackie 910 11
Podlaskie 157 32
Pomorskie 467 16
Śląskie 1,407 9
Świętokrzyskie 383 20
Warmińsko-Mazurskie 284 22
Wielkopolskie 446 17
Zachodniopomorskie 382 15
Source: Author’s own research based on the data of the Central Statistical Oﬃce (GUS).
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NOTES
1 Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw.
2 Centre for Local Studies, Warsaw.
3 Smaller gromadas, where the councils were not appointed, were an exception—the village head was 
elected in direct elections on a village meeting.
4 The commission (komisja rewizyjna) controls also activity of a mayor and other local government 
organization entities. Its members are chosen from a municipal council. 
5 The act (Article 48, Paragraph 2) conﬁrmed that there exist previous, common rights to use the 
customary property and that the municipal council cannot limit them without the permission of 
the village meeting. However, in practice, submunicipal local governments make use of these rights 
to a very small extent. Theoretically, the components of the customary property of submunicipal 
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local governments and rules of its usage should be detailed in the statute. In practice, submunicipal 
local governments accept the statutes given, where the existence of such customary properties not 
noted at all. 
6 On that point the situation is diﬀerent in city districts, as legislative power belongs to an elected 
local/district council.
7 As far as local governments are concerned, in municipalities under 20,000 citizens (most of Polish 
rural local governments) there is a majority system to elect councils, with one (or more) councillor 
elected in every village. In municipalities over 20,000 the system is proportional, as well as in powiats 
and regions.
8 According to the interpretation of the Constitutional Tribunal of August 21, 1991, a village inhabitant 
is a person permanently residing in the village, irrespective of his formal address. In practice this 
interpretation may be questioned (Zell 2000).
9 In Poland, apart from cities and rural areas, there are also “city-rural local governments.” It means 
that one local government controls a small city and rural areas around it. That was also the case we 
were interested in.
10 Besides, the statutes of the submunicipal local governments we analyzed determine that “the means 
dispensed in the municipal budget” are also included in the income of the submunicipal local 
governments; however, they do not determine exactly what is the amount and the origin of these 
means. A precise amount that the municipality dispenses to the submunicipal local government 
every year was determined only in one out of twenty documents: “Deciding on the amount of the 
means determined in paragraph 2 [ﬁnancial means of the submunicipal local government dispensed 
from the municipal budget] ensues by multiplying the number of inhabitants having a permanent 
residence in the village until June 30 of the year preceding the budget year by the monetary equivalent 
of 0.1 quintal of rye according to the price adapted to calculate the agriculture tax for a given year in 
the municipality” (Statut sołectwa… Zielona Góra, 2005). 
11 A study conducted by the students of the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the University 
of Warsaw. During a course on “the role and organization of the local government” the students 
conducted questionnaires with 11 village heads in the Mazowsze region (one village head from each 
municipality).
12 In the Warmia and Mazury region, the villages winning a competition like that can receive a monetary 
reward of PLN 1,000–20,000 (EUR 277–5,555) to use in further village investments. A natural 
leader of such enterprises is also the submunicipal local government.
13 Available online: http://www.odnowawsi.pl.
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Executive Summary
Communal self-governance in Serbia has a strong tradition since the 18th century. However, 
the local community, mesna zajednica (MZ), is still perceived as a relic of the socialist 
past that should be abolished as such. Others argue for the survival of former Yugoslav 
institutions such as MZs as a form of decentralization within municipalities that will be 
useful to strengthen local democracy and accountability.
Encouragingly, provisions of the new Law on the Local Self-government (amended 
in December 2007) are more in favor of communal self-governance compared to the 
previous law from 2002. The new law will support municipalities to delegate more 
responsibilities (and resources) to MZs and to strengthen their capacities to become a 
genuine representative of the citizens and a reliable utility service provider as well. In rural 
communities, the establishment of a communal self-government is obligatory; prior to 
establishing MZs, municipality should consult with the relevant community about what 
municipal responsibilities may be assigned to MZs.  
In the last few years, municipalities devolved some responsibilities, together with 
general budget resources, to MZs, particularly in rural areas: implementation of small 
investment projects, management of youth centers or kindergartens, health campaigns, 
trainings for start-up businesses, etc. 
In the political processes, rural MZs in Serbia still are severely underrepresented. Until 
2002, villages were the constituencies of the municipal councilors, so they created solid 
and permanent links between members of the municipal assembly and their voters. It was 
the period when MZs were substantially involved in the local decision-making process. 
With the introduction of proportional local elections rules, many villages and 
communities have been left without proper representation in the local assembly. 
Some municipalities succeeded to overcome this problem and to efficiently include MZ 
representatives in the political processes by involving MZs  in the decision-making process, 
for example, in the first round of the public hearings on the budget, development of 
strategic plans, or the adoption of a new MZ by-law. 
A good starting point for the future activities on the reform of the MZs in Serbia would 
be a comprehensive analysis on the organization and functioning of local communities 
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internationally, as well as an even more in-depth analysis of the work of local communities 
in Serbia, and a collection and analysis of the good practices from the municipalities that 
have already been implemented.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In almost all local self-governments in Serbia, old normative and administrative models 
of communal self-governance or mesna zajednica still exist as a single manifestation of 
communal self-representation, with a council (savet) of the mesna zajednica (MZ) as a 
major decision-making authority. A previous Law on Local Self-government (adopted 
in February 2002) did not encourage cities and municipalities to take steps towards the 
establishment of the new systems of the communal self-governance. In the period of 
February 2002 to December 2007 (when the previous law was in force), some Serbian 
municipalities were courageous and innovative enough to establish new practices in 
communal self-governance (i.e., to encourage MZs to introduce the “president of the 
communal self-government” as a executive authority; to devolve some original respon-
sibilities to communal self-government; to transfer certain revenues for performing the 
devolved responsibilities; to introduce clear and objective criteria for the joint funding 
of investment projects; and to include MZs in the budget hearings, etc.).1
After the adoption of the new Serbian Constitution, in October 2006, the subsequent 
process of parliamentary elections in January, and formation of a new government in 
May 2007, the new Ministry of the Public Administration and Local Self-government 
(MPALSG) announced the recent adoption of four pieces of legislation on local self-
government: the Law on Local Self-government, the Law on Territorial Organization, 
the Law on the City of Belgrade, and the Law on Local Elections. All four laws were 
adopted at a session of the National Assembly on December 29, 2007. More inventive 
legislative solutions in the new Law on Local Self-government would likely encourage 
the often passive and disappointed population to again utilize (as they did twenty 
years ago) communal self-governance mechanisms for participation in the municipal 
decision-making process, oversight of the work of the municipal bodies (i.e., budget 
spending), and assure a better quality of utility services in the traditionally underserved 
rural settlements/villages. 
Encouragingly, provisions of the new Law on the Local Self-government will be more 
in favor of communal self-governance compared with the previous law from 2002. The 
changes proposed by the new law will encourage proactive municipalities to delegate 
more responsibilities (and resources) to MZs and to strengthen their capacities to become 
genuine representatives of the citizens, as well as a reliable utility service provider. The 
new law mandates that in rural communities the establishment of a communal self-
government will be obligatory (it is currently optional for both urban and rural MZs); 
that prior to a MZ’s establishment, decisions on boundaries of the MZ, or dissolution 
of the MZ municipality, should allow for opinions from the relevant community; that 
communal self-government may be authorized to decide at the ﬁrst level of administra-
tive issues; and most importantly, that all municipal responsibilities may be delegated 
to some or to all MZs. 
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One of the most important characteristics of the local governance in Serbia is the size 
of the cities and municipalities as units of local self-government. Serbia (with Vojvodina) 
has 145 units of local self-government with 7.5 million inhabitants. The average number 
of inhabitants in the territory of a unit of local self-government is 50,000. Units of local 
self-government in Serbia are among the largest local self-government units in Europe.2 
The average area of a Serbian municipality encompasses 610 square kilometers. The 
average number of the community governments within the municipalities is 28. The 
largest number of MZs in one unit of self-government is 142 (the city of Leskovac). 
The average number of inhabitants per MZ is 1,622. 
Table 1. 
Basic Information on Communal Self-government in Serbia
Local 
self-governments
Number 
of MZs
Size of MZ 
(population, area, settlements covered)
Central Serbia 100 + 
23 (city municipalities)
3,569 Average area 15 km2
MZ covers one settlement
Average number of inhabitants 1,520
Vojvodina 45 563 Average area 38 km2
MZ covers 0.82 settlements
Average number of inhabitants 3,575
City of Belgrade 18 307 Average area 10 km2
MZ covers 2 settlements
Average number of inhabitants 5,201
Republic of 
Serbia, total
145 4,132 Average area 19 km2
MZ covers 1.3 settlements
Average number of inhabitants 1,622
Kosovo3 29 453 Average area 24 km2
MZ covers three settlements
Average number of inhabitants NA
Source: “Municipalities in Serbia in 2006,” Republic of Serbia Statistical Oﬃce.
1.1 Historical Origins of Community Self-representation in Serbia 
Citizens’ self-governance in Serbia has a long history dating back to the eighteenth 
century. Under the Ottoman Empire, and based on the legal rules established by the 
Sultan/Porta, self-government was granted to local people on three levels: the settle-
ment (selo), a group of the settlements (knezevina), and the district (nahija). Up until 
1801, there were no visible Ottoman administrators in Serbian villages and settle-
ments. The local settlement administrator (seoski knez), and the village administrator 
(knezinski knez) performed various administrative and judicial functions, maintained 
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order in villages, and protected villagers from the arbitrariness of the Ottoman rulers. 
Settlement and village administrators were elected by the villagers through popular 
vote. In Ottoman decrees (fermans) sent by the Sultan to Serbian Prince (knez) Milos 
in 1816, the Sultan did not mention “self-government” granted to the Serbian villagers, 
just “certain privileges.” However, in practical implementation, those privileges were 
turned into a very substantial set of rights. At the level of the settlement/village, those 
privileges were as follows: villagers were granted the right to collect taxes by themselves 
(danak); Serbian village leaders/administrators (knezovi), elected by the popular vote, 
adjudicated disputes and criminal oﬀences jointly with the Turkish judges (muselims); 
and, most importantly, timariot lords (spahije) were prevented from imposing an excessive 
cash rent for use of the sultan’s land. Villages still were responsible for some duties as a 
community, and had to contribute labor to the lord’s estate. In Belgrade, local people 
established the Peoples’ Oﬃce (Narodna kancelarija) as the highest administrative and 
judicial self-governing body.4
After the ﬁrst and second Serbian Uprising (1804–1813, and 1815) and especially 
after 1830, when Serbia was ﬁnally oﬃcially recognized as a vassal principality, with 
Ottoman inﬂuence much reduced and with Miloš Obrenović as its ﬁrst hereditary ruler, 
the establishment of the Serbian autonomous central organs and its gradual centralization 
began. From 1862, municipalities were submitted under the supervision of the police 
bodies. The police were authorized to dismiss and even punish municipal and village 
authorities. A more liberal constitution from 1888, and the Law on Municipalities 
from 1889, introduced a three-tier local self-government (at the regional, district, and 
municipal level) and granted the right to local self-government to establish judicial 
organs and police/enforcement bodies. Municipalities were entitled to have property 
and their own tax revenues. 
After the First World War, the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians 
introduced broad autonomy to the 33 districts (oblasti). The Law on Self-government 
in Districts and Regions was enacted in 1922 (Zakon o oblasnoj i sreskoj samoupravi), 
which also contained certain guarantees for village communal self-representation. After 
the assassination of Stjepan Radic in 1928, the member of Parliament and the Croatian 
Peasant Party leader, Alexander I. Karadjordjevic, dismissed the Parliament, abolished 
the Constitution and political parties, and completely centralized the state territorial 
organization. Instead of 33 districts, nine administrative units (banovina) were introduced 
and any notion of decentralization was abolished. Although Alexander I announced the 
end of the dictatorship in 1931, and proclaimed a new Constitution, he kept power in 
his own hands until his 1934 assassination in Marseilles.  
After the Second World War, from 1945–1950, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
resembled all other eastern communist states under Soviet political dominance. The state 
was constructed as a monolith centralized structure, with the territorial units granted 
merely administrative functions. Two years after the breakup of the political alliance with 
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the Soviet Union, in 1950, Yugoslavia’s leadership introduced the new political concept 
of political governance for a complex federal state (social self-management/drustveno 
samoupravljanje). This new system was embodied in an extensive and complicated set 
of institutions responsible for representing the interests of citizens at the local level 
and addressing their needs in a broad range of areas. Under social self-management, 
municipalities were the basic socio-political communities (territorial units). They were 
responsible for the self-management of all public functions in their area. To enable them 
to carry out these functions eﬀectively, the municipalities were progressively expanded 
in size from the 1950s onwards, until, by 1991, they had an average of almost 50,000 
inhabitants. 
After becoming too large, the municipalities were no longer able to play an eﬀec-
tive role in local self-government. Local functions were progressively assumed by the 
submunicipal level of government: local communities (mesne zajednice), which exercised 
authority delegated to them by the municipality. At that time, the submunicipal level of 
the government was an integral part of the political system. Important political decision-
making and administrative power was vested in the MZs, and integrated with business 
entities and public services through the complicated system of “self-management interest 
communities” (samoupravne interesne zajednice). For example, MZ boards appointed 
the members/delegates for the chamber of the MZs in the municipalities. 
After the introduction of the new Constitution of the Republic of Serbia in 1990, 
a series of laws were enacted, gradually changing the system of public administra-
tion, including local government. At that time, the process of social transition did 
not include decentralization. Contrary to this international trend in governance, the 
Serbian state pursued a process of high centralization in the early 1990s, and many 
powers were consolidated by the state. This process was viewed by external observers as 
a nation-state building process. Communal self-government gradually lost its political 
signiﬁcance and democratic potential, and was perceived as a sole ideological remnant 
of the former socialist system. A gradual revival of communal self-governance started 
with the adoption of the Law on Local Self-government in 2002. But the law did not 
provide an ideal legal framework for the revitalization of communal self-governance. 
Nonetheless, good practices in some municipalities and vital, proactive citizens in some 
MZs, contributed to the reform process, particularly in rural areas. In rural communities, 
mesna zajednicas remained an important tool in bringing local government even closer 
to citizens. Citizens usually elect the leadership of mesna zajednica and rely on their 
representatives to express the unique concerns and requirements that face the speciﬁc 
area. In some Serbian municipalities, communal self-governments are active and strong 
enough to provide a framework for very eﬀective citizen participation, and to provide 
crucial utility services to frequently underserved citizens. 
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2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 MZ as Communal Self-representation 
In the system established by the new Law on Local Self–government, from December 
2007, mesna zajednica represent a form of local community government (submunicipal 
governance) in the urban and rural municipalities, where citizens express their needs 
and issues that are important to them. 
In the rural areas, MZs are now an obligatory form of submunicipal government. 
That is the main diﬀerence between the system embodied in the previous law (enacted 
in 2002) and the new system. Mesna zajednicas, and other forms of community self-
government, must be established in the villages. In divisions of urban settlements (area, 
district, zone, etc.), the establishment of MZs and other forms of the communal self-
government is optional. In rural settlements, the mesna zajednica is usually set in one 
village or a group of smaller villages with some geographical features (their proximity, 
natural boundaries like valleys, rivers, hill ranges, etc.) and demographic features (popu-
lation, language, ethnic origin, etc.) in common. 
The Law on Local Government from December 2007 does not stipulate the form(s) 
of communal self-government. The municipality is authorized to decide upon the estab-
lishment and abolishment of the local communities and other forms of the communal self-
government. All other issues like the election of the bodies of the communal self-govern-
ment, responsibilities of the unit, and ﬁnancing (other than transfers from municipal 
level) are to be deﬁned by a statute of the unit of self-government in accordance with the 
laws and statutes of the municipality. In this way, the forms of mesna samouprava may 
vary, as they have a diﬀerent structure, manner of election, decision-making procedure, 
competence, territory covered, factual inﬂuence, size, and available funds.
The new Law on the Local Self-government of December 2007 again established 
the right of the citizens to be informed and consulted on the establishment and disso-
lution of the MZ. In Serbia, units of the community self-government traditionally are 
not considered to be legal entities under public law (they are not territorial units and 
elements of the “territorial organization of the state”). The Law on Local Self-govern-
ment proclaims that MZs have the status of the “legal persons” with legal capacity in 
compliance with the statute and acts on incorporation. This status of the legal entity is, 
in most cases, similar to the status of the association of citizens. As a legal entity (person) 
they have all appropriate attributes: they are allowed to sign contracts, use an oﬃcial 
stamp, manage a bank account, associate with other community self-governments, to 
be a party in civil and commercial litigations (to sue and to be sued), and so on. 
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2.2 Property of the MZs 
Since mesna zajednicas are not part of the territorial organization of the state—they are 
autonomous forms of citizens’ self-representation—and, consequently, their property 
should be considered private, and not in the public realm. The mesna zajednicas are 
awarded, in compliance with a lawfully-deﬁned general status of a legal person, the right 
of disposal of the assets that serve them for the regular performance of their work. Aside 
from the right of disposal, MZs in Serbia enjoy the right to hold and utilize real estate 
items, as well as the right to oﬀer the asset for use and/or lease, as well as possessing 
certain limited jurisdictions in the domain of management of utility infrastructure and 
natural resources (village grasslands). MZ property (buildings, utility infrastructure) 
has been ﬁnanced mainly by the mobilization of citizen funds (a self-contribution fee, 
called samodoprinos). 
In Serbia, the voluntary fee or tax is a unique form that is public revenue if collected 
on the whole territory of the municipality. However, it may be collected on the territory 
of the MZ and in that case, the Public Tax Oﬃce is not obliged to administer collec-
tion. The self-contribution fee is voluntary because citizens vote (by referendum) on 
the self-imposed voluntary fee on themselves for certain (usually but not necessarily 
investment) purposes proposed by the Municipal Assembly (i.e., constructing a new 
school, hospital, public road, etc.). When a majority of citizens votes in favor of the 
voluntary tax, it becomes mandatory and it obliges all citizens, including those who 
voted against it or did not vote at all. The basis for calculation of the self-contribution 
fee may be a salary (usual) but also income gained from agriculture, income generated 
from real estate property, etc.  
3. LEGITIMACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
3.1 Political Representation at the Municipal Level
The Law on Local Elections in Serbia, adopted in December 2007, retained the same 
proportional election system as a previous law (from 2002). Article 7 stipulates that 
the election of councilors shall be conducted in a municipality as the electoral unit 
(municipality as a single constituency) and that councilor mandates shall be distributed 
between the electoral lists in proportion to the number of votes won by each electoral 
list. In the last six years, it became common practice that municipal assembly members 
represent their political parties rather than citizens. 
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This practice gradually led to the situation where most villages were underrepre-
sented in the decision-making process. Political parties are “owners” of the lists—they 
nominate lists of their candidates. In this manner, citizens are denied the right to know 
for whom they vote. Instead, they vote for the political option they support, meaning 
for a leader of political party whose name may be on the list. It is diﬃcult for groups 
of citizens to propose their own candidates.
Proportional election of representatives/councilors led to a situation where many 
villages and communities have been left without representatives in the local assembly. 
Having a municipality as a single constituency does not leave much room for adequate 
citizen’s representation at the grass-roots’ level. Rural settlements inside the municipality 
have even lost the opportunity to be constituencies/electoral units, that is, to be politi-
cally represented by their own members in the municipal assembly. This proportional 
system oﬀers no guarantees for equal and non-discriminative representation of the rural 
settlements. That is, every municipality/city has a clearly outlined periphery (usually 
villages), whose problems are usually underestimated. 
There is a real danger that the largest settlement unit may dominate the decision-
making process, leading to ﬁnancial and economic development policies biased in 
favor of the central/urban part of the municipality. According to the data collected in 
Vojvodina,5 approximatly 80 percent of the councilors came from the administrative 
seat/largest settlement of the municipality, and a large number of the villages and settle-
ments at the periphery were not represented at all. 
This proportional local election system practically eliminated the direct link between 
citizens and their councilors. Until 2002, settlements and villages were the constitu-
encies/electorates for the election of the members of the municipal assemblies, which 
created solid and permanent links between members of the municipal assembly and their 
voters. According to the opinion of the majority of MZ representatives interviewed in 
the past few years, it was the period when MZs were substantially involved in the local 
decision-making process. Usually, members of the municipal assembly (councilors), 
who were residing in the territory of the MZ, regularly attended MZ council meetings 
and actually represented genuine interests of their MZ at the assembly meetings. This 
worked very well, especially in rural areas. For example, some MZs organized a weekly 
open day for citizens with the councilor elected from their constituency. 
In the process of the decision-making, most municipalities in Serbia do use mesna 
zajednicas as a vehicle for assuring public participation in the decision-making process. 
In Zrenjanin, Kragujevac, Subotica, and other municipalities, mesna zajednicas have 
been involved for years in the decision-making process pertaining to some municipal 
issues (e.g., budget process, strategic development plans, adoption of a new MZ by-law, 
etc.) to some extent. 
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Box 1.
The Case of Smederevska Palanka 
In Smederevska Palanka, some MZs adopted the statutory rule that municipal councilors, who 
reside on the territory of the MZ, become ex oﬃcio (by position) members of MZ council, but 
without voting rights. In Zrenjanin, municipal assembly materials (documents prepared for the 
sessions of the municipal assembly) that are of direct interest of the citizens are being sent to all 
mesna zajednicas before the session of the municipal assembly. This practice still has its short-
comings. The municipal administration is not obliged to send materials in a timely fashion, and 
leaves the MZ councils inadequate time for the mesna zajednicas to submit recommendations 
or suggestions.
Source: The Future Agenda of Communal Self-governance in Serbia, Mesna Zajednica as a More Eﬀective 
Voice of Citizens, Findings, and Recommendations for the SLGRP, and the Standing Conference 
of Town and Municipalities, Belgrade 2005.
In order to establish a permanent link between the municipality and MZs, and to 
strengthen the operational and managerial capacities of the MZs, some municipalities 
have established councils as formal advisory bodies to the municipal assembly. Advisory 
councils are responsible for tracking and analyzing the position and roll of local commu-
nity government; providing advice and assistance to MZs upon their request; reviewing 
the annual ﬁnancial reports and reports on the work of the MZ from the previous year; 
proposing the budget; as well as preparing ﬁnancial reports of urban and rural local 
communities; and for making proposals for improvement of the local community. In 
some municipalities, these advisory bodies are also responsible for proposing instru-
ments and measures for assuring the harmonized development of the all urban and rural 
settlements (communal and infrastructure development projects). 
Box 2.
The Case of Krusevac and Zrenjanin
In Krusevac, the advisory board/commission is composed of ﬁve councilors (assembly members) 
and four citizens. The tasks of the commission include: the organization of meetings of all MZ 
representatives; the coordination of activities that are of interest for many or all MZs within the 
municipal territory; the organization of public hearings in mesna zajednicas, involving mesna 
zajednica in the development of the new ordinances, MZ by-laws, and rule books, etc. The 
commission for cooperation with MZs in Krusevac has developed a very innovative, participa-
tive mechanism for the involvement of mesna zajednicas in the form of a new MZ ordinance. In 
the ﬁrst phase, a draft MZ ordinance was sent to all mesna zajednicas for their feedback. In the 
second phase, ﬁve public hearings, covering all communal self-governments, were held, in order 
to discuss the draft MZ ordinance. The commission for cooperation with MZs was responsible 
for this process. Two members of the commission were present at each public hearing. Comments 
and suggestions were incorporated into the draft MZ ordinance.
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In Zrenjanin, members of the board for cooperation with the MZs are councilors/
members of the municipal assembly. The main task of this board is to monitor the work 
of mesna zajednicas and their relationship with the municipal assembly, and to propose 
policy recommendations to the municipal assembly. This body is entitled to review 
(prior to the municipal assembly session) reports submitted by the local communities 
on their work in the territory of the given municipality. 
Advisory bodies may play a very important role as a liaison between mesna zajednicas 
and the municipal assembly, mayor, and municipal administration. Advisory boards 
for cooperation with the MZs in many municipalities serve as a policy and advisory 
mechanism that monitors the functioning of the whole system of the MZs, their actual 
level of involvement in the decision-making process, capacities, assess their needs, and 
detects potential areas for municipal ﬁnancial intervention, as well as other types of 
assistance. However, the mere existence of the board does not necessarily mean that 
this institutional link will assure the desired quality of communication between the 
municipality and MZs. 
Box 3.
Meetings of MZs
In some municipalities there exists the practice of organizing a meeting of all mesna zajednica 
representatives. They are organized on a regular or ad-hoc basis. In Krusevac, for example, a meeting 
of all MZ councils is organized by the president of the commission for MZ work and revitaliza-
tion. All chairmen of MZ councils, municipal department heads, directors of public utilities, the 
MZ coordinator, and some other municipal staﬀ are usually invited. Typical topics are communal 
infrastructure, the future role of MZs, culture and sports activities, etc. The Municipality of 
Krusevac organizes three levels of joint meetings of mesna zajednica representatives—general 
meetings of all mesna zajednica (organized usually on an ad-hoc basis), topical meetings of groups 
of mesna zajednica representatives (for joint issues), and individual ﬁeld meetings in MZs. 
Source: Interview with the municipal oﬃcials of the municipality of Krusevac, November 2007.
Apart from the advisory bodies of the municipal assembly, in most Serbian munici-
palities there exist departments for MZ aﬀairs as a part of the municipal administration. 
The departments are usually responsible for providing technical and administrative 
services (including book keeping, accounting, etc.) for all mesna zajednica. In smaller 
municipalities, there is usually one municipal staﬀ member responsible for MZ aﬀairs. 
However, it is usually not a full-time position. For example, in smaller rural munici-
palities, there is one municipal staﬀ responsible for mesna zajednica and the registry of 
voters at the same time. However, there are municipalities that have yet to introduce 
such a position into their administration. 
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3.2 Political Representation at the MZ Level 
History has shown that electorate in the MZ were equally dissatisﬁed with the old-
fashioned method of election, when members of the MZ council were elected at the 
citizens’ assemblies (with no quorum requirements and with the possibility that ten 
people present at the assembly entirely usurp the election process). It is similar in the 
new system, where the election process has been seized and monopolized by political 
parties. Thus, recent results of the survey on citizen participation in the work of the MZs 
in Serbia, conducted in 2006 by the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESiD), 
has shown that 78 percent of the citizens were not involved in a single activity organized 
by their local MZ. About 12 percent of citizens are involved in “at least one activity,” 
seven percent are involved in some activities, and three percent are very active.6
Figure 1.
Citizen Participation in MZ Activities
3.3 Election Process
In the majority of Serbian municipalities, municipal ordinances on communal self-
governance regulate elections in the MZs in a very detailed manner, and thus MZs do 
not have any room left to autonomously decide (by MZ statute) on certain elements of 
the procedure for the election of the MZ bodies. These niches available to MZs are, for 
example: the regulation of quorum requirements, establishment of procedure for the 
ﬁrst and second round of elections, prohibition of party nominations on the ballots if 
the municipality does not provide for that prohibition in its ordinance on MZs, etc. 
Moreover, it is widely-accepted practice that the municipal administration (usually the 
Department for General Administration Issues) prepares the model MZ statute—which 
78% of citizens 
not involved in MZ activities
12% of citizens 
involved in at least one activity
7% of citizens 
involved in some activities
3% of citizens very active
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is submitted to all MZs within the municipality, and which is in line with the municipal 
vision of the MZs’ role and inﬂuence. This means that, almost without exception, all MZs 
within the same municipal jurisdiction have very similar (if not the same) statutes. 
The council members are usually elected by citizens’ assemblies or through general 
elections. If the MZ councils are elected at citizens’ assemblies, the minimum quorum 
requirement for elections to be held corresponds with the minimum quorum for the 
convening of the citizens’ assemblies. The average turnout at these elections is usually 
very low—in the 2004 elections, the average turnout for the elections for the MZ 
councils was about 23 percent.7 Usually, the municipal election commissions did not 
pay attention to irregularities that occurred in the election process for the MZ bodies, 
and in most cases, these elections were a mere formality. The major shortcoming of 
holding elections at the citizen assemblies is usually the usurpation of local community 
functions by council members. MZ councils elected by the citizens assembly often lack 
a basic legitimacy, as the vast majority of local community residents usually do not vote 
because they simply have not been informed about elections.  
3.4 Role of the MZs in Multiethnic Municipalities
As a general rule, in almost all ethnically mixed municipalities in Serbia (Vojvodina, 
Sandzak, and in Presevo Valley) communal self-governments are created as ethnically 
integrated communities, along ethnic, linguistic, and cultural lines. As MZs in those 
municipalities are usually included in the decision-making process (budget public hear-
ings, joint ﬁnancing of infrastructure projects, etc.), ethnic diversity and transparency 
of the decision-making process is usually assured through inclusion and participation 
of the MZs with the minority population. 
Moreover, ethnically integrated MZs represent a signiﬁcant tool for power sharing 
and conﬂict prevention at the local level. This solution is also considered an acceptable 
compromise between the main political groups (for example, in Presevo Valley, between 
the ethnic Albanians and Serbs). The establishment of a properly functioning mesna 
zajednicas would make for enhanced self-government within the ethnic communities, 
ideally, with due regard for the territorial integrity of Serbia, and would enable integra-
tion into Serbian political and territorial structures. 
Problems with discrimination in the delivery of services within some settlements, 
and structural arrangements at the local level favoring the interest of one ethnic group, 
can be overcome only in municipalities that introduced clear criteria for disbursement 
of the MZ investment projects, and include representatives of the MZs in the process 
of the disbursement of funds. In these municipalities, small investment projects are 
excluded from the general investment plans prepared by utility companies. As utility 
companies and members of the municipal committees (for urban planning or municipal 
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development) usually work in a seemingly neutral way, these practices usually result in 
biased land allocation and zoning procedures that favor the further urbanization of the 
“majority” settlements and push the poor to further ghettoization and isolation. 
Members of the specialized municipal or governmental committees working on 
the policy solutions are often members of the dominant ethnic group, and oppose the 
participation of representatives of other groups in their work. Moreover, in cases when 
the experts delegated to the given committees by the (local) government are nominees 
of dominant political parties, they will again belong to the dominant groups (espe-
cially if parties are structured along ethnic lines). In several Serbian municipalities, this 
problem was partially addressed by the creation of a special unit for supporting small 
investment projects, such as the construction and modernization of local roads and 
sewage systems, as initiated by MZs. Members of this special unit are representatives of 
all the major ethnic communities living in the municipality. Basically, MZs are setting 
priorities concerning the development/reconstruction of the settlements, public utility 
services, local roads, etc. After approval of the project, they have the right to contract 
for infrastructure directly with construction companies. The money is then transferred 
from the municipality to the construction company. 
Box 4.
The Case of Multiethnic Presovo
Since 2003, the multiethnic municipality of Presevo (90 percent Albanian, eight percent Serb, two 
percent Roma and others) has been organizing budgetary public hearings in the communal self-
governments on their budget. They plan and perform a series of activities in all local communities 
regarding the budget. Citizen attendance is always very high. The only way to increase citizen 
participation and involvement in the public hearings was to convince them that their ideas were 
taken into consideration (Presevo municipality usually use public gatherings/citizens’ assemblies, 
surveys, radio, and TV programs). The municipality organizes a public hearing in MZs not only 
in the ﬁrst phase of budget preparation (when gathering and prioritizing of the proposals), but 
also in the second phase of the budget drafting. 
Source: The Future Agenda of Communal Self-governance in Serbia, Mesna Zajednica as a More Eﬀective 
Voice of Citizens, Findings and Recommendations for the SLGRP and the Standing Conference 
of Town and Municipalities, Belgrade 2005.
3.5 Accountability of the Community Leadership
Despite these rather isolated eﬀorts, municipal and communal leaders enjoy worry-
ingly low support.8 CESID (the Center for Free Elections and Democracy, a well-
known Serbian NGO specializing in strategic analysis and monitoring of elections), 
recently organized a poll by interviewing 1,310 citizens in 92 Serbian municipalities. 
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This poll showed that public health institutions, church, schools, and even police 
enjoy a much higher level of the public conﬁdence in comparison with the muni-
cipalities and communal self-government. More than 80 percent of the interviewed 
citizens did not have any conﬁdence or had little conﬁdence in the representatives of 
the municipalities and MZs. For example, 74 percent of interviewed citizens did not 
have any conﬁdence in their municipal oﬃcials, 65 percent did not have any conﬁ-
dence at all in municipal administration, and 73 percent of the citizens did not have 
conﬁdence in the MZs and MZ council representatives. The most important element 
of the analysis is fact that citizens have the lowest conﬁdence in the elected municipal 
and MZ oﬃcials. Citizens have slightly higher conﬁdence in public enterprises and 
municipal administration. 
In 2005–2007, in several Serbian municipalities, the network of NGOs tried to 
increase the participation of ordinary citizens in public aﬀairs at the level of the MZ, 
and to decrease the distrust and apathy of the electorate. Those NGOs monitored the 
accomplishments of the municipalities and MZs on very pragmatic matters for ordinary 
citizens like: the budgetary process, budget expenditures, the use or misuse of public 
funds, and subsidies from the municipal budgets, etc. Results of these “budget watching” 
activities were interesting:
 • First, citizens are disappointed with the non-transparent management of the 
funds in some of the MZs. For example, in some MZs only 10 percent of the 
money collected for the agreed purpose was used for that purpose. 
 • Second, mismanagement in the some MZs, partially due to the partisan way 
these bodies are elected, turned them into self-interested groups, isolated from 
the needs of the citizens, which decreased citizens’ conﬁdence in the MZs, and 
have made them the single, lowest level of power at the local level.
These results point to a dangerous disconnect between citizens and the authorities, 
and suggest that all institutions of the local self-government, including communal self-
governance bodies, aside from having to strive to improve their own work, need to pay 
much more attention to ways in which they seek to gain citizens’ trust. Helpful steps 
might include a strict adherence to the Law on the Free Access to Information of Public 
Importance, a timely and adequate response to any doubt about the legality of their 
work, and perhaps most important of all—explaining the results of the decision-making 
process and engaging citizens and experts in the process of preparing these decisions (in 
the form of public hearings). 
An indicator of the level of citizens’ mis(trust) in these institutions also encompasses 
their views regarding the extent to which certain bodies or groups abide by regulations, or 
to what extent those bodies are inclined to corruption themselves. The responses suggest 
that only a small number of citizens believe that institutions are generally predisposed to 
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perform their work according to the law. Over half of the respondents think that many 
important institutions never abide by the law, or do so only when it suits them (53.7 
percent hold this view of the Serbian Parliament, 54.1 percent of the government, and 
50.9 percent of their own local authorities).
4. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
4.1 Submunicipal Government and the Mesna Kancelarija
In Serbian villages mesna kancelarija’s (MKs), as deconcentrated organs of the municipal 
administration, play the role of basic “citizens’ assistance centers” (in fact, they are 
predecessors of the citizens’ assistance centers in Serbia), and provide basic services 
to citizens in villages distant from the municipal urban/administrative center (i.e., 
issuing birth certiﬁcates, citizenship certiﬁcates, etc.). In those rural areas, there are 
mesna kancelarijas that play the role of a branch (deconcentrated unit) of the municipal 
Department of General Administration and provide relevant services for citizens. 
Mesna kancelarija usually conduct functions of the local self-government within the 
competencies of municipal administration, as well as conduct the entrusted functions 
of state administration, and create prerequisites that would make the performance of 
those activities more eﬃcient and much closer to citizens’ residence. In urban areas, 
mesna kancelarijas are usually not established (the city of Nis is an exception, as there 
are no MZs). It is stipulated that citizens in urban areas may submit all their requests 
directly at the municipal hall. 
Mesna kancelarija is not a genuine form of the citizens’ participation at the village 
level and provides only administrative services. However, MKs can provide for admin-
istrative services to the MZ as well (oﬃce facility, telephone, copying, internet) and 
thus make work of the MZ more eﬃcient. 
The previous Law on Local Self-government from 2002 did not allow for munici-
palities to devolve some entrusted functions of state administration to MZs (issuing 
birth certiﬁcates or citizenship certiﬁcates). Therefore, those entrusted functions were 
conferred, in most cases, to mesna kancelarijas. The new Law on Local Self-administra-
tion does not make a distinction between the original and entrusted functions of local 
governments—all municipal functions may be devolved to MZs. 
 Article 80, paragraph 1 of the new law reads as follows: “A municipality and/or city 
may by decision devolve to all or particular local communities certain tasks from the 
purview of local self-government unit, with provision of required funds.” 
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The provision of the previous law from 2002 was much narrower: “A municipality 
and/or city may by decision devolve to all or particular local communities certain tasks 
from the original purview of local self-government unit, with provision of required 
funds.” 
This signiﬁcant change will allow municipalities more ﬂexibility in deciding which 
MZs will be given the possibility to perform virtually all administrative services for 
citizens in distant settlements. That practically means that the function of the dislo-
cated/branch oﬃces of the municipal administration (citizens’ assistance centers) in the 
future may be conferred not only to MKs but also the MZs. This will inevitably lead 
to the amalgamation of the MKs and MZs in the rural areas (or the abolishment of the 
mesna kancelarijas). 
Functions of the mesna kancelarija that may be delegated to the mesna zajednica under 
the new Law on the Local Self-government (“sample responsibilities”) encompass: 
 • performing all administrative and technical activities connected to introducing 
and conducting the self-contribution tax, as well as organizing a referendum;
 • informing citizens on the competencies and scope of activities of the city admin-
istration bodies;
 • maintaining the registry of birth certiﬁcates, marriage, and death certiﬁcates, 
and issuing those certiﬁcates; 
 • maintaining the citizenship registry; 
 • issuing certiﬁcates and oﬃcial documents from the oﬃcial registry; to certify 
the validity of transcripts, manuscripts, signatures; 
 • making an inventory of the legacy of deceased and missing persons; 
 • submitting death certiﬁcates to the competent courts; 
 • conducting the activities connected to voting lists; 
 • performing other conducting other activities within the competencies of local 
self-government. 
4.2 Responsibilities and Structure of the MZ 
The new Serbian Law on Local Government provides the possibility that activities 
within the original and delegated (conferred from the central level) scope of the local 
self-government responsibilities may be delegated to all or certain local communities 
and other forms of community self-government, by the decision of the assembly of the 
local self-government unit, with the provision of funds required for such activities. Such 
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activities shall be delegated with respect to their direct and everyday importance to the 
population of the local community.
Below is a list of sample responsibilities of mesna zajednica councils based on 
comparative analysis of municipal MZ ordinances within Serbian municipalities:
 • organizing citizens’ assemblies and to solicit citizens’ opinions on signiﬁcant 
issues;
 • launching initiatives for the changing of municipal documents (planning, 
zoning);
 • establishing cooperation with municipal public utilities and review reports on 
their work and their development programs;
 • implementing small infrastructure projects (construction of roads, sidewalks, 
village water-supply systems) ﬁnanced from a self-contribution fee;
 • performing other jobs determined by the constitution, law, and municipal 
statute. 
The role and responsibilities of the rural MZs are not necessarily the same as those 
of the urban ones. Moreover, preferences on how to establish each MZ, and how its 
roles and responsibilities may function in rural MZs, may also diﬀer. MZ councils 
need training and capacity-development assistance to cope with this anticipated task, 
especially if we take into consideration that as of December 27, 2007 (after the enact-
ment of the new Law on Local Self-governance), the establishment of the MZs in the 
rural settlements is obligatory.  
Mesna zajednica in Serbian municipalities usually has the following structure: 
 • Citizens’ assembly (oﬃcial gathering of all citizens with voting rights);
 • MZ council: president, vice-president, and other members (representative body 
of the communal self-government);
 • Other working bodies (e.g., mediation council, supervisory board, etc.); 
 • Secretary of the MZ.
Basically, the structure of the MZ bodies has mirrored the structure of the municipal 
organization set by law. The general structure of the main bodies of mesna zajednica does 
not vary to a great extent. Figure 2 presents the structure of MZ bodies. 
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Figure 2.
Mesna Zajednica Structure in the Municipality of Boljevac
4.2.1 Citizens’ Assembly
The law stipulates citizens’ initiative, citizens’ assemblies, and referenda as forms of 
direct citizen participation in exercising local government. Through citizens’ initia-
tives, citizens can propose to the municipal assembly and city to adopt acts in order 
to regulate some of the issues outside their original powers or to call for a referendum. 
Such an initiative obliges the assembly to hold a hearing on the proposal and provide 
citizens with feedback about its decision. Citizens’ assemblies discuss speciﬁc issues and 
produce proposals on which the municipal assembly forms a position and of which 
it informs the citizens. According to the Law on Local Self-government, the citizens’ 
assembly should debate and present proposals for matters within the authority of the 
local self-government unit. 
The citizens’ assembly should approve the requests and proposals by a majority of votes 
of the citizens attending the assembly, and should communicate them to the municipal 
assembly or the relevant bodies of the local self-government unit. The bodies and serv-
ices of the local self-government unit should consider the requests and proposals made 
by the citizens, and establish an opinion thereon, i.e., make the respective decision or 
devise an appropriate measure, and inform the citizens thereof within 60 days after the 
citizens’ assembly. The procedure for convening the citizens’ assembly, its activities, and 
the manner in which its positions are established should be deﬁned by statute and a 
special decision of the municipal assembly (usually a MZ ordinance and statute/by-law 
of an individual MZ).
The salient topics of citizens’ assemblies are usually related to the budget (ﬁnancial 
plan of the MZ) and issues related to the ﬁnancing of communal infrastructure projects 
(e.g., road reconstruction, water supply, sewage system, etc.). Citizens’ assemblies are 
Mediation Council
President of Mediation Council
Citizens Assembly
MZ CouncilOther working bodies
President of MZ CouncilVice-president of MZ Council
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organized once or twice a year on average. The average turnout at citizens’ assemblies 
varies, depending on the topic at hand, on the individual character of the mesna zajed-
nica, on its activity, etc., (in some mesna zajednicas it is about 12 percent, in some 60 
percent, and in others the turnout is very limited). The average turnout (by percentage) 
is usually higher in rural than in urban mesna zajednicas. When the topic of the citizens’ 
assembly is very important for citizens of a well-deﬁned mesna zajednica, the turnout 
is relatively high. 
There is a minimum quorum needed for a citizens’ assembly to be held and make 
valid decisions. The minimum quorum varies from one municipality to another (ﬁve 
percent of citizens with voting rights in Zrenjanin, 10 percent of citizens with voting 
rights in Razanj, 50 citizens in Smederevska Palanka, two percent in urban MZs, and 
ﬁve percent in the rural MZs in Vrsac, etc.). However, some mesna zajednicas (e.g., in 
Kragujevac) have diﬃculties fulﬁlling the minimum quorum, even for the election of 
the MZ council (speciﬁcally larger urban mesna zajednicas). 
4.2.2 MZ Council 
The key decision-making body at the MZ level is the MZ council. The number of 
members of the MZ council diﬀers from approximately ﬁve to 21 members. In some 
municipalities, the number is based on size of the population. However, in some 
municipalities, a range for the number of MZ members is stated in a MZ ordinance, 
without any criteria. In some municipalities (e.g., Smederevska Palanka), delegates of 
the municipal assembly become automatic members of the MZ council. It has been 
common practice that MZ councils were elected at the citizens’ assemblies (meetings 
of the citizens, zborovi gradjana). Citizens’ assemblies are institutions of direct democ-
racy—like informal citizens’ parliaments.9 
Results of a questionnaire that the Standing Conference of the Towns and 
Municipalities submitted to the municipalities in 2004, to ascertain what percent of the 
Serbian municipalities introduced direct suﬀrage for the MZ bodies, showed that more 
than 40 municipalities now have direct elections for the members of the MZ council 
(approximately one-quarter of Serbian municipalities). Other municipalities still have 
a procedure for the election of the MZ representatives at the citizens’ assemblies. 
4.2.3 MZ Secretary
The existence of the position of MZ secretary depends on each mesna zajednica, and 
its ﬁnancial resources. The MZ secretary should be elected or appointed by the MZ 
council by procedure deﬁned in the MZ statute. The MZ secretary is responsible for 
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administrative and technical matters related to the work of mesna zajednicas, including 
the MZ council. In some municipalities (e.g., Krusevac) heads s of mesna kancelarija also 
perform the role of MZ secretary. In larger municipalities, there is usually one secretary 
in each mesna zajednica, regardless of the size of the MZ.
4.2.4 Other Working Bodies
The MZ council may establish speciﬁc permanent or temporary working bodies, 
including commissions and boards, with the aim of preparing, considering, and solving 
speciﬁc issues within the competencies of the MZ council. Those working bodies vary 
from one mesna zajednica to another. It usually depends on whatever projects are being 
implemented (e.g., the committee for MZ development in MZ Razanj, etc.). 
There are also some MZ working bodies stipulated by MZ ordinances on the 
municipal level—such as a supervisory board in Zrenjanin, a mediation council in 
Boljevac, etc. For example, the MZ supervisory board in Zrenjanin should control the 
legal and eﬀective use and distribution of MZ funds.
5. FUNCTIONS
5.1 Public Service Provision
Public institutions do not have a monopoly on the provision of the public services. It 
is permissible for the local government to devolve the performance of public services 
to other subjects, and not only to public services and public enterprises. These may be 
companies but also include other legal entities, including MZs, as well as entrepreneurs. 
For example, the organization of kindergartens, some social welfare services for the 
elderly, or healthcare activities may be performed as a public service when partly or 
entirely ﬁnanced from the budget and when citizens are entitled to use such services at 
subsidized prices or free of charge. 
5.2 MZs as Operators of Utility Services
If the establishment of the public enterprise is economically sound due to the number 
of users, level of business, or for other reasons, these tasks may be entrusted to a MZ 
(or other private entity, as the position of MZ is equal to the position of other business 
entities or entrepreneurs). There are very rare cases where the municipality legally devolves 
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the right to MZ to perform the utility service by itself. By doing so, the municipality 
assumes the right to include the MZ utility network in its system, to provide auxiliary 
services, to provide the same quality of services as elsewhere, to collect fees on behalf of 
MZ, to invest in improvement of the infrastructure, and to be liable for performance 
of the utility activity. 
There are many cases in which local utility networks (especially water supply and 
irrigation systems) exist in rural areas and are maintained by MZs. However, these works 
are mostly in villages, and are not connected to the larger supply systems. MZ councils 
are usually responsible for the use and management of these networks. Because they are 
not usually part of the complex system of utility services for the whole municipality, the 
municipality tolerates the existence of isolated networks that are in private (MZ) owner-
ship. In the cases where an integration of the systems is necessary—i.e., the municipality 
needs to utilize a natural spring which was previously used by village, the municipality 
automatically transfers all village waterworks systems to the state property used by the 
utility waterworks company. Villages are, even to this day, treated as outer elements 
of the system. Utility enterprises usually do not provide villages with their services as 
though they exist only to meet the needs of urban population; farmers pay lower taxes 
and fees, and for that they seem like they are not part of the taxation system; since they 
do not pay much (taxes and fees), they do not receive many services. For this reason, 
villages have to take care of their own infrastructural and other needs (waterworks, 
roads, graveyards, culture, sports, etc.). 
5.3 MZs as Providers of Social Services
In the ﬁeld of public education, local governments have limited but expanding func-
tions. Municipalities cooperate with schools in developing their curriculum within the 
framework set at the national level. Funding responsibilities are mixed: salaries for the 
teachers and technical staﬀ are funded by the Ministry of Education, and local govern-
ments provide co-funding for teachers’ professional development. Municipalities are 
responsible for school operational and maintenance costs, though they have no owner-
ship over the school premises. 
Currently, MZs are not powerful enough to inﬂuence the quality of education within 
their territory. In multiethnic municipalities, this issue should become more important 
in the future, and MZs should be consulted in the process of proposing to the network 
of schools about the ﬁnancing of education in the minority language in question. The 
municipalities should retain general responsibilities, address regulatory issues, and bear 
the bulk of the administrative costs. MZs should be strengthened to provide input to 
the municipal authorities in order to inﬂuence their decisions, and in the second stage 
they should be aﬀorded extended decision-making powers. 
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Primary healthcare is another issue of crucial concern to the public in Serbia. In 
2004 and 2005, the reform process in the health sector was intensiﬁed. The adoption 
of the Law on Health Insurance and the Law on Healthcare in 2005 accelerated the 
reform of the healthcare system. Obviously, primary healthcare should be provided in 
close proximity to its recipients. There are, however, substantial constraints: healthcare 
is a very costly public service and requires highly-qualiﬁed professional service providers. 
This raises a key question: what is the proper role of MZs in primary healthcare? With 
the decentralization of health services, which continue to be the responsibility of the 
municipalities—especially with regard to the quality of healthcare, staﬃng, supplies, 
etc. —the MZs should be granted an immediate role: responsibility for the maintenance 
of facilities (family health centers, community health centers (“ambulantas”), ﬁrst aid, 
etc.). The MZs should also be responsible for certain preventive health measures and 
health promotion. 
Box 5.
Proactive MZs
Proactive MZs will be more successful in the process of obtaining matching funds 
for infrastructural projects. In the last two years, MZ Lazac, in the Cacak munici-
pality, succeeded in establishing a cooperation with the Republic Directorate for 
the Roads and the Public Enterprise “Western Morava” (for management and 
exploitation of the Morava river). The MZ succeeded in repairing (all ground 
works except asphalt) about seven kilometers of village roads, as well as a main 
road from Lazac to Cacak (1,270 meters). The ﬁnancial resources for all these 
infrastructural improvements have mainly been provided by matching funds 
from citizens (municipal budget, private funds, and some funds appropriated 
by Republic of Serbia, i.e., Republic Directorate for Roads). 
Source: Ibarske, September 29, 2007.
6. FINANCING MZS
6.1 MZ Revenues
As mentioned above, mesna zajednicas in Serbia are not part of the system of public 
administration and do not have the status of legal entities under the public law. Villages 
and neighborhoods in Serbia (organized as MZs) are not allowed to act as legal public 
entities. In 2002, the Ministry of Finance issued its opinion (No. 430-08-43/2002 from 
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May 10, 2002) and clariﬁed that revenues of the MZs are not public revenues as MZs 
are not legal public entities. Consequently, the tax administration is not in charge of 
collection of MZ revenues (i.e., self-contribution fee established for the territory of the 
MZ). At the same time, mesna zajednicas are an indirect budget beneﬁciary (Budget 
System Law, Article 2 (7)), and all municipal budgetary appropriation of the MZs are 
part of the consolidated local treasury system. 
According to the Law on Local Self-government, the funds for the functioning of 
the mesna zajednica shall consist of: 
 • funds deﬁned in the municipal and/or town budget decision, including self-
contribution fee;
 • donations;
 • revenues realized by the local community and/or other form of local self-govern-
ment through its activity.
Very few MZs in Serbia have signiﬁcant own revenues. Some MZs organize certain 
proﬁt-generating activities (like maintaining Internet cafes in the municipality of 
Razanj) and some have buildings that are MZ property and lease the business premises 
for investment purposes. 
6.2 Municipal Transfers 
In the terms of the Law on the Local Finances and Budget System Law, it is clear that 
mesna zajednicas’ revenues are not public revenues. Some municipalities are trying to 
provide suﬃcient ﬁnancial and other resources for optimal performance of the devoluted 
services, not only by providing general transfers to MZs, but also by granting them 
a certain portion of the fees collected on the MZ territory. This type of institutional 
capacity building of the MZs proved to be very successful in those municipalities, as 
it raised the managerial capacities of the MZs, increased its technical skills, advanced 
its planning capacities, and enhanced its accountability to the citizens as they were 
managing funds from their own community. 
However, in June 2007 the Ministry of Finance released a binding opinion and 
restricted right of the municipalities to devolve certain percentages of their taxes and 
fees to the MZs. The ministry stated that MZs are only allowed to receive pre-planned 
appropriations from the municipal budget. Moreover, the practice used by some 
municipalities to earmark some utility revenues for MZ purposes was also forbidden, 
as earmarked revenues are (in the ministry’s interpretation) limited to those explicitly 
mentioned in the sectoral laws (i.e., the Law on Planning and Construction envisages 
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that the land-development charge, land-use charge, and lease to be used solely for land 
development purposes). 
The ministry stated that utility fees are general revenues according to the Law on 
Local Finances, and should not be earmarked for MZ purposes. Thus, municipalities 
were only given limited powers to plan MZ needs in the general budget, to plan appro-
priations to MZs in accordance with the predetermined criteria, and to provide general 
transfers (through annual appropriations) to MZs for operational costs, and also for the 
investment costs, as mentioned above. MZs were interpreted, in the intergovernmental 
sense of the word, as indirect budget beneﬁciaries. They are not allowed to play a more 
signiﬁcant role in the public ﬁnance system—i.e., to be assigned authority to administer 
some fees and taxes or to receive a percentage of some fees or taxes. 
Before the enactment of the 2002 Budget System Law, it was generally accepted 
practice that municipalities assign some of the municipal communal fees to the mesna 
zajednica, which then independently organized the administration and collection of the 
fee from the fee payers, residents of this mesna zajednica, or other users of the service 
covered by the fee. For the local development of mesna zajednica, the following local 
communal fees were usually collected within the territory of individual mesna zajednica, 
and thus became a resource of their annual budgets:
 • using public space in front of business premises for business purposes, except 
for sale of newspapers, books, and other publications, handmade products, and 
other traditional products;
 • keeping gambling and gaming accessories (in temporary, movable facilities);
 • using public space for camping, pitching tents; 
 • occupying public space with construction material, etc.
The collection of assigned revenue, establishment of the criteria for collecting the 
fee, and other questions were arranged through municipal ordinances. The Municipal 
Budget Inspector and other bodies monitored the spending. 
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Box 6. 
Intergovernmental Transfers to MZs
In the municipality of Smederevska Palanka, part of revenues from the wage tax (0.85 percent) 
are directly allocated to the account of the public enterprise “Palanka razvoj” to be used for 
infrastructure maintenance in the town and village, as envisioned by the program for municipal 
construction development, construction and maintenance of utility infrastructure, and invest-
ments in public lighting in the municipality of Smederevska Palanka. The allocation will be based 
on MZ programs which are adopted by the councils of the MZ, and which are submitted to the 
public enterprise “Palanka razvoj.” Revenues that amount to 0.85 percent are allocated to rural 
MZs, according to the population size, and based on the data from the 2002 census. 
 In Vrsac, approximately ﬁve percent of the municipal budget has been allocated to mesna 
zajednicas (approximately RSD 15 million, about RSD 2.4 million for urban MZs, and RSD 
12.8 million for rural MZs). One part of the amount for rural areas (about RSD seven million) 
is used for capital investments and is project based. These funds have been directly transferred 
to the accounts of the construction companies or public enterprises that perform the works. The 
second part is per-capita based and is directly transferred to MZs’ bank accounts. The amount 
(approximately RSD 2.4 million) that is determined for urban MZs is used for operational costs 
(the salaries of MZ secretaries). 
Source: The Future Agenda of Communal Self-governance in Serbia, Mesna Zajednica as a More Eﬀective 
Voice of Citizens, Findings and Recommendations for the SLGRP and the Standing Conference 
of Town and Municipalities, Belgrade 2005.
In some municipalities, an exact portion of the selected fees and charges was 
earmarked and used for investment in the selected villages. In the other words, MZs 
submitted project proposals for investment purposes to the Directorate for City 
Construction, which prioritized these investments projects and allocated any available 
ﬁnancial resources. However, there are diﬀerences in the way funds from the municipal 
budget were allocated to mesna zajednicas. In some municipalities, there are no criteria for 
the distribution of funds to mesna zajednica. Funds are distributed based on individual 
estimates of the concrete proposals.. Even in these municipalities, projects that are co-
ﬁnanced by the mesna zajednica usually have priority (in some municipalities, there are 
unwritten rules as to the level co-ﬁnancing by mesna zajednica needed in order to obtain 
municipal resources, e.g., 50 percent). Some municipalities have introduced innovative 
systems of allocating funds to mesna zajednica based on a number of criteria.
In the process of dividing the responsibilities from municipality to MZ, some 
municipalities are courageous enough to devolve some of the responsibilities to MZs. 
Those municipalities also allocate some of the general budget resources for that purpose 
(general transfers according to the terms of Law on the Local Finances). Other munici-
palities do not have that division of responsibilities and allocate the same level of ﬁnancial 
resources to all MZs, for mere operational expenses, without taking into consideration 
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their diﬀerent responsibilities, previously-implemented investment projects, number of 
staﬀ needed, plans for the future activities, and so on.
Box 7.
Distributing Funds in Subotica
 In Subotica, there are four ways of distributing funds from the municipal budget to mesna 
zajednica. A part of the municipal budget is determined for ﬁnancing administrative and tech-
nical activities according to the following criteria: population size, MZ location in relation to 
the center of the municipality, evaluation of planned activates, property, and collected revenues 
from leasing in the previous year. These funds are distributed directly to MZ bank accounts on a 
monthly basis. Another part of the municipal budget contains resources for co-ﬁnancing the MZ 
self-contribution program of the Program for Construction, Land Preparation, and Arrangement 
of the Construction Fund of the Municipality of Subotica. Those funds are determined for 
those mesna zajednica that have introduced a self-contribution tax. Funds are transferred to MZ 
bank accounts on a monthly basis. Resources are allocated according to the following criteria: 
communal infrastructure equipment, municipal priority, population size, and money received 
from the previous year’s municipal budget . 
 Resources for utility projects were allocated for the MZ program within the Program for 
Construction, Land Preparation, and Arrangement. This resource was introduced after conducting 
an extensive analysis on the subject of investments and their maintenance in MZs from 1996 
to 2006. The analysis showed a large disproportion of investments completed in MZs. In order 
to give support to less developed MZs, and balance their relationship to municipal territory, 
the following criteria have been agreed on: population size, percentage of MZ population in 
the municipality, percentage of MZ population in the group of urban or rural areas, investment 
in repair of IT equipment, investment per capita, allocated funds per value, allocated funds in 
percentages, waterworks, sewage, road surface and sidewalks, education, schools, and others. 
The transfer of those budget resources is done on the basis of individual requests submitted by 
the public enterprise to the Urban Planning Agency in Subotica, and with the consent of the 
Executive Board department member in charge of communal issues. The Urban Planning Agency 
then enters into corresponding agreements with MZs, where general conditions and conditions 
related to professional services performance of the Urban Planning Agency need to be in accor-
dance with the Executive Board and the Managing Board of the Urban Planning Agency. 
 The last resource designated for MZs is granted according to the following criteria: type 
of project, willingness of citizens to contribute money, and the quality of infrastructure. This 
amount is used as a contribution from the municipal budget to MZ projects ﬁnanced by citizens. 
However, as resources transferred from the municipal budget to mesna zajednicas are usually 
very low, the majority of funds of mesna zajednicas are composed of service delivery charges, 
self-contribution taxes, donations from citizens, and other funds obtained by mesna zajednicas. 
The Municipality of Subotica has signed contracts with each particular MZ that specify how 
transfers must be spent, and grants the right to the municipality to perform monitoring of the 
MZ budget expenditures. 
Source: The Future Agenda of Communal Self-governance in Serbia, Mesna Zajednica as a More Eﬀective 
Voice of Citizens, Findings and Recommendations for the SLGRP and the Standing Conference 
of Town and Municipalities, Belgrade 2005.
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Mesna zajednicas usually do have their own bank accounts; however, there are some 
municipalities where MZs do not. MZs usually prepare an annual work plan and budget 
report. In some (usually smaller) municipalities, MZs can enter into legally-binding 
contracts without municipal approval (e.g., Razanj). On the other hand, there are some 
municipalities, where this is not possible (e.g., Smederevska Palanka). Regarding the 
distribution of funds for administrative tasks, some municipalities provide funds for 
administrative tasks to MZs (e.g., on a per-capita basis) and some do not.
The allocation of the transfers for salaries of the MZ employees has usually been 
performed in accordance with a single criteria: the population of the MZ. In accordance 
with this criteria, MZs have been classiﬁed into six groups and a lump-sum transfer 
assures the salaries in those six groups. There is a presumption that employees in those 
MZs that serve a larger population have more work. 
6.3 Voluntary Fee (Self-contribution Tax)
For decades, the voluntary fee has been one of the pillars of local government ﬁnances, 
and an important source of revenue for the lower tier of government (for municipalities 
and MZs, particularly rural ones). Designed as an instrument that could provide ﬂex-
ibility and, to some extent, enable independent local decision-making, it was frequently 
used as the main instrument of ﬁnancing the development of the local utility infrastruc-
ture in villages, as well as the work of municipal branch oﬃces (MKs). 
During recent years, the administration of the voluntary fee has faced diﬃculties. 
For instance, the Tax Revenue Administration, in accordance with the law, is no longer 
responsible for collection in MZs. This practically disables the eﬃcient administration 
of the fee. Furthermore, there are problems in obtaining reliable results from the local 
polls on the voluntary fee and in controlling spending. 
In this section we will take a look at some basic facts regarding voluntary fees in 
Serbia, obtained primarily from a survey conducted in the municipalities during the 
months of June and July 2006. The surveys were conducted jointly by CLDS and the 
Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities. There were 77 municipalities that 
provided responses; since that number makes one half of the total number of local 
government units in Serbia, the survey sample is valid for the entire territory. 
Out of the total number of municipalities in Serbia, 82 percent impose some kind 
of voluntary fee, which means that the voluntary fee is still a popular way of collecting 
funds. Nevertheless, closer analysis shows that the coverage of the territory of Serbia is 
still relatively low. 
Only 14 percent of municipalities are imposing the fee on their entire territory, 
meaning that all of the citizens in a municipality cast a ballot, and they will thus receive 
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some sort of beneﬁt from it. Such a low percent shows that the utility infrastructure needs 
in municipalities are generally met by regular mechanisms, and only some particular 
areas require outstanding measures; the voluntary fee being one of them. 
Figure 3.
The Self-contribution Fee and the Types of Fees That Are Imposed
The number of municipalities that use the voluntary fee to meet the needs of their 
local communities/MZs is signiﬁcantly higher: 39 percent of the municipalities impose 
the fee in at least one urban community, and 66 percent of them in at least one rural 
local community. In brief, the voluntary fee, as a means of collecting funds, is mostly 
used by rural local communities, whereas cities use it only in exceptional cases. 
The voluntary contribution fee is most commonly used for building utility infra-
structure (roads, streets, waterworks, sewer, electricity, gas, etc.) and also for ﬁnancing 
municipal branch oﬃces and buildings important for community life (education, 
healthcare, social assistance). Some municipalities include sports and cultural facilities, 
graveyards, churches, etc. Out of the 63 municipalities that imposed a voluntary fee, only 
24 have no problems with collection; others are facing certain diﬃculties which can be 
classiﬁed into three groups: (1) evasion, (2) lack of cooperation with the Tax Revenue 
Administration, (3) diﬃculty in obtaining fee payers’ information. According to the 
Serbian Law on Tax Procedure and Tax Administration, the revenue from the contribu-
tion fee is not considered public when collected in local communities; consequently, the 
Tax Agency is not obliged to administer, collect, or control the voluntary fee. 
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6.4 Co-financing of Self-contribution Projects 
During the process of the budget preparation, many municipalities designate certain 
funds to be spent for small capital investment projects in MZs. Each year, a public 
enterprise (usually the Directorate for the Land Construction) adopts a plan for capital 
investments. This includes a detailed plan for the small, capital investment projects in 
municipalities. The municipality co-ﬁnances the project with self-contribution revenues 
during the whole life of the project. MZs are obliged to submit to the municipality an 
annual ﬁnancial report on self-contribution project execution.
The allocation of the resources has been executed in accordance with the following 
criteria:
 • current level of the capital infrastructure in relevant zones;
 • alignment with municipal capital improvement priorities (highly scored are 
larger projects which require a smaller amount/percentage of the municipal 
matching funds);
 • large MZs are highly scored;
 • MZs which have been delaying payments (despite the fact that they have been 
receiving the funds in the previous ﬁscal year, they are not likely to receive funds 
for the next ﬁscal year). 
7. PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE REFORM OF MZS
The Law on the Local Self-government, adopted in December 2007, for the ﬁrst time 
changed the basic criteria of the local self-government in Serbia to a monotype structure. 
By providing objective criteria for granting the status of the city and municipality, the 
law opened the possibility for the enlargement of the number of cities and for the devo-
lution of the new original responsibilities to cities.10 The Law on Local Self-government 
does not contain any provision from the previous law that the city needs to be divided 
into two or more city municipalities. 
Consequently, new cities now have the possibility to decide, in their city statutes, on 
the optimal way for the “decentralization within local self-government.” Most probably, 
the majority will decide to strengthen the structure of their MZs, their responsibilities 
and modes of operation (in functional and operational terms), instead of establishing 
city municipalities. Most likely, with the changes of the new sectoral legislation, the 
new responsibilities will be devolved to 19 new cities. There are strong arguments to 
focus attention on new cities and to assist them in developing policies and regulations 
that will strengthen the position of the MZs, and preparing them for the expected new 
transfer of responsibilities. 
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Table 2. 
Cities in Serbia as of January 2008
Cities Number of registered MZs Number of inhabitants Area/km2
1. Belgrade 307 1,576,124 3,222
2. Novi Sad 49 299,294 699
3. Niš — 250,518 597
4. Kragujevac 78 175,802 835
5. Leskovac 142 156,252 1,024
6. Subotica 37 148,401 1,007
7. Zrenjanin 37 132,051 1,326
8. Kruševac 54 131,368 854
9. Pančevo 16 127,162 755
10. Šabac 61 122,893 795
11. Kraljevo 69 121,707 1,529
12. Čačak 69 117,072 636
13. Smederevo 38 109,809 481
14. Sombor 22 97,263 1,178
15. Valjevo 51 96,761 905
16. Vranje 33 87,288 860
17. Loznica 56 86,413 612
18. Sremska Mitrovica 34 85,902 762
19. Novi Pazar 26 85,996 742
20. Užice 31 83,022 667
21. Požarevac 37 74,902 481
22. Jagodina 62 70,894 470
23. Zaječar 46 65,969 1,069
Source: “Municipalities in Serbia in 2006,” Republic of Serbia Statistical Oﬃce.
A good starting point for the future activities on the reform of the MZs in Serbia 
would be a comprehensive analysis on the organization and functioning of local 
communities internationally, as well as an even more in-depth analysis of the work of 
local communities in Serbia, and a collection and analysis of the good practices from 
the municipalities that have already been implemented. Some of the initial proposals 
for the future reform of the rural MZs in Serbia should consider following:
 (i) By the virtue of the Law on Local Self-government, in the rural parts of the 
municipality, local community units may be set up for one or more rural 
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settlements. If a local community (mesna zajednica) is established for several 
rural settlements, it would be beneﬁcial for villages to envisage setting up a 
local board (mesni odbor) in each settlement. 
 (ii) The diﬀering nature of urban and rural local communities is an argument for 
proposing that, in rural communities, a president should be directly elected 
through secret ballot. This proposal should be optional, meaning that each 
rural local community may deﬁne by its statute as to whether the president 
of the community will be directly elected. 
 (iii) Concerning elections for the bodies of the local community (council), it is 
advisable that they be held concurrently with the elections of the members 
of the municipal assembly. Direct, secret ballot is recommended based on 
universal and equal suﬀrage. Candidates should be listed in the alphabetical 
order. The ballots should not contain the name of the political party or a group 
of citizens proposing a candidate.
 (iv) The MZ council should be authorized to propose new municipal regulations 
and changes to the existing ones. Also, they should administer the introduc-
tion of referenda that are held on its territory, in areas of the municipality, in 
the local community, or its environs. The local community council should 
appoint its representative to participate in the citizen assemblies. The councilor 
should participate in the work of the council in the local community of his 
place of residence, without the right to vote. If a local board is established, the 
president of the board is, at the same time, a member of the local community 
council.
 (v) A commission on MZs should be established as a working body of the municipal 
assembly, and be in charge of tracking and analyzing the position and roll of 
the local community government; reviewing the annual report of the president 
of the local community government from the previous year; proposing the 
budget, as well as the ﬁnal statement of urban and rural local communities 
from the previous year; and for making proposals for the improvement of local 
community functioning.
 (vi) The local community council may set up permanent and ad-hoc working bodies, 
like commissions, boards, etc., with the aim of addressing issues relevant to 
the competency of MZ. 
 (vii) The municipality should set up a body for the coordination of the local 
community’s development. Members of the coordination body will be the 
president of the municipality, representatives of communal enterprises, repre-
sentatives of the municipal agency for construction, and representatives of 
the local communities. The main duty of this body would be to discuss issues 
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important to the local communities. The meetings of the body should be at 
least bi-monthly.
 (viii) Transparency and providing citizens with important information should be 
achieved through mandatory public hearings (citizens’ assemblies), organized 
to discuss the draft of municipal budget decisions and ﬁnal statements, work 
reports of the municipal organs, ﬁnancial reports, and ﬁnal statements of the 
local community government. 
 (ix) Local community government should be entitled to manage the assets in 
accordance with its own program and plans. Assets of local community govern-
ments are funds allocated to the local community by the municipality. They 
are provided in the municipal budget and amount to at least two percent of 
the total revenues, less loans. Additionally, a portion of assets are funds which 
are provided by the citizens through the self-contribution fee. The spending of 
the funds should be determined in a ﬁnancial plan and the ﬁnal balance should 
be shown in the ﬁnal statement in accordance to the law. Local community 
government units should have to ﬁle a report no later than March 15 each 
year. This report should show their work and the realization of plans for which 
local communities had funds designated to them by the municipalities. 
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9 Forms of the direct citizens’ participation in the decision-making process in Serbia, stipulated by the 
Law on Local Self-government, is threefold: citizens’ initiative, referendum, and citizens assemblies. 
The referendum is the right of citizens to vote on a decision adopted by the municipal assembly 
and, thus, to decide whether they want to approve or to reject it. The citizens’ initiative is the right 
of citizens to demand, with their signatures, that a speciﬁc proposal is put on the agenda of the 
municipal assembly and to vote about it at the ballot box if that body rejects the demand. Citizens’ 
assembly is an oﬃcial gathering of all citizens with voting right and residence in the same MZ (or 
municipality). The role of the citizens’ assembly may be consultative or it may serve as a electorate 
(electing members of the MZ Council by a simple majority of the citizens present). 
10 A municipality is a “basic territorial unit for realization of the functions of the local self–government 
which is capable of performing local self–government functions independently, and which has more 
than 10,000 inhabitants.” A city is deﬁned as a “unit of the local self–government estabished by law 
which represent economic, administrative, geographic, and cultural center of the wider area and has 
more than 100,000 inhabitants.” On the basis of this criteria, the Law on Territorial Organization 
(from December 2007) increased the number of cities in Serbia from four (Belgrade, Novi Sad, 
Kragujevac, and Nis) to 23. Therefore, 19 municipalities had changed their status, and it is to be 
expected that those municipalities will have new responsibilities in the areas of the public health, 
education, social wellfare, economic development, and so on.
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